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Abstract 
 
 
Studies of memory in the works of William Wordsworth and George Eliot have 
hitherto focussed mainly on individual recollective memory. By contrast, this study 
explores habit-memory in the work of both writers, on both an individual and a 
collective level. It proposes that for Wordsworth as well as for Eliot, habit-memory can 
enhance moral awareness and maintain the cohesion of a community.  
 
The thesis is divided into four chapters. The first discusses ‘The Old 
Cumberland Beggar’, Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda. Drawing on the idea of an 
ethics of memory in the work of the philosopher Avishai Margalit, I argue that the two 
writers regard habit cultivation as an important means of developing a sense of 
universal humanity in their characters as well as in their readers. 
 
The second chapter looks at the relationship between habit and duty through a 
discussion of ‘Ode to Duty’, Silas Marner and Romola. Wordsworth’s notion of duty, a 
universal law governing both the natural and the human world, is different from that of 
Eliot, which is identified with the habitual feelings of the body. Despite this difference, 
both believe that habit can help mould an individual into a duty-bound being.  
 
Chapter Three deals with the relationship between habit and guilt in Book X of 
The Prelude, Adam Bede and ‘Janet’s Repentance’. Rather than looking at guilt over a 
real transgression, it examines what Frances Ferguson terms ‘circumstantial memory’, 
the remorse that occurs when the unforeseen outcome of an action is interpreted as 
though it had been intentional. Wordsworth and Eliot differ in their view of the origin of 
wrongdoings and the pattern of recovery from guilt, but they both believe that this 
recovery can never be complete.  
 
The final chapter shifts from individual to collective habit-memory. Adopting a 
phenomenological approach to habit in discussing ‘Michael’ and The Mill on the Floss, 
I suggest that Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s theory can help us to understand Michael’s and 
Mr. Tulliver’s embodied relationships with their patrimonial land. I also draw on the 
theories of Pierre Bourdieu and Maurice Halbwachs to show that the habitual lives these 
characters lead and their attachments to their habitual states of being are collectively 
rooted. The chapter concludes by examining the two writers’ criticism of the intrusion 
into agrarian society of capitalism, which disrupts the transmission of collective 
memory from one generation to another. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Memory studies in Wordsworth and Eliot have drawn critical treatment for more 
than half a century. Most attention, however, has often focused on the way in which the 
recollection of a past event, through re-interpretation, feeds into or disrupts the present 
identity constructed by characters in the works of the two writers. Admittedly, this is a 
very significant aspect of memory. There is, however, another equally important area of 
memory which has not gained adequate critical attention. This category of memory, 
which is described by James Booth as ‘a rich deposit of habit, of body memory and 
habits of the heart’, is where the persistence of the past finds its best expression. 
Distinct from recollection, which is often self-conscious and which involves an effort to 
‘preserve the past from erosion’, this form of memory is ‘often barely visible to us in 
the present’. Rather, it does its work ‘almost automatically’. 1  In absent-mindedly 
yielding to an accustomed way of behaving, in the skills we have learned and performed 
with great ease, and in the mode of conduct we have inherited from our community, we 
see the work of this memory. This thesis will take habit-memory as its central concern, 
attempting to explore both its mechanism and its social and political significance in the 
writings of Wordsworth and Eliot. Particular attention in the four chapters will be given 
to: the relationship between habit-memory and universal humanity; duty; guilt; and 
finally collective memory and the way it helps maintain the cohesion of a community.  
 
This chapter, as the introduction to the thesis, will start with Eliot’s life-long 
reading of Wordsworth. It will then move on to an overview of memory criticism in 
                                                 
1 W. James Booth, Communities of Memory: On Witness, Identity, and Justice (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2006), p. x. 
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past decades, followed by an explanation of the theoretical approaches that will be 
adopted in this research, and finally, a summary of how the thesis is structured.    
 
Eliot’s Reading of Wordsworth 
Stephen Gill notes that ‘[b]y the late 1830s […] Wordsworth’s fame was 
widespread and assured’. He was ‘the king-poet of our times’, as Elizabeth Barrett put 
it.2 This popularity was cemented by the award of an honorary degree at Oxford in 1839, 
and the Laureateship conferred in 1843. To the Victorians, both Wordsworth’s work 
and his life were ‘a spiritually active, empowering force’.3  Many people found his 
poetry immensely therapeutic, and some even experienced spiritual conversion after 
reading it.4 Though Eliot did not undergo a dramatic conversion of the kind recorded by 
William Macready, John Stuart Mill, and William Hale White, Wordsworth still played 
a very significant part in her life. He was not only one of the forces who shaped her 
moral values, but also proved a strong influence on her theory of novel writing.    
 
Wordsworth was read by George Eliot throughout her adult years ‘with 
undimmed enthusiasm’.5 Wordsworth was clearly a very significant writer for her, as 
she shared her reading of him with the most important people in her life. The earliest 
correspondent with whom Eliot shared such feelings about reading Wordsworth was 
Maria Lewis, the governess whose evangelicalism was the strongest influence on her 
early years. It was on 4 September 1839, when she was nearly twenty years old, that 
Eliot wrote to Lewis, saying that she had been reading ‘scraps of poetry picked up from 
                                                 
2 Stephen Gill, Wordsworth and the Victorians (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 16; p. 10. 
3 Gill, Wordsworth and the Victorians, p. 41. 
4 For a detailed discussion, see Gill, Wordsworth and the Victorians, which gives examples of five readers 
who regard Wordsworth’s poetry as spiritual balm: William Charles Macready, Sir William Gomm, John 
Stuart Mill, William Hale White, and William Whewell. Mill’s Autobiography contains the account of his 
reading of Wordsworth. 
5 Oxford Reader’s Companion to George Eliot, ed. by John Rignall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), pp. 449-50. 
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Shakespeare, Cowper, Wordsworth, and Milton’. 6  Her enthusiasm for Wordsworth 
must have intensified during the following two months, for on her twentieth birthday, 
22 November 1839, she wrote to Lewis again, declaring that ‘I have been so self-
indulgent as to possess myself of Wordsworth at full length, and I thoroughly like much 
of the contents of the first three volumes which I fancy are only the low vestibule to the 
three remaining ones’ (Letters, I, p. 34). The edition she was reading at that time was 
the first three volumes of the fifth collected edition of Poetical Works of William 
Wordsworth, in six volumes, published by Moxon in 1836-37. These volumes include 
‘Poems of the Imagination’, ‘Poems Referring to the Period of Childhood’, ‘Poems 
founded on the Affections’, ‘Memorials of a Tour in Scotland, 1803’, and 
‘Miscellaneous Sonnets’, the headings of which he adopted in 1815, when the first two-
volume edition of his collected poems was published.  They also contain essays such as 
the ‘Preface’ to the second edition of Lyrical Ballads, ‘Essay, Supplementary to the 
Preface’, and the ‘Preface’ of 1815.  
                                                
 
If she read all these volumes thoroughly, in other words, it can be assumed that 
by the time she was twenty, Eliot had read most of Wordsworth’s major works (with the 
exception of The Prelude, which was not published until 1850, and The Excursion), as 
well as the most important of his essays on poetic theory. 7  About a year later, in 
October 1840, she told Lewis that she had ‘just been delighted’ with Wordsworth’s 
short poem ‘On the Power of Sound’, and recommended that she read it (Letters, I, p. 
 
6 George Eliot, The George Eliot Letters, ed. by Gordon Haight, 9 vols (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1954; repr. 1975), I, 29. All subsequent quotations of these books, abbreviated Letters, are from 
this edition are from this edition with page and volume numbers given in parentheses. Though this is the 
earliest written record, Stephen Gill has noted that Ellis Yarnall records Eliot saying in 1873 that ‘I began 
to read Wordsworth when I was fifteen, and have gone on ever since with continually increasing pleasure’. 
See Wordsworth and the Coleridges: With other Memories Literary and Political (New York, 1899), p. 
101. 
7 No record is given as to when Eliot first read The Prelude. Thomas Pinney remarks that he found no 
quotations from The Prelude in Eliot’s writings until 1867. However it is unlikely that she waited till 
1867 to read it. Her own copy of The Prelude was the second edition, published in 1851, therefore she 
could have read it at a much earlier time. Thomas Pinney, ‘Wordsworth’s Influence on George Eliot’ 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, Yale University, 1960), p. 23. 
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68). It seems that Wordsworth had become Eliot’s idol by then, for on 21 June 1841 she 
told Lewis that she had collected some rose-leaves from Wordsworth’s garden, a 
common way for his admirers to show reverence for the ‘king-poet of our times’ 
(Letters, I, p. 99).8   
 
With her introduction to Charles and Caroline Bray and induction into the 
advanced thinking of the day in the beginning of the 1840s, Eliot began to share her 
reading of Wordsworth with the couple. The poet, in fact, appears to have helped calm 
some of Eliot’s religious anxieties. On 18 June 1844, for example, while she was 
translating Strauss’s The Life of Jesus, she wrote to Mrs Charles Bray, describing her 
mood by quoting from ‘Tintern Abbey’: ‘I am quite happy, only sometimes feeling “the 
weight of all this unintelligible world”’ (Letters, I, p. 177). In May 1852, she asked the 
Brays to forward her copies of Shakespeare, Goethe, Byron and Wordsworth (Letters, II, 
p. 25).  
 
After Eliot’s union with George Henry Lewes, he became her co-reader of 
Wordsworth. She recorded many a time when Lewes read Wordsworth to her during the 
most productive years of her novel writing. On 18 January 1858 she told Sara Hennell 
that she and Lewes ‘are reading now with fresh admiration for his beauties and 
tolerance for his faults’ (Letters, II, p. 423). This suggests that she was reading 
Wordsworth in a more critical way than before. The next day her journal recorded that 
‘We are reading Wordsworth in the evening—at least G. is reading him to me’.9 They 
could have been reading The Excursion at that time, for about two weeks later, Eliot 
                                                 
8 At the zenith of his fame, Wordsworth was idolized by the Victorians. His home, Rydal Mount, became 
a shrine. Common people were in the habit of gathering leaves from his garden as a way of expressing 
their reverence. Those who were not able to go there in person would entrust those who had the luck to go 
there to get some for them. Eliot was probably one of these, as she was likely to have acquired the leaves 
from her brother Isaac, who spent his honeymoon in the lakes and Scotland in June 1841. (Gill, 
Wordsworth and the Victorians, pp. 10-11).  
9 Thomas Pinney, ‘George Eliot’s Reading of Wordsworth: The Record’, Victorian Newsletter, 24 (1963), 
20-22 (p. 21). 
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wrote, ‘G. has finished the Excursion, which repaid us for going to the end by an 
occasional fine passage even to the last’ (Letters, II, p. 430). Lewes’s journal recorded 
that he was reading Wordsworth to Eliot during the last week of July 1858, while Eliot 
was working on Adam Bede.10 About a year later, when Eliot was working on The Mill 
on the Floss, Lewes read The Excursion aloud to her on 6 and 8 September 1859 
(Letters, III, p. 149). In 1867, when Eliot was writing The Spanish Gypsy, Lewes’s 
journal from 27 to 28 June 1867 shows that he read The Prelude to Eliot.11 On 26 
December 1877, Eliot wrote to Miss Charlotte Carmichael, describing the poet as ‘our 
incomparable Wordsworth’ (Letters, VI, p. 439). 
 
During the last years of her life, Eliot shared her reading of Wordsworth with 
her husband, John Cross. This habit of reading carried on until a few weeks before her 
death. In April 1879, about a year before their marriage, Cross recorded that they read at 
this time ‘much of Chaucer, Shakespeare, and Wordsworth’ (Letters, VII, p. 140). After 
their marriage, they continued to read Wordsworth.12 In the fall of 1880 they ‘were 
constantly reading together, Shakespeare, Milton, and Wordsworth’. And in the last 
month of her life, Eliot read F. W. H. Myers’s newly published life of Wordsworth in 
the ‘English Men of Letters’ series.13  
 
Though the above reading lists are by no means comprehensive, they at least 
suggest that Wordsworth and Shakespeare were always Eliot’s favourite authors, 
showing her persistent enthusiasm in their works throughout her life. This lifelong 
reading and re-reading made it easy for Eliot to quote lines from Wordsworth’s poems 
to describe her feelings and thoughts. It seems that either consciously or unconsciously, 
                                                 
10 Pinney, ‘George Eliot’s Reading of Wordsworth: The Record’, 21. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 John Cross, George Eliot’s Life as Related in Her Letters and Journal, 3 vols (Edinburgh: Blackwood 
and Sons, 1885), III, 370, 384.  
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Wordsworth became a constituent of Eliot’s own way of thinking. As Stephen Gill puts 
it, ‘[t]he unostentatious allusion to lines and phrases in her letters indicates the easy 
commerce of her own thoughts with Wordsworth’s words’.14 She herself also confesses 
that ‘I never before met with so many of my own feelings, expressed just as I could 
<wish> like them’ ((Letters, I, p. 34)). On 27 October 1840, quoting from 
Wordsworth’s ‘My Heart Leaps Up’, she writes that it is joyous to ‘have the wind of 
heaven blow on one after being stived in a human atmosphere, to feel one’s “heart leap 
up”’ (Letters, I, p. 71). ‘Tintern Abbey’ must be one of the poems which best expressed 
Eliot’s feelings, as she quotes it many times in her letters and essays, with a certain line 
mentioned more than once. In February 1848, commenting on the works of three 
English landscape painters, she says that ‘they bring a whole world of thought and 
bliss—“a sense of something far more deeply interfused”’ ((Letters, I, p. 248). ‘The 
weight of all this unintelligible world’ was not only quoted in her 1844 letter to Mrs 
Bray, which has been mentioned above, but also reappeared in a letter to John 
Blackwood on 23 June 1866 (Letters, IV, p. 277). In ‘German Wit: Heinrich Heine’, 
Eliot describes the poet as one ‘whom the lovely objects of Nature have always 
“haunted like a passion”’.15   
 
Wordsworth’s moral values can also be seen to have shaped Eliot’s. As early as 
February 1848, she wrote to John Sibree and expressed her faith in the ultimate triumph 
of ‘sympathy, all-embracing love, the super-added moral life’ over ‘egotism’. She 
supported her view by quoting from Wordsworth’s poem ‘These Times Strike Monied 
Worldlings with Dismay’: ‘Every gift of noble origin / Is breathed upon by hope’s 
perpetual breath’ (Letters, I, p. 251). Eliot’s aspiration for ‘something higher, something 
nobler’, which is often expressed by the protagonists of her novels, also has its source in 
                                                 
14 Gill, Wordsworth and the Victorians, p. 147.  
15 George Eliot, ‘German Wit: Heinrich Heine’, in The Essays of George Eliot, ed. by Thomas Pinney 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1963; repr. 1967), p. 242.  
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Wordsworth. On 12 February 1874, writing to Mrs William Smith, she says that she 
cares very much for ‘the demonstration of an intense joy in life on the basis of “plain 
living and high thinking”’. The quotation is from Wordsworth’s poem ‘O Friend! I 
Know Not Which Way I Must Look’ (Letters, VI, p. 17). Moreover, throughout her life 
and artistic creation, Eliot remains faithful to the maxim advocated by the poet in The 
Excursion: ‘we live by admiration, hope, and love’.16   
 
Wordsworth also had a strong influence on Eliot’s artistic theories. The most 
important of them is art as a means of extending sympathy and of removing the social 
division between the rich and the poor. In ‘The Natural History of German Life’, Eliot 
states that 
 
The greatest benefit we owe to the artist, whether painter, poet, or novelist, is 
the extension of our sympathies. […] When Wordsworth sings to us the 
reverie of ‘Poor Susan,’ […] more is done towards linking the higher classes 
with the lower, towards obliterating the vulgarity of exclusiveness, than by 
hundreds of sermons and philosophical dissertations.17 
 
 In his introduction to this essay, which was written between May and June 1856, 
Thomas Pinney writes that it ‘makes clear the Wordsworthian conviction […] that the 
highest function of art is “the extension of our sympathies” towards “the life of the 
People”’.18  It is worth noting that it was during this summer that Eliot was planning to 
write fiction. Her early novels, Adam Bede and Silas Marner, published in 1859 and 
1861 respectively, as we shall see, manifest the Wordsworthian principles she cherished.   
                                                 
16 The Excursion, Book IV, Line 760, quoted by Eliot in Impressions of Theophrastus Such (Edinburgh: 
William Blackwood and Sons, 1879), p. 179. 
17 Eliot, ‘The Natural History of German Life’, in Essays of George Eliot, pp. 270-1. 
18 Thomas Pinney, Introduction to ‘The Natural History of German Life’, in Essays of George Eliot, pp. 
266-7 (p. 267). 
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 The Treatment of Memory in Criticism of Wordsworth and Eliot  
Memory studies in Wordsworth have until now mainly focused on recollective 
memory. Despite being one of the major themes of Wordsworth studies up to now, 
memory was not a central issue during the poet’s own time. The Critical Heritage, for 
example, shows that memory was mentioned only occasionally by Wordsworth’s 
contemporary reviewers, and that there was no systematic exploration of the topic.19 
Memory does not seem to have been a major concern for Victorian readers, either. In 
fact, it is difficult to find an article dedicated to Wordsworth’s treatment of memory 
until the late 1930s, when Bennett Weaver published an essay entitled ‘Wordsworth’s 
Prelude: The Poetic Function of Memory’. This is perhaps the earliest in-depth study of 
memory in Wordsworth. In this essay, Weaver notices that the poet’s treatment of 
memory is not confined to the passive recollection of past events. Instead it is creative, 
enabling the mind to assimilate everything and resulting in the creation of a poetry of 
‘another truth than the truth of tabulation’.20  
 
From the 1960s onwards, critics saw childhood recollection as important in the 
formation of Wordsworth’s poetic identity, the development of his poetic power and his 
moral growth. Christopher Salvesen studies how Wordsworth, ‘by way of memory’, 
achieves ‘a more unified view of self within time present and past’.21 As a ‘persistent 
exploration of the nature and significance of memory’, The Prelude manifests 
Wordsworth’s power to maintain ‘the elements of continuity’ between his past and 
                                                 
19 William Wordsworth: The Critical Heritage 1793-1820, ed. by Robert Woof (London: Routledge, 
2001), I. 
20 Bennett Weaver, ‘Wordsworth’s Prelude: The Poetic Function of Memory’, Studies in Philology, 34 
(1937), 552-63 (p. 557). 
21 Christopher Salvesen, The Landscape of Memory: A Study of Wordsworth’s Poetry (London: Edward 
Arnold, 1965), p. 76.  
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present selves.22 Wordsworth’s ‘spots of time’ show his theory of memory as a positive 
source of ‘nourishment and inspiration’. Not only the pleasant, but also the painful and 
insignificant experiences can be ‘fruitful’,23 contributing to the ‘calm existence’ which 
the narrator believes he now has. 24  Herbert Lindenberger also discusses how 
Wordsworth’s early experiences gain inward meaning through memory, and become 
‘the mysterious sources of life and power’ in The Prelude.25 In this process, chronology 
is of little consequence: ‘When assertions of inward power were needed to 
counterbalance the effects of the external world, Wordsworth did not hesitate to take 
them out of chronological sequence’. 26  Nevertheless, Wordsworth’s construction of 
such a moral development through acts of memory is not regarded as problematic. 
There is no questioning of Wordsworth’s unified and organic identity.  
 
Some critics, however, find such a narrative of progressive development 
problematic. As early as 1964, Geoffrey Hartman noticed that Wordsworth’s ‘spots of 
time’ represent memory clusters of traumatic fixation or flashbacks. 27  As Hartman 
himself summarizes, Wordsworth’s memory is always bound up with a particular place, 
a psychology of what Hartman terms ‘spot syndrome’. These spots, being at the same 
time ‘particular places in nature’ and ‘fixed points in time’,28 are both ‘mythic’ and 
‘realistic’. They represent the poet’s obsession with seeking the origin, which ‘inspires 
him to evoke quasi-sacred sites of “first encounter,” binding contacts between his 
                                                 
22 M. H. Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature (New York: 
Norton, 1973), p. 75. 
23 Jonathan Wordsworth, William Wordsworth: The Borders of Vision (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 
30. 
24 William Wordsworth, The Prelude: 1799, 1805, 1850, Authoritative Texts, Context and Reception, 
Recent Critical Essays, ed. by Jonathan Wordsworth, M. H. Abrams and Stephen Gill (New York: Norton, 
1979), 1805, I, line 360. 
25 Herbert Lindenberger, On Wordsworth’s Prelude (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 134. 
26 Lindenberger, p. 170. 
27 Geoffrey Hartman, The Geoffrey Hartman Reader, ed. by Geoffrey Hartman and Daniel T. O’Hara 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), p. 296. 
28 Geoffrey Hartman, Wordsworth’s Poetry 1787-1814 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964; repr. 
1967), p. 212. 
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imagination and earth’, as though earth had ‘specific localities’ that could ‘restore 
poetic strength and lead to a future as strong as the past’.29 Such an understanding of 
Wordsworth’s memory facilitates Hartman’s own thinking about the way that memory 
is bound up with a particular place, and leads him to the development of a theoretical 
exploration of trauma later in his career. 
 
Historically-minded critics also suggest that Wordsworth suppresses aspects of 
his past. Kenneth Johnston reveals a Wordsworth never known before, a poet with many 
aspects of his youth lying hidden, including working as a spy for the Home Office.30 
However, Hunter Davis later points out that this information is wrong. The person who 
acted as a secret agent was not Wordsworth the poet, but one of his cousins, Robinson 
Wordsworth. 31 In a similar way, David Bromwich’s Disowned by Memory investigates 
the troubled elements beneath the surface of Wordsworth’s poetry of the 1790s, which 
emanate from his extremely uncomfortable experiences in France. 32  Stephen Gill’s 
study also suggests that Wordsworth’s seemingly unified self is constructed through the 
suppression of his inconvenient past. Gill finds that there is an ‘evasion of memories 
that threaten to overwhelm or subvert the interpretative pattern being created’.33 Lucy 
Newlyn points out that in handling the guilty materials of his life, for example, 
Wordsworth is ‘suppressing the major transgressions’ while ‘bringing minor 
misdemeanours into the foreground’.34 The problem of Wordsworth’s unified identity 
                                                 
29 Hartman, The Geoffrey Hartman Reader, p. 296. 
30 Kenneth R. Johnston, The Hidden Wordsworth (London: W. W. Norton, 1998; repr. London: Pimlico, 
2000). 
31 Hunter Davis, William Wordsworth: A Biography, rev. edn (London: Frances Loncoln, 2009), p. xii. 
32 David Bromwich, Disowned by Memory: Wordsworth’s Poetry of the 1790s (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998). 
33 Stephen Gill, William Wordsworth: The Prelude (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 3. 
34  Lucy Newlyn, ‘“The Noble Living and the Noble Dead”: Community in The Prelude’, in The 
Cambridge Companion to Wordsworth, ed. by Stephen Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), pp. 55-69 (p. 59).  
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has also been approached from a post-structuralist perspective, from the viewpoint of 
trauma theory and with reference to the Freudian notion of repression.35 
 
The focus of this thesis, as I explain below, is not recollective memory, but 
habit-memory. It seeks to explore not only the mechanism of habit, but also its social 
and political significance. There are two works dealing with Wordsworth’s treatment of 
habit to which I am particularly indebted. One of them is David Bromwich’s 
aforementioned Disowned by Memory. Although this book deals mainly with 
Wordsworth’s guilty feelings during the French Revolution, which runs as an 
undercurrent in his poetry of the 1790s, Bromwich emphasizes strongly the role of habit 
in moral experience and its function in the amelioration of feelings and the cementation 
of communities. ‘Habit’, David Bromwich believes, ‘is not just a guide’ for the poet, 
‘[i]t is the most reliable guide we have’, working more effectively than reason when 
converting man to moral virtue.36 By following this blind and animal spirit we discover 
a sense of belonging to humanity. My understanding of the moral implications of habit 
is built upon that of Bromwich. However, by situating habit in Wordsworth’s poetry 
within the theoretical frameworks of both his own time and that of the twentieth century, 
my research marks a significant departure from Bromwich’s research, which mainly 
locates Wordsworth’s work historically. 
 
                                                 
35 For a post-structuralist approach, see Paul de Man, ‘Autobiography as Defacement’, Modern Language 
Notes, 94 (1979), 910-30. It is generally agreed that poetry writing for Wordsworth is a means of coming 
to terms with the traumatic memories in his childhood and the French Revolution. For a detailed 
discussion of trauma in Wordsworth, see Geoffrey Hartman, ‘Trauma within the Limits of Literature’, 
European Journal of English Studies, 7 (2003), 257-74; Anne Whitehead, ‘Geoffrey Hartman and the 
Ethics of Place: Landscape, Memory, Trauma’, European Journal of English Studies, 7 (2003), 275-92; 
Cathy Caruth, ‘An Interview with Geoffrey Hartman’, in The Wordsworthian Enlightenment: Romantic 
Poetry and the Ecology of Reading, ed. by Helen Regueiro Elam and Frances Ferguson (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 2005), pp. 296-317. For a Freudian interpretation, see Richard Onorato, The 
Character of the Poet: Wordsworth in The Prelude (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), David 
Ellis, Wordsworth, Freud and the Spots of Time: Interpretation in The Prelude (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), Eugene Stelzig, ‘Wordsworth’s Bleeding Spots: Traumatic Memories of the 
Absent Father in The Prelude, European Romantic Review, 15 (2004), 533-45. 
36 Bromwich, Disowned by Memory, p. 33 (original emphasis). 
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James Chandler’s Wordsworth’s Second Nature is another work dealing with 
habit in Wordsworth. It examines, from a political perspective, how Wordsworth was 
influenced by Burke’s notion of ‘second nature’ and his conservative ideology, and how 
the poet sees human nature as cultivated by custom, habit and tradition. While 
Chandler’s book is helpful in the development of my idea of the political significances 
of habit, his book is not concerned particularly with memory. 
    
In the last chapter of my thesis, I will explore the representation of collective 
memory in the work of Wordsworth and Eliot. My interest in the collective nature of 
habit in Wordsworth is developed in response to the growing attention to collective 
memory in recent years. As Michael Rossington has pointed out, ways of remembering 
are now more and more seen to be ‘fostered and shared by family, religion, class, the 
media and other sources of the creation of group identities’. Moreover, collective 
memory plays a vital role in ‘conceiving of a society’s past’.37 This is also the reason 
why critics have begun to investigate the role collective memory plays in Wordsworth’s 
poetry, though one has to admit that research in this field is still relatively new. Drawing 
on Pierre Nora’s concept of lieux de mémoire and his idea that we can now only seek to 
‘decipher our experience in terms of what we can no longer experience’ because 
memory has given place to history, Lisa Hirschfield contends that The Excursion 
dramatizes ‘the divorce of memory from history’, and at the same time seeks ‘to 
intervene in this process’. The poem demonstrates ‘this act of decipherment’, which 
emerges from and thus defines ‘the remains of ancestral, customary traditions of rural 
English life and Lake District communities’.38 My approach to collective memory is 
different from that of Hirschfield. I will draw on the theories of Pierre Bourdieu and 
                                                 
37 Michael Rossington, ‘Introduction’ to ‘Collective Memory’, in Theories of Memory: A Reader, ed. by 
Michael Rossington and Anne Whitehead (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), pp. 134-8 (p. 
134). 
38 Lisa Hirschfield, ‘Between Memory and History: Wordsworth’s Excursion’, Romanticism On the Net, 
16 (1999) <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~scat0385/memory.html> [accessed 20 April 2008] (10 para. of 41).  
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Maurice Halbwachs to demonstrate Wordsworth’s belief that collective memory is vital 
for the cohesion of a community and that social changes should proceed gradually, 
without damaging the collective roots of society. 
 
Memory studies in George Eliot follow a similar pattern to those in Wordsworth 
in their focus on recollective memory. At first, memory is seen to help preserve the 
continuity between the past and present and construct a stable personal identity. Noting 
Eliot’s frequent use of plants as a metaphor for the growth of personality, Thomas 
Pinney goes on to compare memory to ‘the network of veins […] carrying nourishment 
to the remotest branches of the tree’.39 This typically Romantic metaphor attempts to 
smooth over the problematic aspect of memory. Memory also protects Eliot’s 
protagonists from becoming a prey to the inclination of the moment. In The Mill on the 
Floss, memory is the only force that keeps Maggie in touch with her past and urges her 
to resist her natural passions.40  
 
In recent years, memory in Eliot is more often seen as a subversive force, 
destabilizing the fixed identity her characters have constructed. Working on the 
relationship between music and memory in The Mill of the Floss and Daniel Deronda, 
Delia da Sousa Correa concludes that music shows ‘the uncanniness of submerged 
physical memory lurking within the subjective memories from which we construct 
ourselves’.41  This view is shared by Michael Davis, who holds that on the one hand, 
memory of the past shapes the present, while on the other, the relationship between past 
and present identity remains ‘highly problematic’. In Daniel Deronda, for instance, it is 
precisely Deronda’s emotional ‘distancing’ from his childhood memory which signals 
                                                 
39 Thomas Pinney, ‘The Authority of the Past in George Eliot’s Novels’, in George Eliot: A Collection of 
Critical Essays, ed. by George Creeger (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 47. 
40 K. M. Newton, George Eliot: Romantic Humanist (Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble, 1981), p. 117. 
41 Delia da Sousa Correa, ‘“The Music Vibrating in Her Still”: Music and Memory in George Eliot’s The 
Mill on the Floss and Daniel Deronda’, Nineteenth-Century Contexts, 21 (2000), 541-63 (p. 558). 
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‘his establishment as an emotionally mature and directed adult’. The harmonization of 
past with his present discovery of his Jewish identity is achieved only through ‘the 
exclusion of a large part of that past’. In a similar way, Deronda’s mother, though 
having been brought up as a Jew, struggles to ‘escape the “spots of memory” which 
Wordsworth sees as the shaping force of his poetic identity’.42 
 
Recollective memory in Eliot has also been studied in the light of the Freudian 
notion of repression and trauma. Drawing on a variety of Freudian theories, critics 
attempt to show that his ideas can enhance our understanding of the way in which 
psychic wounds operate in Eliot’s characters. Michele Moylan contends that in The Mill 
on the Floss, Freud’s notion of ‘oceanic’ feeling sheds light on our understanding of 
‘why Maggie chooses to give up Stephen in favor of her ties to the past’.43 Dianne 
Sadoff argues that the Freudian primal scene of seduction serves as a metaphor in 
Eliot’s fiction. In Romola, for example, the heroine ‘rejects the law of the father’, but 
cannot break with father figures, thus ‘creating an unresolved tension’ between ‘paternal 
authority and daughterly desire’. 44  Laura Emery and Margaret Keenan suggest that 
psychoanalytic ideas about trauma and mastery can ‘enhance our understanding of 
Silas’ in Silas Marner, who, through isolating himself, attempts to master loss but fails 
to do so. When events repeat the trauma, his old wounds reopen. This time, he begins to 
heal ‘by acknowledging the intolerable pain of loss to himself and others’.45  
 
Some critics have recognized that Eliot’s depiction of the psychic wound and its 
recovery pattern anticipates later theories of trauma. Carl Rotenberg has noted that 
                                                 
42 Michael Davis, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Psychology: Exploring the Unmapped Country 
(Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), p. 76; pp. 84-5.  
43 Michele Moylan, ‘The Moral Imperatives of Time and Memory in Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss’, 
Journal of Evolutionary Psychology, 11 (1990), 369-77 (p. 370). 
44 Dianne Sadoff, ‘Romola: Trauma, Memory and Repression’, in George Eliot, ed. by K. M. Newton 
(Essex: Longman, 1991), pp. 131-43 (p. 131). 
45 Laura Emery and Margaret Keenan, ‘“I’ve been robbed!”: Breaking the Silence in Silas Marner’, The 
American Journal of Psychoanalysis, 59 (1999), 209-23 (p. 209). 
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Freud was an admirer of George Eliot and may have been influenced by her. In Daniel 
Deronda, the treatment of the relationship between Deronda and Gwendolen displays 
Eliot’s remarkable understanding of how a treatment relationship works decades before 
the development of psychoanalysis.46 Jill Matus explores the way in which psychic 
shock and its effect on memory are represented in Daniel Deronda long before the 
concept of trauma ‘had even been named, let alone been classified as a psychic 
disorder’. She thus contends that, in representing psychic shock, Eliot is arguably ‘a 
precursor of later theories of trauma’.47 Chapter Three will continue this discussion, but 
rather than focusing on the Freudian trauma, I will look at the late-twentieth-century 
theorist Cathy Caruth’s conception of trauma and discuss the extent to which Eliot’s 
treatment of psychic wounds and their recovery pattern is similar to and differ from that 
of Caruth. 
 
While recollective memory in Eliot has attracted extensive critical attention, this 
is not true of habit memory. For individual habit, several critics have noticed the 
importance of the physiological basis of habit and its relationship with the development 
of moral sense. Terry Wright has illustrated how Comte’s Positivist cerebral theory 
illuminates Eliot’s belief that ‘egoistic instincts can be broadened by careful exercise 
and meditation into altruistic attachment and universal love’. 48  Sally Shuttleworth 
discusses the influence of Lewes’s theory of reflex action on Eliot, who sees moral habit 
                                                 
46 Carl T. Rotenberg, ‘George Eliot – Proto-Psychoanalyst’, The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, 59 
(1999), 257-69.  
47 Jill Matus, ‘Historicizing Trauma: The Genealogy of Psychic Shock in Daniel Deronda’, Victorian 
Literature and Culture, 36 (2008), 59-78 (p. 61; p. 73). Another article which is about Eliot’s treatment of 
psychic wound but which is not from a Freudian approach is Louise Penner, ‘“Unmapped Country”: 
Uncovering Hidden Wounds in Daniel Deronda’, Victorian Literature and Culture, 30 (2002), 77-97. 
The article situates the discussion mainly within the framework of nineteenth-century theories of memory 
to explore the hidden wound of Gwendolen.  
48 T. R. Wright, The Religion of Humanity: The Impact of Comtean Positivism on Victorian Britain 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 192. 
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as based on ‘physiological channels established in the mind by previous action’. 49  
Michael Davis continues the discussion of the relationship between reflex action and 
moral sense, but from the broader perspective of nineteenth-century psychology.50  
 
Reflex action is indeed an important way of explaining the mechanism of habit 
cultivation, which I will continue to engage with in my thesis. However, I find this 
approach alone inadequate, as it treats the body merely as a machine which responds 
passively to external stimuli. In Chapter Four, I will adopt a phenomenological 
approach to habit and examine how Merleau-Ponty’s theory of habit and an individual’s 
embodied relationship with the environment facilitates an understanding of habit 
memory in Wordsworth and Eliot. I will argue that in ‘Michael’ and The Mill on the 
Floss, for example, the body is represented not as a passive force, but as an agency 
which is capable of both feeling and knowledge. 
 
Collective memory in Eliot has also been explored by critics. In ‘History and 
Memory in Adam Bede’, Gail McGrew Eifrig discusses the way in which communal 
memory is related to the present and the future through the study of rituals and customs: 
the funeral, the celebration of birthdays, the trial and the wedding. 51  A more 
theoretically informed and in-depth study of collective memory in Eliot is Hao Li’s 
Memory and History in George Eliot. Drawing extensively on both nineteenth-century 
and current theories on collective memory, Hao Li explores Eliot’s conception of the 
mechanisms and functions of communal memory in terms of its relation to history. She 
defines communal memory as a kind of collective habit, which is made up of forms of 
‘collective mentality and moral consciousness, shared feelings, manners, rituals, 
                                                 
49 Sally Shuttleworth, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Science: The Make-Believe of a Beginning 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 108. 
50 Davis, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Psychology. 
51 Gail McGrew Eifrig, ‘History and Memory in Adam Bede’, Soundings, 76 (1993), 407-20.  
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customs as well as verbal expressions, which have evolved over generations’. It works 
as ‘a framework of knowledge and presupposition consciously or often unconsciously 
inherited and shared’.52 I draw on this notion when defining my concept of collective 
memory and discussing its representations in Wordsworth and Eliot. However, Hao Li 
draws a distinction between memory in Wordsworth, which she sees mainly as an 
individual phenomenon, and memory in Eliot, which she sees as collective. 53  My 
research will show that collective memory, which Hao Li sees as crucial in Eliot, also 
plays an important role in Wordsworth’s poetry.  
 
So far I have been looking at memory research in Wordsworth and Eliot 
separately. Now I will examine the comparisons that have been made between them. 
Many Wordsworthian themes in Eliot’s novels have been identified, and comparisons 
have been made showing both their affinities and the extent to which Eliot reworks 
Wordsworth’s themes. Frequently discussed topics include: childhood and nature, the 
primacy of feelings in moral judgment, the authors’ similar attitudes towards political 
reform, humble and ordinary life as their subject matter, and the extension of the 
readers’ sympathy as their artistic aim.54   
 
Memory is also a major subject of comparison, but in relation to each individual 
writer, the focus is on recollective memory. Critics have pointed out the difference 
                                                 
52 Hao Li, Memory and History in George Eliot: Transfiguring the Past (London: Macmillan Press, 2000), 
p. 1; p. 3 (original emphasis). 
53 Li, p. 49. 
54 For comparisons between childhood and nature, please see U. C. Knoepflmacher, ‘Mutations of the 
Wordsworthian Child of Nature’, in Nature and the Victorian Imagination, ed. by U. C. Knoepflmacher 
and G. B. Tennyson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 417-22. For the primacy of 
feelings in moral judgment, see Donald Stone, The Romantic Impulse in Victorian Fiction (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1980). For their attitudes towards political reform, see Edward Dramin, 
‘“A New Unfolding of Life”: Romanticism in the Late Novels of George Eliot’, Victorian Literature and 
Culture, 26 (1998), 273-302 (pp. 278-9). For humble life as their subject matter, see Gill, Wordsworth 
and the Victorians, and Pinney, ‘Wordsworth’s Influence on George Eliot’, 1960). For the extension of 
readers’ sympathy, see Basil Willey, Nineteenth-Century Studies: Coleridge to Matthew Arnold 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964). 
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between Wordsworth and Eliot in their treatment of childhood recollection. 
Knoepflmacher sees that Eliot attempts to follow Wordsworth but fails: The Mill on the 
Floss, for instance, ‘vainly enlists the Romantic’s power of memory’, because 
childhood no longer provides the Wordsworthian ‘sustenance of faith’.55 Stephen Gill 
also remarks that while memory in Wordsworth is a saving intercourse, in this novel it 
lacks this ‘saving egotism’.56 The relationship between early recollections and the sense 
of selfhood is another major concern. Thomas Pinney holds that both writers see the 
importance of early memory in developing a sense of continuity. The difference 
between them, he claims, is that memory in Wordsworth is ‘egocentric’ while in Eliot it 
is more closely connected with duties to others.57  Santanu Majumdar questions the 
unified self constructed through memory in Eliot, arguing that while she follows 
Wordsworth in depicting memory as a force of retaining identity in her early novels, in 
her later novels memory casts doubt upon the unity of selfhood.58 Comparisons have 
also been made concerning the relationship between memory and morality. Thomas 
Pinney singles out the ethical primacy of early affections for both writers. Old and 
familiar objects and associations are cherished because they supply all the meaning of 
life and are inseparable from the feelings which exalt them.59 Robert Dunham holds that 
Wordsworth and Eliot share the view that all experience has ethical implications, and 
that they seek to stimulate enriching personal memory as a means of nourishing the 
natural moral impulse.60 
     
                                                 
55 U. C. Knoepflmacher, George Eliot’s Early Novels: The Limits of Realism (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1968), p. 175. 
56 Gill, Wordsworth and the Victorians, p. 159. 
57 Pinney, ‘The Authority of the Past in George Eliot’s Novels’, p. 47. 
58 Santanu Majumdar, ‘Memory and Identity in Wordsworth and in George Eliot’s Middlemarch’, The 
Critical Review, 36 (1996), 41-61.  
59 Pinney, ‘Wordsworth’s Influence on George Eliot’, p. 154. 
60  Robert Dunham, ‘Wordsworthian Themes and Attitudes in George Eliot’s Novels’ (unpublished 
doctoral thesis, Stanford University, 1971), p. 231. 
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In these works, however, Wordsworth’s theories of memory, as well as his 
poetic creations, moral standards and political attitudes, have often been used as the 
background or framework against which Eliot’s works are judged and evaluated. My 
approach will be different. I acknowledge that Eliot read and absorbed Wordsworth but 
I focus on the very different contexts in which they write. In each of the four chapters, I 
will treat them separately as two distinct writers, and explore their representation of 
memory within the different theoretical and historical backgrounds in which they are 
situated. An analysis of their similarities and differences will be made in the last section 
of each chapter. 
 
Theoretical Approaches 
The focus of this study, therefore, is not recollective memory, but habit-memory, 
which is represented as both an individual and a collective experience. The reason for 
choosing this topic is not only that habit-memory has been largely marginalized in 
memory studies of these two writers in the past, but also because it has been overlooked 
in traditional philosophy, which I will soon demonstrate. Recollective memory will still 
be discussed; however, it will be approached mainly in relation to habit-memory. 
 
Recollective Memory and Habit-Memory 
Past studies have shown that memory can be seen as both an individual and a 
collective phenomenon. 61  Individual memory can be further divided into two sub-
categories: memory as ‘the power to recollect and to recognize specific things’ and 
memory as the ‘retention of language and skills’.62 I will follow William Brewer by 
                                                 
61 For more details, see Rossington, ‘Introduction’ to ‘Collective Memory’, p. 134. 
62 Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward Craig, 10 vols (London: Routledge, 1998), VI, 
296. 
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calling these ‘recollective memory’ and ‘habit memory’ respectively. 63  It must be 
pointed out that in spite of their distinctive qualities, they have been seen by 
philosophers as connected and supportive of each other. 
 
Habit-memory has three characteristics. First, it is sedimented in the body and is 
therefore, as Anne Whitehead classifies it, a type of body memory.64 It is performative, 
since the body remembers it by acting out past experience. Whether riding a bike, 
nursing a baby or playing a musical instrument, we demonstrate that we remember the 
skill by carrying it out with ease. Finally, habit-memory is automatic and 
unselfconscious. The acquisition of a habit may involve conscious effort but once a 
habit has formed, it does its work ‘almost automatically’.65 
 
Habit-memory plays an important role in the development of moral sense. 
According to Aristotle, moral virtues are ‘the product of habit’.66 Like the acquisition of 
skills in arts and crafts, moral virtues are established as habits through exercise. 
Morality can thus be seen as an area shared by individual and collective habit-memory. 
It is individual in the sense that it involves individual effort for cultivation. It is also 
collective because it is a mode of conduct that a particular community shares, and it can 
be passed down from one generation to another.  
 
Though habit-memory is of vital importance, it has not been given adequate 
attention in the past. As Paul Connerton has noticed, habit-memory has been ‘largely 
                                                 
63  William Brewer, ‘What Is Recollective Memory?’, in Remembering Our Past: Studies in 
Autobiographical Memory, ed. by David Robin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 21-
31.  
64 Anne Whitehead, Memory (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 12. 
65 Booth, p. x. 
66 Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle, trans. by J. A. K. Thomson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1955), p. 55. 
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ignored’.67 The marginalization of habit-memory is no coincidence. It can be seen to go 
back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when habit-memory was treated as a 
passive force of remembering. Coleridge, for example, expresses a most negative 
opinion on habit. In response to Locke, Hume and Hartley’s philosophy that habit is 
‘essential, the mainspring which governs physiology, psychology, and epistemology’,68 
he contends that it deprives human agency and degrades men into inanimate objects. As 
he vehemently attacks it in Biographia Literaria, he implies that associationism seems 
to suggest to him that man has a disposition similar to ‘a weather-cock’ which ‘had 
acquired a habit of turning to the east, from the wind having been so long in that 
quarter’. 69  Coleridge admits that there is some associative power in the mind, but 
asserts that it is wrong to elevate the role of habit at the expense of the will, which is 
connected with the creative and imaginative power of the mind. His hierarchical 
dichotomy between imagination and fancy also follows this line of argument. 
Imagination is related to the creative power of the mind, which intends to ‘re-create’, to 
‘idealize’ and to ‘unify’. It shows that man is an active agent and puts man’s initiative 
into best play. Fancy, by contrast, is an inferior form of mental activity. Being a product 
of habitual association, it is nothing more than ‘a mode of memory emancipated from 
the order of time and space’.70 
                                                
 
Lewes takes a different approach to that of Coleridge in his discussion. For him, 
memory, as acquired reflex actions, has the broadest connotation, including both 
recollection and habit-memory. 71   ‘Recollection’ is the ‘higher form’ of memory 
 
67 Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 25. 
68 Richard Fadem, ‘Coleridge, Habit, and the Politics of Vision’, in Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria: 
Text and Meaning, ed. by Frederick Burwick (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1989), pp. 88-104 
(p. 91). 
69 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, in Samuel Taylor Coleridge: The Major Works, ed. by 
H. J. Jackson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 214.  
70 Coleridge, p. 313. 
71 George Henry Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind: Second Series: The Physical Basis of Mind (London: 
Trübner, 1877), p. 462. It needs to be pointed out that Lewes does not adopt the specific term habit-
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because it is ‘exclusively human’, in that there is ‘an effort, a search, and a finding’. By 
contrast, habit-memory is ‘the lower, or animal form’ of remembering, which is 
characterized by passivity: ‘Images and ideas arise spontaneously, […] and intrude 
themselves into the current of thought’.72 
 
Though Coleridge and Lewes approach habit from different perspectives, the 
former pairing it with imagination while the latter contrasts it with recollection, they 
share the view that habit is an inferior form of mental capacity. Passively responding to 
external stimuli, it deprives an individual of his agency, degrading him into an animal or 
inanimate object. 
 
Such a negative view of habit-memory continues far into the late nineteenth 
century. Like Lewes, Henri Bergson also makes a distinction between these two types 
of individual memory, though he uses ‘pure memory’ to refer to ‘recollective 
memory’.73 According to him, the main distinction between the two is the presence or 
absence of memory images when the past is recovered: ‘Pure memory records, in the 
form of memory-images, all the events of our daily life as they occur in time’ (Bergson, 
p. 92). In contrast, ‘habit-memory’ recovers the past ‘not in the memory-images which 
recall them’, but through ‘intelligently coordinated movements which represent the 
accumulated efforts of the past’. Bergson’s use of the term ‘pure memory’ also points to 
the hierarchical nature of his dichotomy. Pure memory is ‘memory par excellence’. It is 
                                                                                                                                               
memory. His argument is slightly vague in that he contrasts recollection, in which there is an effort of 
searching, with all other forms of involuntary memory, which are characterized by passivity. One may 
argue that involuntary memory does not necessarily mean the same as habit-memory, though the two 
concepts sometimes overlap. However, when talking about involuntary memories, Lewes actually refers 
to habitual associations which crop up automatically and effortlessly, and which, I suggest, are within the 
realm of habit-memory.    
72 George Henry Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind: Third Series (Continued) (London: Trübner, 1879), 
p. 119. 
73 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (London:  
Allen & Unwin, 1950), p. 21. All subsequent quotations of this book are from this edition with page 
numbers given in parentheses. 
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superior because ‘man alone’ possesses it, while both man and animals are capable of 
habit-memory (Bergson, p. 93; p. 94).  
 
Bertrand Russell follows Bergson in distinguishing between the two types of 
individual memory. Instead of ‘pure memory’, Russell adopts the term ‘true memory’. 
He also calls it ‘knowledge memory’, for he believes that true memory constitutes 
knowledge. Russell holds that the distinction is ‘vital to the understanding of memory’, 
with the immediate qualification that it is more theoretically convenient than practically 
possible.74 Like their eighteenth- and nineteenth-century predecessors, both Russell and 
Bergson conceive of recollective memory as the privileged form, while habit memory 
involves little human agency and makes man not so different from a gramophone or 
some other mechanical recording device. 
 
Though recollective memory and habit-memory have their own unique qualities, 
with the former often considered superior to the latter, it is not possible to separate the 
two. Bergson holds that the two forms of memory ‘lend to each other a mutual support’ 
(Bergson, p. 98). A. J. Ayer also maintains that though habits are independent of 
recollection, performance of a skill is sometimes ‘facilitated by the occurrence of a 
recollection of a particular instance of learning’.75 The interaction between recollective 
memory and habit-memory will be discussed in this thesis, with the emphasis on how 
the two forms of memory work together to enhance the development of moral habits.  
 
Habit in Associationism 
From the discussion above, we can begin to understand that habit-memory has 
not been given adequate critical attention, and has been considered an inferior form of 
                                                 
74 Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1921), p. 166. 
75 Brewer, p. 31. 
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memory in traditional philosophy. However, in British empirical thought, it was 
regarded as an essential force governing physiology, psychology and epistemology. I 
will now focus on the three thinkers who are most relevant to my research: David Hume, 
David Hartley and George Henry Lewes. All of them attempt to explain human 
behaviour in terms of physical causation, suggesting that the body abides by the same 
law as objects in the natural world. Their theories of habit, based on a mechanistic view 
of the human body, illuminate our understanding of the way in which habit works in 
Wordsworth and Eliot.  
 
In the opinion of David Hume, habit is ‘the great guide of human life’. He 
identifies habit as an important principle of human nature: ‘For whatever the repetition 
of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or 
operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding, we 
always say, that this propensity is the effect of Custom’.76 Its effect upon the mind is 
twofold: ‘bestowing a facility in the performance of any action […]; and afterwards a 
tendency or inclination towards it’.77  
 
Moral sense has nothing to do with reason, either. Hume notes that ‘[i]f flame or 
snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind is carried by custom to expect heat or 
cold’, the same principle follows ‘when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the 
passion of love, when we receive benefits’.78 Likewise, ‘to have the sense of virtue, is 
                                                 
76 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, 
ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 43 (original emphasis). 
77 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by David Norton and Mary Norton (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2000; repr. 2001), p. 271 (original emphasis). 
78 Hume, Enquiries, p. 46. 
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nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a 
character’.79  
 
Hume’s privileging of feeling over reason had a great impact on Romantic 
writers. His idea of the significant role custom plays in our moral life is especially 
helpful in understanding Wordsworth’s belief that ‘habit does the work / Of reason’ in 
the cultivation of moral awareness. 80  As Anne-Lise François points out, ‘a good 
Humean reader […] resembles a good Wordsworthian reader in that both recognize and 
privilege the cumulative significance, acquired over time, of things that may initially 
appear of little moment’.81 
 
Hartley’s system goes a step further than that of Hume by analysing the 
physiological mechanism of habit formation. His thought can be seen as that of Hume 
‘transferred to the physiological sphere’, though Edwin Boring remarks that he wrote 
‘relatively independently of Hume’.82 Hartley groups human actions into two categories: 
automatic and voluntary. Automatic actions, such as the jerking back of the finger when 
touching a hot poker, are generated by automatic reflexes. This involves ‘a circuit by 
which an impulse travels up the sensory nerves to the brain and then from the brain 
down the “motory” nerves to the muscles’.83 He then goes on to describe how automatic 
action can become voluntary. The motion of grasping in a child may initially be 
automatic. But through sufficient repetition, ‘the will to grasp is generated, and 
                                                 
79 Hume, A Treatise, p. 303 (original emphasis). 
80 William Wordsworth, ‘The Old Cumberland Beggar’, in The Major Works, ed. by Stephen Gill (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), lines 92-3. All subsequent quotations of this poem, abbreviated OCB, are 
from this edition with line numbers given in parentheses. 
81 Anne-Lise François, ‘To Hold in Common and Know by Heart: The Prevalence of Gentle Forces in 
Humean Empiricism and Romantic Experience’, Yale Journal of Criticism, 7 (1994), 139-62 (p. 142). 
82 Edwin Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950), p. 
196; p.195. 
83 Richard Allen, David Hartley on Human Nature (New York: State University of New York Press, 
1999), p. 163. 
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sufficiently associated with the action to produce it instantaneously’. As a result, the 
action becomes ‘perfectly voluntary’.84  
 
In a similar way, voluntary actions can become automatic through repetition. At 
the early stage of learning to play a harpsichord, the player moves his fingers from key 
to key slowly.  Gradually, the acts of volition grow ‘less and less express’, until finally, 
there is no intervention by voluntary will. The movement becomes ‘secondarily 
automatic’.85  This process shows the dialectical relationship between voluntary and 
automatic actions. These two modes of action, rather than being in opposition, are ‘in 
alliance’.86 If voluntary powers, as Hartley maintains, are of the nature of memory, 
secondarily automatic actions are also of the nature of memory. Through repetition and 
practice, we remember so well that we can perform certain actions automatically, 
without the need to resort to voluntary efforts. 
 
Like Hume, Hartley links habit with the development of moral sense. His project 
is much more ambitious, however. Hume connects virtue with an instinctive feeling of 
pleasure and stops there. Hartley shows how the desire to seek pleasure and avoid pain 
further leads to the evolution of an individual’s moral growth. Moral sense is acquired 
through the association of pleasurable sensations with certain objects. The world, he 
suggests, was designed by Providence as ‘a system of benevolence’, so that ideally, or 
under a proper educational regimen, the mind will undergo an evolutionary process 
through sensation, imagination, ambition, self-interest, and sympathy, until at last we 
acquire a moral sense. Thus human individuals may be regarded as ‘a sort of refinery in 
which the loftiest spirituality is being mechanically distilled out of sense’. Moral sense, 
                                                 
84 David Hartley, Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations, 3 vols (London: 
Johnson, 1791), I, 105. 
85 Hartley, I, 108. 
86 Allen, p. 168. 
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which is the last to be acquired, is regarded as ‘the final outcome of Nature’s holy plan’. 
It is ‘generated necessarily and mechanically’ as an inevitable destination.87 
 
If Hume is helpful in understanding Wordsworth’s preoccupation with habit in 
the enhancement of moral awareness, Hartley’s theory on the dialectical relation 
between automatic and voluntary actions and the way in which memory operates as an 
accumulative force of the past further reveals how habit works to mould an individual 
into a duty-bound being in ‘Ode to Duty’.   
 
In the nineteenth century, associationists continued to engage with the 
mechanical-response explanation of habit formation. While many associationists 
discussed the mechanism of reflex action, the most relevant to my research is George 
Henry Lewes, whose theory of habit, particularly his idea that cultivation is more 
essential than inheritance in the development of moral sense, and the way the 
accumulative force of the past determines an individual’s moral choice upon emergency, 
has the most direct influence on Eliot. 
 
Lewes’s theory of habit is very similar to that of Hartley. He also explains 
automatic actions in terms of muscular contraction and reflex action. Hartley argues that 
through training, voluntary actions can be transformed into secondarily automatic 
actions, and Lewes expresses a similar point: ‘habits, Fixed Ideas, and what are called 
Automatic Actions, all depend on the tendency which a sensation has to discharge itself 
through the readiest channel’. Learning to speak a new language is very difficult at first, 
because ‘the channels through which each sensation has to pass have not become 
established’. Once frequent repetition has ‘cut a pathway’, however, this difficulty is 
                                                 
87 Basil Willey, The Eighteenth Century Background: Studies on the Idea of Nature in the Thought of the 
Period (London: Chatto & Windus, 1946), pp. 143-52. 
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overcome: ‘the actions become so automatic that they can be performed while the mind 
is otherwise engaged’. 88  Lewes’s ‘Automatic Actions’ here closely resemble what 
Hartley terms ‘secondarily automatic actions’, actions that become automatic through 
training.  
 
Lewes also equates acquired reflex actions with memory. In his view, 
physiologically speaking, memory is but ‘an organized tendency to react on lines 
previously traversed’. Acquired reflex actions involve the ‘very reproduction of 
experience, which in the sphere of Intellect is called Memory’. 89  The process of 
remembering is that of creating a new channel through which a sensation discharges 
itself through repetition. We remember very well when we perform an action with 
perfect ease, because the pathway is well established so that we no longer need to rely 
on voluntary powers to carry it out. 
 
Like Hume and Hartley before him, Lewes discusses habit cultivation in relation 
to moral sense: ‘All men are trained to act rightly on emergencies by what is a kind of 
moral instinct, organized in previous habit of acting rightly’. 90  The habit of acting 
appropriately in emergencies is an automatic action, which does not need to resort to 
voluntary powers. Since memory is what we call an acquired reflex action, the very 
process of the acquisition of moral habit involves the process of remembering. What we 
do in an emergency is the result of memory, the accumulated force of our past, habitual 
action. As the word ‘instinct’ suggests, it is independent of the conscious will.   
 
                                                 
88 George Henry Lewes, The Physiology of Common Life, 2 vols (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1859-60), II, 
58-9. 
89 Lewes, The Physical Basis of Mind, pp. 462-3. 
90 George Henry Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind: First Series: The Foundation of a Creed, 2 vols 
(London: Trübner, 1874-75), I, 306. 
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What differentiates the nineteenth-century associationists from those of the 
eighteenth century is their evolutionary perspective. To summarize, they hold that reflex 
actions, when repeated frequently, can be inherited by following generations. 91  
However, scientists differ on the role played by inheritance in the acquisition of moral 
sense. For Herbert Spencer, moral instinct can be inherited, and has nothing to do with 
individual experience. Moral intuitions, he says, are the result of ‘accumulated 
experiences of utility, gradually organized and inherited’. They have ‘no apparent basis 
in the individual experiences of utility’.92 
 
 For Lewes, cultivation is more important than inheritance. Inheritance only 
leads to moral aptitude: ‘It no more brings with it conceptions of what is right, what 
wrong, than the musical aptitude brings with it a Symphony of Beethoven’.93 Without 
learning and training, however, this aptitude remains dormant since moral sense can 
only be developed through repeated practice. In Lewes’s view, therefore, an individual’s 
own moral history is more important than the moral history of the species. 
 
This development from Hume and Hartley to Lewes, which involves a gradual 
shift in emphasis towards a greater recognition of the role habit plays in moral 
education, the physiological process of habit formation and the issue of inheritance, is a 
key element of this thesis. This movement, especially the emphasis on physiology and 
inheritance, which marks the development of science from the Romantic to the 
Victorian period, is also a point where Eliot moves far beyond her predecessor.  
 
 
                                                 
91 For more details, see Boring, pp. 240-4. 
92 Herbert Spencer, An Autobiography, 2 vols (London: Williams and Norgate, 1904), II, 89. 
93 Lewes’s version of ‘The Moral Sense’ from the appendix of K. K. Collins, ‘G. H. Lewes Revised: 
George Eliot and the Moral Sense’, Victorian Studies, 21 (1978), 463-92 (p. 484).  
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Habit in Phenomenology  
So far I have been discussing habit-memory from the perspective of British 
associationism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. I will now approach it from a 
different perspective, the phenomenological approach to habit as advocated by the 
twentieth-century French philosopher, Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty is not 
happy with the mechanical explanation of habit acquisition adopted by the modern 
behaviourists, of whom the eighteenth and nineteenth-century associationists can be 
seen as precursors. 
 
I adopt the phenomenological approach because I find associationism alone 
inadequate in understanding habit in Wordsworth and Eliot. In some of their works, 
‘Michael’ and The Mill on the Floss for example, habit is not represented as the body’s 
mechanical response to the external world. It is an active agent. The characters created 
by the two writers, as I hope to show, demonstrate an embodied understanding of their 
environment.  
 
In associationism as well as in modern behaviourism, as we have seen, the body 
is modelled after Newton’s clockwork universe. It abides by the law of physical 
causation and is thereby ‘divorced from the world of meaning, purpose and agency’.94 
Following this mechanical view of the body, habit is understood in terms of a 
conditioned reflex, as can be seen in my discussion of Hartley and Lewes above.    
 
Basing his theory on a deconstruction of the body-mind dichotomy, Merleau-
Ponty revises earlier notions of the body, which goes back to Descartes, who, being the 
most important exponent of Dualism, sharply separates body and mind. Merleau-Ponty 
                                                 
94 Nick Crossley, The Social Body: Habit, Identity and Desire (London: SAGE Publications, 2001), p. 63. 
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contends that ‘I am my body’. ‘The body is our anchorage in the world’. The human 
body is not a machine passively responding to external stimuli, but an agent which can 
feel, see and hear. Merleau-Ponty also revises the traditional concept of ‘understanding’ 
as ‘subsuming a sense-datum under an idea’, suggesting that it is the body which 
understands a significance.95 
 
The body understands significance by forming a habit. To be more specific, to 
form a habit means to grasp a significance in terms of the body, and to achieve ‘the 
harmony between what we aim at and what is given’.96 But how does the body grasp a 
significance? It does so by incorporating the spatial objects it inhabits into the body 
itself, so that they become extensions of the body. As can be seen, this notion of habit is 
different from the behaviourists’ view of habit, which is a fixed reflex action; it is a 
‘bodily know-how’.97 If the associationists’ notion of remembering is the establishment 
of a reflex action, through which a sensation can be discharged easily, Merleau-Ponty’s 
notion is that we remember through the incorporation of spatial objects into the body 
itself.  
 
Habit in Collective Memory 
So far I have been looking at habit-memory from an individual perspective, but I 
want now to move on to its collective aspect. As Michael Rossington has pointed out, 
‘within the disciplines of sociology, history and cultural theory, the phrase “collective 
memory” proposes that practices of remembrance are shaped and reinforced by the 
societies and cultures in which they occur’. 98  Just as there are different types of 
                                                 
95 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. by Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 
2002), p. 231; p. 167. 
96 Merleau-Ponty, p. 167. 
97 Crossley, p. 52. 
98 Rossington, ‘Introduction’ to ‘Collective Memory’, p. 134. 
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individual memory, so collective memory comes in different forms, which James Booth 
groups into roughly two categories: institutional and habitual.99 
 
In habit, then, we see not only the re-enactment of an individual’s past, but also 
a collective past. This collective past is best exemplified in such timeless practices as 
conventions, rituals and ceremonies. But collective habit-memory is not necessarily 
restricted to these. In everyday life, in our customary acts, in the way we think, we all 
bear the imprint of our forefathers. Pierre Bourdieu, a sociologist who builds his theory 
upon the work of Merleau-Ponty and who extends his insights into the sociological 
sphere, maintains that individual habits are but ‘variants’ of their ‘collective root’.100 
The difference between Bourdieu and Merleau-Ponty, besides their engagement in 
different subject areas, lies mainly in the fact that Bourdieu puts more emphasis on the 
collective aspect of habit, whereas Merleau-Ponty is more concerned with the individual. 
Thus his theory works as a bridge between the individual and the collective habit-
memory in this research. His concept of ‘habitus’, ‘systems of durable, transposable 
dispositions’, is an appropriation of the Latin word habitus. 101 In stressing ‘habitus’ as 
‘systems’ and considering  the individual habitus as but a ‘variant’ of its ‘collective 
root’, Bourdieu highlights the fact that such a body memory is a re-enactment of a 
collective past. 102  In saying that ‘habitus’ is ‘durable’ and ‘transposable’, he also 
stresses its function of giving an individual and a social group a sense of continuity. 
This explains Maurice Halbwachs’s idea that an individual’s resistance to the change of 
a specific physical setting ‘can emanate only from a group’.103  
 
                                                 
99 Booth, p. x. 
100 Crossly, p. 94. 
101 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. by Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977), p. 72.  
102 Crossly, p. 94. 
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Situating the individual within the social group to which he belongs, Bourdieu’s 
theory of habit sheds light on our understanding of the collective nature of the 
customary behaviour and habitual attachment of Wordsworth and Eliot’s characters to 
their patriarchal land and the community in which they were born.   
 
Habit in Political Writings 
Since collective memory plays an important role in daily life and in maintaining 
the cohesion of a community, it has been a major concern in political writings. Edmund 
Burke, for example, attaches great importance to the transmission of the whole body of 
collective values from the past to the present. For him, we are the bearers of our 
collective memory. This inheritance comes in the form of habit, custom, morality, 
prescription and even prejudice, and constitutes our very identity: ‘All those habits, 
customs, and local superstitions’ are ‘human nature’. 104  They have an anchor-like 
quality, giving us a sense of who we are. If we cast them off, we will not know ‘to what 
port we steer’.105 
 
The same holds true of society. If society is an edifice, the collective past made 
up of shared beliefs and practices constitutes the models and patterns upon which it is 
built. A drastic break away from it would be destructive, leaving us with ‘no compass to 
govern us’.106 Therefore, we need to be extremely cautious when social changes are 
brought about. 
 
The German social historian Wilhelm Heinrich von Riehl holds a similar view to 
Burke on the significant role collective memory plays in both an individual and a 
                                                 
104 David Bromwich, A Choice of Inheritance: Self and Community from Edmund Burke to Robert Frost 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 45. 
105Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. by Conor Cruise O’Brien (London: 
Penguin, 1986), p. 173. 
106 Burke, p. 172. 
 33
society. While Burke’s focus when discussing individuals and a societies’ complicated 
relationships with their past is the community of the ancien régime, Riehl’s central 
concern is the lower classes. In The Natural History of German Life, which George 
Eliot reviewed at great length, he proposes the notion of ‘incarnate history’, suggesting 
that we all ‘physically embody, and carry forward through the generations, the nature of 
our collective being […] in our customary acts, emotional responses, and social 
relationships’.107 This expresses a similar idea to Burke’s that an individual is a physical 
carrier of his collective past. This past makes itself present through the way we act, 
think and feel and our relationships with other people. If we are deprived of our 
customary way of life, we will suffer serious mental disturbance.  
 
Society works in a similar way to the individual. Like Burke, Riehl also believes 
that a social structure is a complicated inheritance from the past, which proves the best 
choice of the previous generations. Development can only take place while ‘allowing 
those roots to remain undisturbed’. If they are thrown away instead of being carried 
down to the following generations, it will be ‘destructive of social vitality’. 108  
 
The way in which Burke and Riehl deal with habit is of great significance to 
Wordsworth and Eliot in their thinking about the role that habit plays in providing an 
individual with a sense of anchorage and in maintaining the cohesion of a community. 
Furthermore, it gives direction to why the two writers consider it crucial for social 
changes to proceed slowly, without damaging the collective root. 
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Habit-Memory in Wordsworth and Eliot 
It is nothing new to say that both Wordsworth and Eliot are preoccupied with the 
past. While an individual is what his past makes him, this past is largely habitual. For 
Wordsworth and Eliot, habit-memory is important in both individual and collective life. 
As far as the individual is concerned, it is important for the development of his moral 
awareness. For the collective, it is vital for the cohesion of a community and thus 
closely connected with the manner in which social change should be conducted. 
 
Habit-memory is crucial in the acquisition of knowledge and skills. It is also 
important in regulating moral conduct. Both Wordsworth and Eliot see humans as 
essentially moral beings, therefore the acquisition of moral habit is a crucial part of their 
artistic theory and practice, as Chapter One will attempt to show. Both their theories of 
literary creation and their works manifest their belief in the gradual amelioration of 
human nature through habit cultivation. An individual’s moral habit is also closely 
bound up with his sense of duty, as Chapter Two will demonstrate, and the way he 
treats wrongdoings in the past, which is my focus in Chapter Three. 
 
Morality, as I have mentioned earlier, has been situated by some thinkers within 
the realm of habit-memory. It is about how the body remembers to act rightly, 
voluntarily, and, more importantly, involuntarily, as in the performance of other skills. 
For Wordsworth, the cultivation of this bodily practice is a much more reliable means of 
obtaining moral virtue than reason. In ‘The Old Cumberland Beggar’, ‘habit does the 
work / Of reason’, and makes sure the continuation of a timeless practice ‘else 
unremembered’ (OCB, ll. 92-3; l. 83). In ‘Ode to Duty’, it further ‘breed[s] a second 
Will more wise’.109 Both of these poems will be analysed in detail in the thesis. 
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 The representation of habit-memory in Eliot’s novels involves a dialogue with 
the scientific developments of her age. Gall’s phrenological discoveries, Comte’s 
cerebral theory and Lewes’s reflex theory all attempt to demonstrate the physiological 
basis of moral sense and thereby make possible the development of moral habit through 
adequate practice. For Eliot, character is formed through repeated behaviour in the past. 
An individual can never do anything drastically different from his habitual past. 
Changes are possible, but can only take place gradually. In case of emergency, one 
remembers how to act rightly through the previous cultivation of moral habits. Many of 
Eliot’s characters show an awareness of this law and a conscientious practice of it in 
order to strengthen this body memory.   
 
If an individual is what his habitual past makes him, the same holds true for 
society. As Riehl points out, ‘[t]he external conditions which society has inherited from 
the past are but the manifestation of inherited internal conditions in the human beings 
who compose it’.110 Therefore, for both Wordsworth and Eliot, habit-memory is also 
important for collective life, as I will demonstrate in Chapter Four. 
 
In the view of both of these writers, habit-memory is the fabric from which 
society is woven. This explains why they think society should change slowly. On the 
other hand, they recognize that there are times when changes are necessary. Eliot, in 
particular, is torn between these two oppositions, recognizing the importance of the past 
while legitimizing the value of change.  
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Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into four chapters, of which the first three look mainly at 
individual habit-memory. Chapter One investigates the relation between habit and 
morality in the artistic practice and theory of Wordsworth and Eliot, while Chapters 
Two and Three study the relationship between habit-memory and two fundamental 
issues in their writings: duty and guilt. The final chapter shifts to a discussion of 
collective habit-memory. Most of the chapters begin by summarizing an aspect of 
contemporary theories of memory, which, I suggest, is relevant to an understanding of 
both writers. I then move on to discuss individual works by each writer, concluding 
with a comparison between the two. The four chapters are arranged thematically rather 
than in chronological order by the composition date of the texts. 
 
The first chapter looks at the relationship between the cultivation of moral habit 
and a sense of universal humanity. I begin by introducing the idea of an ethics of 
memory in the work of the modern philosopher Avishai Margalit, which sheds light on 
an understanding of Wordsworth and Eliot’s projects of universal humanity. In 
discussing Wordsworth, my focus is on ‘The Old Cumberland Beggar’. Drawing on 
Hume’s theory of habit, I argue that, for Wordsworth, habit, not reason, is the dominant 
moral guide. It not only steers the villagers towards virtue, but also leads Wordsworth’s 
readers to form new habitual attitudes towards the poor and marginalized people in 
society. In so doing, Wordsworth envisages the possibility of a society in which there is 
no division between rich and poor.      
 
The texts by Eliot discussed in this chapter are Middlemarch and Daniel 
Deronda. These two most canonical novels are dealt with at the very beginning of the 
thesis because they best exemplify Eliot’s humanitarian project. I examine some of the 
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sources of the image of the web in these novels — Feuerbach’s religious humanism, for 
example, and the concept of organicism in Victorian science — and argue that her web 
of human relations is sustained by the memory of caring for others. Like Wordsworth, 
Eliot believes that this project can be achieved through habit-cultivation. The 
physiological basis of moral sense, and Lewes’s idea that cultivation is more important 
than inheritance in the development of moral sense, make it possible for an individual to 
perfect his moral sense through repeated practice. This section concludes with a 
discussion of Eliot’s artistic theory, for she regards the extension of the reader’s 
sympathy through her novels as the result also of habit formation.     
 
The second chapter looks at the relationship between habit and duty. Both 
Wordsworth and Eliot believe that an individual should not indulge in absolute freedom, 
but needs to submit to duty. Moreover, the sense of duty for them is obtained through 
experience rather than existing a priori, as proposed by Kant. It is identified with will 
and inclination. I suggest that, for Wordsworth, duty is a universal law which governs 
both the natural and the human world. My reading of ‘Ode to Duty’ suggests that the 
memory of duty prevents the course of an individual’s life from going astray in both his 
calling and his moral development. Hartley’s theory on the dialectical relationship 
between voluntary and involuntary actions further illuminates an understanding of the 
way in which Wordsworth attempts to bring unruly instincts under control and to 
convert them into involuntary adherence to dutiful behaviour. Ultimately, Wordsworth 
wishes the memory of duty to become an involuntary action. 
 
In my discussion of Eliot in this chapter I draw on Lewes’s reflex theory and 
argue that in Silas Marner and Romola, duty is identified with inner voice, namely 
reflex action and reflex feelings of the body. Eliot argues that the duties stipulated by 
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external laws should arise in individuals as a manifestation of an inner voice. If there is 
no such inner sanction, for instance for loyalty to an unfaithful husband or a mistaken 
prophet, they can be regarded as false duties against which rebellion is justified. Eliot 
also recognizes, however, that even the claims of such ‘false’ duties are never totally 
invalid. By rebelling against them one may be setting oneself against some good that 
society has sanctioned. Both Romola and Silas Marner ultimately manage to devote 
themselves to new duties while maintaining a connection with their past in a critical 
way. 
 
The third chapter discusses the relationship between habit and guilt. It does not 
look at guilt over a real transgression, rather it examines what Frances Ferguson terms 
‘circumstantial memory’. This may be summarized as the sense of remorse that occurs 
when the unforeseen outcome of an action is interpreted in such a way as to make it 
seem as though it was subliminally intended. Circumstantial memory has the potential 
both to wound and to heal, to incriminate but at the same time to undo the guilt with 
which an individual is overloaded. The text by Wordsworth discussed in this chapter is 
Book X of The Prelude, in which the poet almost appears to hold himself responsible 
for the blood shed during the French Revolution and blames himself for his involvement 
in it as though there were a force within him that seductively led him to engage with it. 
However, I depart from Ferguson by suggesting that Wordsworth’s guilt is not undone 
and arguing that there is a tug of war between self-recrimination and self-justification in 
his psyche.  
 
Eliot’s treatment of guilt in Adam Bede and ‘Janet’s Repentance’ in Scenes of 
Clerical Life also bears a similarity to Ferguson’s notion of ‘circumstantial memory’. 
Adam’s feeling of implication in his father’s death and Mr. Tryan’s remorse over 
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Lucy’s death represent this kind of memory most accurately. I then investigate Eliot’s 
determinism, which has its source in Christianity and Victorian science, and consider 
why Eliot burdens her characters with such a sense of guilt even though the outcomes of 
their actions are not deliberately intended. I then draw on Bunyan and Mill’s treatment 
of guilt to illustrate that instead of letting her protagonists forever indulge in guilt, Eliot 
turns it into a positive emotion, which provides them with an opportunity to recognize 
their moral blemishes and to reform their moral habits.  This process is paralleled by the 
healing of their traumatic guilt. In this respect, Eliot can be seen as a precursor of 
modern trauma theory. 
 
While the earlier chapters consider individual habit-memory and its relationship 
with a series of key issues—universal humanity, duty and guilt—the fourth and final 
chapter shifts to collective habit-memory. I adopt a phenomenological approach to habit 
and thus provide an alternative way of considering habit-memory. In discussing 
Wordsworth I focus in particular on ‘Michael’, suggesting that Merleau-Ponty’s theory 
illuminates our understanding of Michael’s embodied relationship with his patrimonial 
land, which is manifested in his love for it and his resistance to its loss. I then draw on 
Pierre Bourdieu to argue that both attachment and resistance are the collective 
sentiments of his family group. ‘Michael’ shows Wordsworth’s criticism of the 
intrusion of capitalism, which has prevented the inheritance of the collective memory of 
the agrarian culture. 
 
In The Mill on the Floss, Mr. Tulliver’s relationship with his mill is found to be 
similar to that between Michael and his land. His resistance to its loss, too, is the 
collective resistance of his family group. Mr. Tulliver’s blind clinging to his habitual 
past, which leads to his own destruction, and Maggie’s painful commitment to her 
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collective past reflect Eliot’s conflicting views on the inheritance of collective memory 
which is characteristic of agrarian culture. 
 
On the whole, as the conclusion of my thesis will show, both Wordsworth and 
Eliot are preoccupied with the role of habit-memory in the development of an 
individual’s moral awareness and the coherence of a community. However, compared 
with her predecessor, Eliot is engaged with a wider range of scientific dialogue and her 
treatment of habit-memory is more nuanced. 
Chapter One 
Habit and Humanitarianism in 
‘The Old Cumberland Beggar’, Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda 
 
Introduction 
In The Convention of Cintra, Wordsworth envisages society as a concentric circle, 
with the self as the centre and benevolence as ‘the outermost and all-embracing circle’.1 
Eliot’s religion of humanity also advocates the extension of concern from the self to an 
ever-widening circle. This chapter will explore the humanitarian projects of the two 
writers and argue that for both Wordsworth and Eliot, the network of human relations is 
sustained by a memory of the needs of others and of our concern for them. This memory, 
I suggest, can be enhanced through habit cultivation.  
 
 My reading of Wordsworth’s poem, ‘The Old Cumberland Beggar’, and Eliot’s 
novels Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda will show that, similar though their positions 
are, Eliot puts more emphasis on an individual’s conscientious effort in extending his 
concerns for others, often under the guidance of a morally superior person. By contrast, 
what Wordsworth values is the unconsciousness of this process, and the person who 
converts others to virtue does not have to carry moral agency. 
 
 
                                                 
1 William Wordsworth, The Convention of Cintra, in William Wordsworth, The Prose Works of William 
Wordsworth, ed. by W. J. B. Owen and Jane Smyser, 3 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), I, 340. 
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Thick and Thin Relations 
Before my discussion of habit memory, I would like to draw on Avishai Margalit’s 
idea of ‘the ethics of memory’, as it will facilitate an understanding of the humanitarian 
projects of Wordsworth and Eliot. The Ethics of Memory is a philosophical work written 
in the twenty-first century. Its particular concern surrounds the relations between different 
ethnic groups. In the book, Margalit introduces the binary concepts of ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ 
relations, which derive from Gilbert Ryle’s definition of thick and thin descriptions.2 
Thick relations are in general ‘our relations to the near and dear’.3 Thin relations are ‘our 
relations to the stranger and the remote’. They are ‘backed by the attribute of being 
human’ (Margalit, p. 7). Memory is inherent among thick relations. Margalit argues that 
‘we usually care about our parents, children, spouses, lovers, friends, and by extension 
about some significant groups to which we belong’. As a result, memory is ‘the cement 
that holds thick relations together’ (Margalit, p. 32; p. 8). Communities formed by 
memories are ‘families, clans, tribes, religious communities, and nations’. In contrast, 
memory is lacking within thin relations: ‘We usually lack an attentive concern for the 
well-being of most members of the human race’ (Margalit, p. 69; p. 32). Love is a thick 
relation that can only be directed to those with whom we have ‘historical relations, and 
not just a brief accidental encounter’. Therefore, it is very difficult to form a community 
out of universal humanity: ‘It is hard to carry the memory of isolated and unconnected 
events and people, taken from very different histories’ (Margalit, p. 44; pp. 79-80). 
                                                 
2 In thick and thin descriptions, ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ have to do with interpretation. Thick descriptions move 
beyond neutral observation in order to capture the layers of meaning and implication inherent in a speech or 
gesture. They are culturally bound and historically sensitive. Thin descriptions are more 
context-independent. This concept is given much wider currency by the anthropologist by Clifford Geertz. 
It is an attempt to capture a stratified structure of meaningful structures, or the accumulated structures of 
inference and implication that the anthropologist encounters in the field. 
3 Avishai Margalit, The Ethics of Memory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 7. All 
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Margalit also distinguishes between ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’: ethics ‘guides our thick 
relations’ while morality regulates our thin relations. It is precisely morality’s role to 
‘overcome our natural indifference’ towards those with whom we hold thin relations 
(Margalit, p. 37; p. 33).  
 
Margalit’s division between thick and thin relations is similar to the division 
between ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ by Robert Putnam in his book Bowling Alone: The 
Collapse and Revival of American Community. ‘Bonding’ is similar to thick relations: it 
refers to the act of reaching out to those closest to you. Putnam suggests that people are 
closely connected with and care for one another when they are from a similar background. 
‘Bridging’ is similar to thin relations, in that one does not necessarily feel internally 
concerned with those to whom one is thinly related. Morality is the only external guide, 
and enables people to get on well with others.  Bridging with those with whom one cannot 
bond but must get along is necessary for communities to survive and prosper. In what 
follows, I will discuss the extent to which Wordsworth and Eliot’s humanitarian projects 
fit within and are different from Margalit’s theory, and how they see habit as a reliable 
guide to universal humanity.  
 
‘The Old Cumberland Beggar’ 
In Wordsworth’s own time ‘The Old Cumberland Beggar’ was well received. 
Many readers spoke highly of its moral significance, and some critics further pointed out 
the poem’s educational value. Sir George Beaumont, for example, said that it ‘had more 
                                                                                                                                               
subsequent quotations of this text are from this edition with page numbers given in parentheses. 
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purified his mind than any Sermons had done’.4 James Montgomery suggested that it has 
‘taught us new sympathies’. In this aspect Wordsworth was far superior to any ‘preceding 
poet’ (CH, p. 208). Thomas Noon was particularly impressed by the beggar’s function as 
a binding force of past charities, saying that the poem was ‘one of those which linger most 
tenderly on our memories’, with some lines ‘at once more tear-moving and more sublime 
than the finest things in Cowper’ (CH, pp. 871-2). On the other hand, a few readers did 
not like the didactic style of the poem. Charles Lamb, for example, said that ‘the 
instructions conveyed in it are too direct and like a lecture’ (CH, p. 100).   
 
Contemporary criticism, however, takes a different turn. It is largely focused on 
the way in which the poem reflects Wordsworth’s critical response towards the relief of 
poverty and the war on mendicity launched by the political economists of his time. Mark 
Koch contends that the poet responds to this social phenomenon not by ‘challenging the 
dogma of utility’, but rather by ‘adopting the language of utilitarianism’ and defending 
the mendicant ‘on the ground of his utility’.5 Gary Harrison discusses the ideological 
contradictions in the economy of charity in Wordsworth’s time and shows that this poem 
is ‘one of the forms through which that ideology is produced’.6 David Simpson, on the 
other hand, points out that the poem is ‘anti-Benthamite’.7   David Chandler, while 
recognizing the value of such research, does not agree that this poem presents a 
                                                 
4 William Wordsworth: The Critical Heritage 1793-1820, ed. by Robert Woof (London: Routledge, 2001), I, 
p. 130. All subsequent quotations of this book, abbreviated CH, are from this edition with page numbers 
given in parentheses 
5  Mark Koch, ‘Utilitarian and Reactionary Arguments for Almsgiving in Wordsworth’s “The Old 
Cumberland Beggar”’, Eighteenth Century Life, 13 (1989), 18-33 (p. 23). 
6  Gary Harrison, ‘Wordsworth’s “The Old Cumberland Beggar”: The Economy of Charity in Late 
Eighteenth-Century Britain’, Criticism: A Quarterly for Literature and the Arts, 30 (1988), 23-42 (p. 24). 
7 David Simpson, Wordsworth’s Historical Imagination: The Poetry of Displacement (New York: Methuen, 
1987), p. 172. 
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‘straightforward’ account of Wordsworth’s views on poor relief in the late 1790s, and 
Malthus’s Essay in particular.8 A similar view is held by Philip Connell, who maintains 
that the poem’s connection with Malthus’s Essay is questionable. Though The Fenwick 
Notes, written in 1843, are directed against ‘the political economists’, they should be 
treated as a ‘reflection of Wordsworth’s personal and political concerns in 1843’ rather 
than an ‘authoritative insight into the origins’ of the poem.9  My major concern about 
‘The Old Cumberland Beggar’, however, is not so much the poem’s relationship with 
poor relief, but rather the mechanism of habit and how Wordsworth thinks it helpful in 
addressing the problem of social division in his time.  
 
There are a few points on which Wordsworth’s treatment of thick and thin 
relations differs from that of Margalit. The two writers write at different times with 
different motivations. While Margalit, like Putnam, deals with ethnic relations in the 
twentieth century, Wordsworth is concerned with the relationship within a pre-industrial 
society. More importantly, unlike Margalit, Wordsworth supports the idea of universal 
humanity. Margalit’s memory cements only thick relations, but Wordsworth wants it 
extended to thin relations, especially to the poor and the distressed. He wants to remove 
the boundary between thick and thin relations and to see how people within the same 
community can be thickly related through and through. He makes no distinction between 
morality and ethics. Instead, he advocates the Christian project of making all relations 
thick.  
                                                 
8  David Chandler, ‘Wordsworth versus Malthus: The Political Context(s) of “The Old Cumberland 
Beggar”’, Charles Lamb Bulletin, 115 (2001), 72-85 (p. 72; p. 74). 
9 Philip Connell, Romanticism, Economics and the Question of ‘Culture’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), p. 24. 
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 Different though their ideas are, Margalit’s theory is helpful in understanding 
Wordsworth’s use of memory and how he thinks strangers should be treated within a local 
community. Both of them address the problem of social division. While Margalit deals 
with cultural diversity among different ethnic groups, Wordsworth addresses the problem 
of divisions within the same culture. In Wordsworth’s time in Britain, the country was 
divided along different lines, one of which was the increasing division between the rich 
and the poor as a consequence of industrialization. Poverty was one of the most important 
issues confronting Britain in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
Wordsworth’s A Guide through the District of the Lakes records how the ‘estatesmen’ 
became poverty-stricken by the invention and universal application of machinery and lost 
their land.10 With the widening gap between rich and poor, the political theory advocated 
by Edmund Burke that man can only love those to whom he is immediately related 
threatened to intensify such a division. Burke famously claims that ‘to be attached to the 
subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle […] of 
public affections’.11  Thick relations provide a model upon which society at large is built. 
Patriotism, and even love of mankind, must be an extension of the love for those nearest 
to us. Hazlitt, though himself a radical all his life, gives his enemy Burke credit for his 
insight: man is essentially ‘a creature of habit and feeling’.12 A man acts in accordance 
with his nature to love his relatives, because he can only love those he knows best and 
                                                 
10 Wordsworth, A Guide through the District of the Lakes, in Prose Works, II, 224. ‘Estatesmen’ is an 
etymologizing perversion of statesmen, which means Cumberland or Westmorland yeomen (OED). 
11 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. by Conor Cruise O’Brien (London: Penguin, 
1986), p. 135. 
12 William Hazlitt, ‘Character of Mr. Burke’, in Selected Writings, ed. by Jon Cook (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), p. 55. 
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who most affect him. This is because with his limited understanding, he cannot show 
equal concern to everyone.  
 
The widening gap between the rich and the poor was manifested by hatred 
towards the poor, and the cruel ‘war upon mendicancy’ recorded in The Fenwick Notes.13 
Together with the ethics of self-reliance and the prevailing attitude suggesting that 
poverty resulted from a refusal to accept one’s social place and attendant duties, this gave 
rise to the workhouse system, where the poor were supposed to work for their relief. 14 
Most of these workhouses were comfortless and unhealthy asylums for the deprived, and 
aggravated the division between the rich and the poor. Another social division lay 
between the well-educated and the poor, which I will discuss later in this section. ‘The 
Old Cumberland Beggar’ captures these divisions. But Wordsworth is not happy with the 
use of morality, or bridging, to mend them, as they are merely external means of getting 
along. He wants memory, which is inherent in thick relations, to be cultivated among thin 
relations. He wants the rich and the educated to feel internally bound to the poor.  
 
This project is achieved through habit-formation. Here I would like to turn to 
Hume’s theory of habit as it contributes to an understanding of Wordsworth’s view that 
habit is the guide of moral life. Discussions of the connection between Hume and 
Wordsworth are often centred on their treatment of personal identity. In the view of 
Robert Langbaum, Hume sees the continuity of personal experience as a fiction. By 
                                                 
13 William Wordsworth, The Fenwick Notes of William Wordsworth, ed. by Jared Curtis (London: Bristol 
Classical Press, 1993), p. 56. 
14 See David Robert, The Social Conscience of the Early Victorians (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
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contrast, Wordsworth sees it as ‘the fundamental reality’. Thus, in dealing with the issue 
of identity, Wordsworth bears more resemblance to Locke and Hartley than to Hume.15 
Although he does not connect Wordsworth directly with Hume, Thomas Keymer puts 
Wordsworth’s The Prelude, which is repeatedly invaded by ‘a sense of disjuncture’, 
within the context of the sceptical philosophy of the eighteenth century, in which Hume’s 
instability of subjectivity occupies a central place.16 Michael Rossington points out that 
both find it difficult to know the past. He argues that Hume’s idea of memory, which 
seeks to overcome the ‘essential discontinuity’ in human experience, anticipates 
Wordsworth’s treatment of memory in The Prelude.17  
 
Hume expresses a deep distrust of reason. For him, habit, or custom, is an 
important principle of human nature:  
 
For whatever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a 
propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by 
any reasoning or process of the understanding, we always say, that this 
propensity is the effect of Custom.18  
 
                                                                                                                                               
Press, 2002), pp. 44-54. 
15 Robert Langbaum, The Mysteries of Identity: A Theme in Modern Literature (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1977), p. 29. 
16 Thomas Keymer, ‘Sterne and Romantic Autobiography’, in The Cambridge Companion to English 
Literature, 1740-1830, ed. by Thomas Keymer and Jon Mee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), pp. 173-93 (p. 186). 
17 Michael Rossington, ‘Introduction: Enlightenment and Romantic Memory’, in Theories of Memory: A 
Reader, ed. by Michael Rossington and Anne Whitehead (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 
pp. 70-4 (p. 72). 
18 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. 
by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 43 (original emphasis). 
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Its effect upon the mind is twofold, ‘bestowing a facility in the performance of any action 
[…]; and afterwards a tendency or inclination towards it’. 19  ‘All inferences from 
experience’, Hume argues, are ‘effects of custom, not of reasoning’. Hence, habit is ‘the 
great guide of human life’.20 It is particularly important in guiding moral life, and any 
theory of morality should, ‘by proper representations of the deformity of vice and beauty 
of virtue, beget correspondent habits’.21 For Hume, morality is ‘more properly felt than 
judg’d of’.22 He refutes the claim of moral rationalists that reason alone can arrive at vice 
and virtue. Rather, he suggests, reason can only decide if the possible consequences of an 
action are pernicious or useful, and it is up to feeling to decide which to choose. Moral 
approval is a feeling of pleasure and moral disapproval a feeling of pain: ‘to have the 
sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the 
contemplation of a character’.23  
 
In his ‘Essay on Morals’, written in 1798, Wordsworth’s argument is similar to 
that of Hume. Habit, instead of reason, is shown to be a guide, and Wordsworth asserts 
that ‘[i]n a [? strict] sense all our actions are the result of our habits’, over which reason is 
‘impotent’.24 Like Hume, Wordsworth also opposes reason to feeling where morality is 
concerned, and feeling is the decisive factor: ‘We do not argue in defence of our good 
actions, we feel internally their beneficent effect’. The performance of virtue is a habitual 
act carried out absent-mindedly: ‘Even when we are called upon to justify our conduct, 
                                                 
19 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by David Norton and Mary Norton (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2000; repr. 2001), p. 271 (original emphasis). 
20 Hume, Enquiries, pp. 43-4. 
21 Hume, Enquiries, p. 172. 
22 Hume, A Treatise, p. 302. 
23 Hume, A Treatise, p. 303 (original emphasis). 
24 Wordsworth, ‘Essay on Morals’, in Prose Works, I, 103. 
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we perform the task with languor & indifference’.25 
 
‘The Old Cumberland Beggar’, I suggest, is an example of how habit guides 
moral life. In his note to the poem, Wordsworth emphasizes the historically habitual 
nature of begging. Beggars ‘confined themselves to a stated round in their neighbourhood, 
and had certain fixed days, on which […] they regularly received alms’.26 In this light, it 
is not insignificant that the old beggar looks virtually unchanged over the years: old, weak 
and helpless. Regular begging in turn leads the alms-givers to a virtuous life:    
 
Where’er the aged Beggar takes his rounds,    
The mild necessity of use compels 
To acts of love; and habit does the work  
Of reason, yet prepares that after joy 
Which reason cherishes. And thus the soul, 
By that sweet taste of pleasure unpursued     
Doth find itself insensibly disposed  
To virtue and true goodness. (OCB, ll. 90-7) 
 
The beggar makes the villagers’ behaviour habitual. ‘Use’ here, of course, means 
                                                 
25 Wordsworth, ‘Essay on Morals’, in Prose Works, I, 104 (original emphasis). 
26 William Wordsworth, ‘The Old Cumberland Beggar’, in The Major Works, ed. by Stephen Gill (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 49 (my emphasis). The quotation is from Wordsworth’s introductory 
note to the poem. All subsequent quotations of this poem, abbreviated OCB, are from this edition with line 
numbers given in parentheses. 
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‘accustomed practice or procedure’ (OED). ‘Compels’ conveys the power of habit: the 
villagers cannot help but be charitable. As the Humean concept of habit suggests, the 
beggar’s itinerary is important. It facilitates charity and fosters a tendency to give. As 
with the acquisition of skills, the better one is trained, the more spontaneous the 
performance becomes. The involuntary and absent-minded charity of the 
horseman-traveller, the toll-gate tender and the post-boy suggests that they are very well 
trained to perform acts of benevolence. Conversely, the less frequently one repeats the 
action, the more easily one tends to forget about it. As the poet remarks, if it were not for 
the punctual presence of the beggar, human nature would probably yield to another habit: 
‘by sure steps’ given to ‘selfishness and cold oblivious cares’ (OCB, ll. 86-7).  
 
The act of habitual charity gives the villagers a ‘sweet taste of pleasure’. 
‘Insensibly disposed’ is a striking phrase in which the adverb refers to the ‘unconscious’ 
nature of the prompting to generosity (OED). The customary act of charity and the 
pleasurable feeling which follows are achieved without the exercise of the will. Rather, 
they are ‘unpursued’. The villagers are not conscious of what they are doing, nor do they 
resort to any process of reasoning. It seems that virtuous acts, pleasure and the exalted 
feeling of virtue are a train of motions and emotions triggered spontaneously by giving to 
the beggar. By asserting that moral sense involves a habitual feeling of pleasure, 
Wordsworth refutes Godwin, who is opposed to the reliance upon habit for moral 
guidance and stresses instead that virtuous actions should be preceded by a rational 
decision based on correct premises.27  Though reason can perhaps also achieve this, 
                                                 
27 William Godwin, Political and Philosophical Writings, ed. by Mark Philp, 7 vols  (London: William 
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Wordsworth contends that habit works more effectively. It is ‘a guided, but unreasoning, 
impulse’ which ‘gives all the sanction to an act that we could hope to obtain from rational 
reflection’.28  
 
Besides habitualizing their behaviour, the presence of the beggar also prompts the 
villagers to think in a particular way:  
 
minds like these,     
In childhood, from this solitary being,    
This helpless wanderer, have perchance received, 
[…] 
That first mild touch of sympathy and thought,     
In which they found their kindred with a world  
Where want and sorrow were. (OCB, ll. 101-8)  
   
The villagers are not only trained to perform benevolent acts mechanically, they are 
prompted to come to the awareness that others are living in a world of suffering and 
deprivation, as the phrase ‘sympathy and thought’ suggests. ‘Mild touch’ indicates that 
such awareness is not arrived at through analytical reasoning, as is advocated by Godwin. 
Rather, it is an intimation, even an epiphanic experience, very similar to the education 
                                                                                                                                               
Pickering, 1993), IV, An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice: Variants, 33-4. 
28 David Bromwich, Disowned by Memory: Wordsworth’s Poetry of the 1790s (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998), p. 33. 
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Wordsworth receives from nature in poems such as ‘Nutting’ and the ‘Stealing of the 
Boat’ episode in The Prelude. Such a mode of awareness, once set into motion, will crop 
up as involuntarily as the performance of charitable deeds. This is what Locke terms the 
‘habit of Thinking’, which is settled by ‘custom’ and belongs to ‘Trains of Motion in the 
Animal Spirits’.29  
 
As Robin Jarvis points out, the cultivation of the benevolent instinct of the 
villagers is ‘rather like the formation of the mind and morals of the child by the subliminal 
influence of natural objects which Wordsworth theorizes in Book I of The Prelude’.30 In 
Book VIII, the poet summarizes nature’s influence on his mind:     
 
[...] all without regard 
As both may seem—are fastening on the heart  
Insensibly, each with the other’s help, 
So that we love, not knowing that we love,  
And feel, not knowing whence our feeling comes.31 
 
The position of ‘Insensibly’ at the beginning as well as the repetition of ‘not knowing’ 
                                                 
29 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by Peter Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1975; repr. 1979), p. 396. 
30 Robin Jarvis, ‘Wordsworth and the Use of Charity’, in Beyond Romanticism: New Approaches to Texts 
and Contexts 1780-1832, ed. by Stephen Copley and John Whale (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 200-17 (p. 
210). 
31 William Wordsworth, The Prelude: 1799, 1805, 1850, Authoritative Texts, Context and Reception, Recent 
Critical Essays, ed. by Jonathan Wordsworth, M. H. Abrams and Stephen Gill (New York: Norton, 1979), 
1805, Book VIII, lines 168-72. All subsequent quotations of this poem are from this edition with line 
numbers given in parentheses. 
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highlights the unselfconscious manner of the way in which nature works on the mind. Just 
as the beggar ‘disposes’ the villagers ‘insensibly’ to moral virtue, so nature disposes the 
poet ‘insensibly’ to the love of mankind, without the exercise of his will and his 
awareness of the development of such a feeling.    
 
What Jarvis does not point out is the similar function of nature and the beggar in 
the extension of love from thick relations to thin relations through nurturing habits, 
namely memory:  
 
For I already had been taught to love  
My fellow-beings, to such habits trained 
Among the woods and mountains, where I found 
In thee a gracious guide to lead me forth 
Beyond the bosom of my family, 
My friends and youthful playmates. ’Twas thy power 
That raised the first complacency in me, 
And noticeable kindliness of heart, 
Love human to the creature in himself 
As he appeared, a stranger in my path, 
Before my eyes a brother of this world. (VIII, ll. 69-79) 
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Nature’s education is a training of ‘habits’, or more specifically habits of love, that goes 
beyond the narrowness of the love for one’s relatives and friends to include human beings 
in general. In this process, thin relations (a stranger in my path) are converted into thick 
relations (a brother of this world). Furthermore, Wordsworth seems to be concerned about 
the social implications of Burke’s emphasis on the importance of relatives in the 
development of our love of mankind in general. That is, as my earlier argument shows, 
Burke’s emphasis on the centrality of love for one’s relations may result in love stopping 
at those closest to us, and going no further. The role of nature is important, as Wordsworth 
needs to be ‘taught’ and ‘led […] forth’ to love those thinly related to him. Likewise, 
without the presence of the old beggar, the villagers’ love and concern will be limited to 
those ‘with whom they dwell’ (OCB, l. 132). Transition to the love of man in general 
cannot happen by itself; it has to be ‘trained’ through nurturing habits. Something is 
needed to effect its happening, either a natural object or a human being.   
 
It must be noted that though the education the villagers receive through the beggar 
bears some similarities with the education the poet receives from nature in its 
unconscious process and the movement from thick to thin relations, there are a few points 
on which they differ. Firstly, nature in The Prelude carries moral agency whereas the 
beggar does not. Moreover, in being led by nature towards benevolence and love of 
mankind, the poet’s role is characterized by passivity. In the case of the beggar, by 
contrast, the villagers play an active role. They need to perform acts of benevolence in 
order to remember the needs of others.  
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Though the workings of habit in this poem may be divided into its influence on 
behaviour and thinking, there is no clear-cut distinction between the two. They work 
together to reform the moral habit of the local community. As the poet says, ‘let him 
prompt the unlettered Villagers / To tender offices and pensive thoughts’ (OCB, ll. 162-3), 
with ‘tender offices’ indicating the act of benevolence towards the beggar and ‘pensive 
thoughts’ denoting the awareness of the deprivation of other people prompted by the 
presence of the beggar. In this way, people will be able to reach out to the far and remote 
and develop the Christian conception of brotherhood: 
 
[...] Many, I believe, there are       
Who live a life of virtuous decency, 
Men who can hear the Decalogue and feel 
No self-reproach, who of the moral law 
Established in the land where they abide  
Are strict observers, and not negligent,      
Meanwhile, in any tenderness of heart 
Or act of love to those with whom they dwell,  
Their kindred, and the children of their blood. 
Praise be to such, and to their slumbers peace! 
—But of the poor man ask, the abject poor,    
Go and demand of him, if there be here 
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In this cold abstinence from evil deeds,  
And these inevitable charities, 
Wherewith to satisfy the human soul. 
No—man is dear to man:  
[…] we have all of us one human heart. (OCB, ll. 125-46)  
 
The rich practise Margalit’s theory of ethics and morality: they love only those closely 
related to them, ‘their kindred and the children of their blood’. For Wordsworth, this is 
only ‘inevitable charity’, namely, a natural act common to all. It does not constitute a 
special virtue. 
 
 Wordsworth’s view can be seen to belong to the Christian tradition, exemplified 
in Jesus’s denial of blood relationships in Matthew 12:50.32 In claiming that ‘whoever 
does the will of my Father in heaven is my brother and sister and mother’, Jesus attempts 
to remove the boundary between thick and thin relations and to create a Christian 
commonwealth. Similarly, Wordsworth preaches that an individual should overcome his 
natural concern, which is confined to kinship, and extend it to the poor. The reason is 
simple: ‘We have all of us one human heart’. Moreover, removal of the boundary 
between thick and thin involves actively reaching out. In the Bible, Jesus states that 
humankind must do ‘the will of my Father in heaven’. Jesus also tells a rich young man 
that abiding by the Commandments alone does not constitute a virtuous life (Matthew 19: 
                                                 
32 Wordsworth’s religious outlook will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
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16-29; Luke 18: 18-22). A literal and rigid understanding of the Commandments misses 
the essence of Jesus’s teaching. Only when the young man gives everything he has to the 
poor will he be assured of treasure in heaven. In this respect, therefore, Wordsworth can 
be seen to echo the Bible. He is not impressed with those ‘strict observers’ of the 
Decalogue, since ‘strict’ may well denote rigidity and lack of human warmth as well as 
unrelaxing adherence to moral law. With only ‘cold abstinence’ from evil deeds, the 
virtue of the rich is at best that of passivity; they only try to get along with people who are 
thickly related to them. For Margalit, this may be natural, as we all tend to love those 
sharing a meaningful past with us rather than those with whom we have only an 
accidental encounter. But for Wordsworth, this is not enough. A mere clear conscience 
does not make a true Christian. The absence of ‘self-reproach’ highlights the 
complacency of the rich. It is especially ironic if we remember that the well-off accused 
the poor of lacking in fine feelings, forgetting that they are the salt of the earth. Hedged 
between disapproval and irony, the phrase ‘Praise be to such, and to their slumbers 
peace!’ also acquires an ironic twist in this context. 
 
While this poem brings to light ‘the process of being converted by the work of 
habit’,33 a parallel process takes place in Wordsworth’s readers, the polite audience for 
whom Wordsworth is writing and with whom he has a great deal in common. As 
mentioned earlier, the gap between this group of people and the poor is another social 
division Wordsworth wants to bridge. In a letter to John Wilson, Wordsworth laments that 
well-educated people have a habitual misunderstanding of the poor: they ‘cannot bear to 
                                                 
33 Bromwich, p. 34. 
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see delicate and refined feelings ascribed to men in low conditions of society, because 
their vanity and self-love tell them that these belong only to themselves and men like 
themselves in dress, station, and way of life’.34 This misunderstanding occurs because 
they do not reach out to the lower classes. They only ‘associate with’ people of their own 
class, and ‘few descend lower among cottages and fields and among children’ (LWW, p. 
52). This may be compared to the ‘vulgarity of exclusiveness’ Eliot refers to in her essay 
‘The Natural History of German Life’, which I will discuss in detail in the next section.35  
 
‘The Old Cumberland Beggar’, and in a sense Lyrical Ballads as a whole, are 
intended to correct this habitual mistake. The poems in Lyrical Ballads seek to 
‘disconcert the polite reader, […] to suggest that his “natural” modes of feeling and 
response are not “natural” at all’.36 A poet, Wordsworth says, should not only reflect, but 
also ‘rectify men’s feelings’ and ‘enlarge our feelings of reverence for our species, and 
our knowledge of human nature’ (LWW, p. 52; p. 43). This task is accomplished through 
the formation of new habits. Reading Wordsworth’s poetry is a process of habit formation, 
or more accurately, of habit reformation. Wordsworth is aware that in writing poetry, a 
poet is expected to satisfy certain readerly expectations conditioned by previous reading 
experiences, which he calls ‘habits of association’.37 Yet he sets out to ‘counteract’ and 
reform rather than gratify reading habits, because in his eyes, the habits of his readers are 
                                                 
34 William Wordsworth, Letters of William Wordsworth: A New Selection, ed. by Alan Hill (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984), p. 51. All subsequent quotations of this book, abbreviated LWW, are from this 
edition with page numbers given in parentheses 
35 George Eliot, ‘The Natural History of German Life’, in Selected Critical Writings, ed. by Rosemary 
Ashton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 263. 
36 Heather Glen, Vision and Disenchantment: Blake’s Songs and Wordsworth’s Lyrical Ballads (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 54. 
37 Wordsworth, ‘Preface to Lyrical Ballads’, in The Major Works, p. 596. All subsequent quotations of this 
article, abbreviated PLB, are from this edition with page numbers given in parentheses. 
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not healthy. He mourns their ‘degrading thirst’ for sensational literature, like ‘frantic 
novels, sickly and stupid German Tragedies, and deluges of idle and extravagant stories 
in verse’ (PLB, p. 599). Such reading habits are pernicious and threaten morality. For 
Wordsworth, poetry has a pragmatic purpose, which is to educate readers and ameliorate 
their feelings:  
 
For our continued influxes of feeling are modified and directed by our 
thoughts, which are indeed the representatives of all our past feelings; and, 
as by contemplating the relation of these general representatives to each 
other we discover what is really important to men, so, by the repetition and 
continuance of this act, our feelings will be connected with important 
subjects, till at length, if we be originally possessed of much sensibility, 
such habits of mind will be produced, that, by obeying blindly and 
mechanically the impulses of those habits, we shall describe objects, and 
utter sentiments, of such a nature and in such connection with each other, 
that the understanding of the being to whom we address ourselves, if he be 
in a healthful state of association, must necessarily be in some degree 
enlightened, and his affections ameliorated. (PLB, p. 598)  
 
Anne-Lise François comments on the way in which Wordsworth ‘puts his trust in “habits 
of the mind”’, both on a personal level and in relation to his readers.38 His habits of mind 
will ultimately lead to the amelioration of his readers’ habits of mind through the act of 
                                                 
38 Anne-Lise François, ‘To Hold in Common and Know by Heart: The Prevalence of Gentle Forces in 
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reading. The habits thus work on two levels. On the one hand, poetic composition relies 
on healthy ‘habits of mind’. It departs from sensational literature and habitually connects 
the ‘feelings’ of the poet with ‘important subjects’, most often found in the life of rural 
people. If he follows such habits ‘blindly and mechanically’, Wordsworth insists, a poet 
will be able to produce works of enlightening and educational value. On the other hand, 
his poetry puts a demand on his readers, encouraging them to follow his habit of creation. 
If they can follow the ‘important subjects’ the poet represents and appreciate the way in 
which he ‘describes objects’ and ‘utters sentiments’ in the same manner as the villagers 
follow the beggar, their reading habits will be rectified, and their attitudes towards the 
poor corrected.       
 
Moreover, in order for the well-educated to understand his poetry, Wordsworth 
encourages them to overcome their narrow-minded exclusiveness and associate regularly 
with the poor. This is not only because his poetry is about poor people, but also because 
their simple life is free from ‘false refinements, wayward and artificial desires, […] 
effeminate habits of thinking and feeling’ and is thus more representative of human nature 
(LWW, p. 52). Wordsworth points out to John Wilson that unlike Wordsworth himself, 
middle class people do not have regular association with the poor and the marginalized: 
‘A man must have done this habitually before his judgment upon the Idiot Boy would be 
in any way decisive with me. I know I have done this myself habitually’ (LWW, p. 52, 
original emphasis). Wordsworth claims, in other words, that his readers, after regular 
association with rural people, will be able properly to understand his poetry. 
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 By correcting the habits of the well-educated in thinking about the poor and thus 
removing the boundary between the two groups, Wordsworth claims, the poet will 
ultimately move a step closer to his project of universal humanity:   
 
In spite of difference of soil and climate, of language and manners, of laws 
and customs, […] the Poet binds together by passion and knowledge the 
vast empire of human society, as it is spread over the whole earth, and over 
all time. (PLB, p. 606)  
 
Transcending the differences of space, race, and culture which divide the human world 
into different thick relations, Wordsworth has in mind a commonwealth which is 
universal and eternal, and which knits men into one thickly related brotherhood.  
 
‘The strangest feature of Wordsworth’s account of thoughts and feelings, and the 
way that together they may achieve an amelioration of the affections’, according to 
Bromwich,  ‘is the central role he assigns to habit’.39 Through Margalit’s thick and thin 
relations and Hume’s theory of habit, I have attempted to show that in Wordsworth’s view, 
besides this central role in the development of an individual’s sensibility, habit also has 
the social function of cementing a community. With the help of this reliable guide, 
humanity will ‘live, and spread, and kindle’ (OCB, l. 101). With this in place, 
                                                 
39 Bromwich, p. 96. 
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Wordsworth envisages a society in which there is no division because there is no 
distinction between thick and thin. 
 
Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda 
Critical studies of the role of memory in George Eliot’s last two novels, especially 
Daniel Deronda, are often centred around the problematic relationship between past and 
present. Santanu Majumdar contends that in Middlemarch, Dorothea’s memory disrupts 
the sense of a unified selfhood. The way memory works in this novel, he suggests, ‘paves 
the way for’ Daniel Deronda, in which the disruptive role of memory plays ‘an even 
larger part’.40 Delia da Sousa Correa also points out that in Daniel Deronda, musical 
memory ‘complicates issues of identity’ and undermines the distinctions between 
‘consciousness and oblivion, future and past’.41 In a similar vein, Michael Davis suggests 
that it is precisely Deronda’s distancing from his childhood memory which signals ‘his 
establishment as an emotionally mature and directed adult’. The harmony between his 
racial past and present is achieved ‘to the exclusion’ of a large part of his childhood 
past.42 My main concern, however, is not so much the relationship between memory and 
individual identity, but the way in which these novels demonstrate, in a manner similar to 
that observed in Wordsworth, how habit cultivation can extend memory from an 
individual to his fellow creatures and breed a sense of universal humanity. 
 
                                                 
40 Santanu Majumdar, ‘Memory and Identity in Wordsworth and in George Eliot’s Middlemarch’, The 
Critical Review, 36 (1996), 41-61 (p. 60). 
41 Delia Da Sousa Correa, ‘“The Music Vibrating in Her Still”: Music and Memory in George Eliot’s The 
Mill on the Floss and Daniel Deronda’, Nineteenth-Century Contexts, 21 (2000), 541-63 (p. 542). 
42 Michael Davis, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Psychology: Exploring the Unmapped Country 
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In a claim that amounts to an announcement of the effective death of God before 
Nietzsche’s famous declaration, Eliot says that salvation can no longer be found in God, 
but in human relations: salvation is ‘not to be sought in metaphysical refinements about a 
“personal God”, but is to be found in our idealization of human relations and human 
needs’.43 Her claim, as I hope to demonstrate, is informed both by Feuerbach’s religious 
humanism and by the concept of organicism in Victorian science. Such an idealized 
human relationship, she argues, can be achieved through memory. As in Wordsworth’s 
case, Margalit’s distinction between thick and thin relations can illuminate our 
understanding of the role played by memory in Eliot’s humanitarian project. However, 
rather than extending memory from the thick to the thin, which is the case in ‘The Old 
Cumberland Beggar’, Eliot believes that people should extend memory from themselves 
to their fellow men, whether thickly or thinly related to them. Remembering the 
well-being of other people, Eliot suggests, will enable us to overcome our innate 
selfishness so that we will be able to reach out to our fellow creatures. 
 
Eliot’s belief in human relations is informed by Feuerbach, whose The Essence of 
Christianity she translated into English and with whose ideas she could at one point 
announce that she ‘everywhere’ agrees.44 Feuerbach argues that the theological concept 
of God to be found in Christianity is ‘human nature purified’ and ‘made objective’.45 As 
such it should serve to strengthen the ties of human relations. Christianity goes wrong, 
                                                 
43 George Eliot, The George Eliot Letters, ed. by Gordon Haight, 9 vols (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
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44 Eliot, Letters, II, 153. 
45 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. by Marian Evans (London: John Chapman, 1854), 
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 65 
 
however, when it encourages men to love each other for the sake of God, that is to say, 
when it makes the love of man derivative of the love of God. Instead, Feuerbach posits 
that love in itself is original and religious:   
 
The relations of child and parent, of husband and wife, of brother and 
friend, —in general, of man to man,—in short, all the moral relations are 
per se religious. Life as a whole is, in its essential, substantial relations, 
throughout of a divine nature. (Feuerbach, p. 268)  
 
‘The true or anthropological essence of religion’ (the title of Part I of The Essence of 
Christianity) consists of the command to love one another. The problem with Christianity 
is that it reverses the fundamental and the derivative. The love of man, which should be 
fundamental, becomes subordinate to the love of God. And the idea of God is such that it 
alienates men from the love of each other by making them believe that only through his 
holy power can their relations become holy. Feuerbach wants to restore what is original 
and wants men to see that their relationships with each other are sacred ‘in and by 
themselves’ (Feuerbach, p. 268). Moreover, Feuerbach can be seen to extend the divinity 
of moral relations from the thick to the thin, from the near and dear to man in general.  
 
Eliot’s echoes of Feuerbach are most obvious in ‘Evangelical Teaching: Dr 
Cumming’, a scathing attack on what she sees as the subordination within this 
fundamentalist strand of Christianity, in particular of human love to the love of God. 
Human relations in themselves, she insists, are essentially religious while the theological 
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concept of God is ‘an extension and multiplication of the effects produced by human 
sympathy’.46 It can serve to intensify such religiousness by ‘sharing and aiding our 
human sympathies’ and ‘strengthening the bond between man and man’ (ET, p. 169). Dr 
Cumming, however, preaches that human love is derivative of the love of God, which can 
only weaken human ties and make people feel that they have relation only ‘to Him’ (ET, p. 
169). Like Wordsworth, in other words, Eliot relates the command to love one another to 
Christianity, although her understanding of theology is more radical. 
 
Eliot’s belief that salvation lies in human relations can also be related to the 
concept of the ‘organism’, which is central to Victorian Science because ‘advances in 
geology and biology’ had demonstrated ‘the essential unity of life forms and organic 
systems’.47 Darwin argues that ‘all living and extinct forms can be grouped together in 
one great system [...] connected together by the most complex and radiating lines of 
affinities’. 48  Spencer, Lewes and Comte extend the notion of ‘organism’ from the 
biological to the sociological sphere. They propose that ‘the growth and interdependence 
of society—the social organism—are governed by the operation of the same immutable 
laws that govern physiological life’.49 Comte further relates the notion of ‘organism’ 
directly to humanity: he sees humanity as ‘the greatest of all organisms’.50 With ‘love’ as 
                                                 
46 Eliot, ‘Evangelical Teaching: Dr Cumming’, in Selected Critical Writings, p. 169. All subsequent 
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its principle, its existence depends entirely upon ‘mutual Love knitting together its 
various parts’ (Comte, I, p. 264).  
 
Organicism is important for Eliot because after her abandonment of the 
theological doctrines which knit human relations into one brotherhood through God’s 
love, it answers her need to retain this thick relation without the need to resort to a 
metaphysical God. As Tim Dolin points out, it enables her to retain ‘the commanding 
ethical dimension built into the very notion of an organism’s interdependence’.51 I would 
like to suggest that Comte’s idea of humanity, as an organism knitted together by love and 
memory, is particularly important for Eliot. 
 
Habit cultivation, for Eliot, is essential in cultivating our memory of our 
fellowmen and in actualizing our idealized relation to humanity in general. There are 
three issues central to habit cultivation in the Victorian period: inheritance versus 
cultivation, the physiological basis of moral habit, and the importance of the social 
medium. In what follows, I will deal with these issues one by one, as this will demonstrate 
the importance of habit in Eliot’s humanitarian project. 
 
There was a wide debate in the Victorian period about whether the ability to care 
about others was inherited or cultivated. Spencer’s evolutionary associationism holds that 
the formation of moral instincts, like that of other instincts, is the result of accumulated 
experiences of utility, gradually organized and inherited. It has no basis in ‘the individual 
                                                 
51 Dolin, p. 203. 
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experiences of utility’.52 Darwin’s view on inheritance and cultivation is more balanced 
than that of Spencer. He does not deny the importance of cultivation as Spencer does. For 
him, sympathy, as one of the social feelings, is ‘fundamentally innate and inherited’. 
However, its development cannot be separated from social factors such as ‘habit, 
imitation and the wishes of the community’.53  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, Mill and Lewes hold that cultivation is more 
important. For Mill, moral feelings, like other skills, are acquired through training. What 
is innate only plays a very little part, which enables moral feelings to spring up 
spontaneously ‘in a certain small degree’. Their development relies on cultivation.  Yet 
moral feelings are not less natural because they are acquired. Like the capability of 
speaking a language, they are ‘a natural outgrowth’ from our nature. In other words, they 
are our second nature.54 Lewes, as I mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis, also sees 
cultivation as essential for the development of moral habits.  
 
Eliot is sympathetic with Mill and Lewes regarding the priority of cultivation over 
inheritance. Her view on this issue is expressed in her editing and revising of Lewes’s 
posthumous work, the first volume of the third series of Problems of Life and Mind: The 
Study of Psychology.55 In the section entitled ‘The Moral Sense’, she points out that the 
moral sense in man 
                                                 
52 Herbert Spencer, An Autobiography, 2 vols (London: Williams and Norgate, 1904), II, 89. 
53 See Davis for a more detailed discussion, p. 54. 
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section, see K. K. Collins, ‘G. H. Lewes Revised: George Eliot and the Moral Sense’, Victorian Studies, 21 
(1978), 463-92. 
 69 
 
 cannot properly be said to be connate otherwise than as a musical sense is 
connate: it no more brings with it conceptions of what is right, what wrong, 
than the musical aptitude brings with it a symphony of Beethoven. What it 
carries are certain organised predispositions that spontaneously or docilely 
issue in the beneficent forms of action which the experience of society has 
classed as right. 56 
 
Eliot disagrees with Spencer that moral sense can be inherited without any basis in 
individual experience, saying that this is an exaggeration of the action of heredity (SP, p. 
152). Eliot does believe that moral sense is inherited, but the inheritance is schematic, like 
musical aptitude, which alone can never make a Beethoven. In order for it to work, 
sustained training is necessary. We train our children and domestic animals to develop the 
right habit by giving ‘expressions of approbation and disapprobation’. Similarly, men are 
trained to develop moral habits by the approbation and disapprobation from ‘custom, law 
and public opinion’ (SP, p. 145).   
 
Eliot’s belief in the supreme role of habit cultivation over inheritance in the 
development of moral habits is also influenced by phrenological conceptions that moral 
sense is physiologically based, and can be enhanced through exercise. According to Franz 
Joseph Gall’s phrenology, ‘psychological faculties were dependent on separate organic 
                                                 
56 George Henry Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind: Third Series: Problem the First: The Study of 
Psychology: Its Object, Scope, and Method (London: Trübner, 1879), p. 145 (original emphasis). All 
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structures within the brain’. It was therefore ‘possible to estimate an individual’s 
character from the shape of his skull’.57 Originally, Gall’s theory had nothing to do with 
morality, but some of his disciples developed a ‘moral philosophy’ out of it, and the idea 
of the possibility of cultivating moral actions through the exercise of these faculties. 
Charles Bray, for example, proposed that although ‘all the faculties were supposed to 
exist in everyone in different degrees’, they were modifiable through exercise or neglect 
(Wright, p. 35; p. 36). Auguste Comte’s cerebral theory can be seen as a development of 
Gall’s phrenology. He divides the ‘affective motors’ into two basic groups, the personal, 
or egoistic, and the social, or altruistic. These emotional faculties form ‘a ladder, a scale 
against which individuals can be measured and up which they can climb or fall’ through 
proper exercise or neglect (Wright, p. 36). Inborn egotism is thus modifiable through 
practice. Comte also points out that the victory of social feeling over innate self-love is 
rendered possible only by ‘a slow and difficult training of the heart’ (Comte, I, p. 285). 
Different as they are, both Comte and Bray emphasize the importance of cultivation in the 
modification of innate qualities. As in the acquisition of other skills, the more one 
practises altruism, the better one is able to perform it. Eliot’s familiarity with Bray and 
Comte’s theories is well documented.58 Many of her characters, as I will show in the next 
section, gradually overcome their egotism and learn to care more about the well-being of 
their fellow creatures through constant exercise.   
 
While exercise is important in modifying people’s inherited propensity for charity 
                                                 
57  T. R. Wright, ‘From Bumps to Morals: The Phrenological Background to George Eliot’s Moral 
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and enhancing their ability to care about others, a proper social medium is also 
indispensable in the cultivation of moral habits. ‘Medium’, like ‘organism’, is an 
important concept in Victorian science. Lewes defines it as ‘the sum of external 
conditions affecting the organism’ and terms it one of the two factors that produce an 
individual object.59 Darwin notes that man has the capacity to be habituated to a new 
social medium: ‘he has great power of adapting his habits to new conditions of life’.60 
During the process of adaptation, Lewes points out, new habits are formed: 
 
Corresponding with the fluctuations in the Medium there must necessarily 
be fluctuations of Adaptation, […] it is only when these fluctuations cease 
that the Adaptation becomes Habit. This is the interpretation of the phrase 
“Habit is second nature”.61  
 
An organism is capable of adapting itself to its medium. More importantly, a change of 
medium can lead to a change of habit. Once the fluctuation of adaptation ceases, an action 
becomes ingrained into memory and the performance can be carried out with greater ease.  
 
My reading of Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda will suggest that Eliot’s 
idealized human relation is realized through an individual’s memory of his fellow men. 
Memory is important in prompting Eliot’s characters to reach out to those either thickly or 
thinly related to them, and in strengthening the bond between man and man. As Hao Li 
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60 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man (New York: Prometheus, 1998), p. 131. 
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suggests, for Eliot, memory of other people’s sufferings may ‘remind a character of the 
need to cherish sympathy’.62 Many of her characters are in the habit of remembering the 
difficulties their fellow creatures are going through. Dinah’s ‘loving remembrance’ of the 
people in Snowfield, for example, keeps her always close to them.63 Deronda often 
reminds himself that there are less fortunate people in the world, and this in turn prepares 
him for helping Gwendolen and Mirah out of their trouble. Felix Holt too remembers the 
misery of others and is preoccupied with making life easier for those within his reach.64 
Dorothea’s concern about ‘the lot of others’ is a haunting memory, which she cannot 
dispel until her engagement in ‘some active good’ can relieve their difficulties: 
 
The idea of some active good within her reach ‘haunted her like a passion,’ 
and another’s need having once come to her as a distinct image, 
preoccupied her desire with the yearning to give relief, and made her own 
ease tasteless.65  
 
Eliot here evokes Wordsworth’s treatment of memory in ‘Lines Written above Tintern 
Abbey’. Like the sounding cataract which ‘haunted’ the poet ‘like a passion’, Dorothea’s 
recollection of Lydgate’s misery becomes so overwhelming that it takes possession of her. 
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Despite operating within a framework informed by Victorian science, Eliot clearly 
associates her cultivation of moral habits with that of Wordsworth.    
 
Comte’s idea of humanity illuminates an understanding of the workings of  
memory in Eliot. Comte, as we have seen, sees humanity as the greatest organism, 
extending to ‘Time as well as Space’. Correspondingly, social sympathy is characterized 
by the feeling of ‘Solidarity, or union with the Present’ and ‘of Continuity, or union with 
the Past’ (Comte, I, p. 291). In the above examples, memory works mainly on the present, 
and its particular emphasis is on space. It strengthens our ties with our fellow-creatures 
and links us to a much wider circle.  
 
However, as Comte suggests, a sense of union with the present alone is not 
enough. The sense of ‘[c]ontinuity, or union with the Past’ is more important. Without it, 
social sympathy is a ‘barren’ feeling, present life becomes ‘without roots’ and the future is 
left ‘undetermined’ (Comte, I, pp. 291-2). A better understanding of the collective past 
enables an individual to understand his own past better and to recognize where the future 
lies. I will deal with the relationship between an individual and his collective past more 
extensively in Chapter Four, but here I would like to suggest that Eliot shares Comte’s 
view that the union with the past cultivated by memory is of great importance in the 
development of moral habits. 
 
A good example of this process is provided by Deronda’s sense of undecidedness 
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before his racial identity is revealed to him. The narrator tells the reader that when 
Deronda’s sympathy is not rooted in the past, it does not have a focus, but is 
‘many-sided’.66 Tending to sympathize with everything, even vice, he is not able to take 
any definite action, which is motivated by ‘that indignation against wrong and that 
selectness of fellowship which are the conditions of moral force’ (DD, p. 336). Since he is 
ignorant of his past, his indignation is neutralized and rendered ineffective. He also 
suffers from a sense of uncertainty and is not sure where his future lies.         
 
After his racial identity is revealed to him, Deronda’s sympathy becomes well 
focused and practical:   
 
It was as if he had found an added soul in finding his ancestry—his 
judgment no longer wandering in the mazes of impartial sympathy, but 
choosing, with that noble partiality which is man’s best strength, the closer 
fellowship that makes sympathy practical—exchanging that bird’s-eye 
reasonableness which soars to avoid preference and loses all sense of 
quality, for the generous reasonableness of drawing shoulder to shoulder 
with men of like inheritance. (DD, p. 693) 
  
Memory, as well as knitting us together with our fellow creatures in the present, also 
binds us with past generations. Without the union with a ‘closer fellowship’, sympathy is 
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‘impartial’. It is detached and distanced, as the phrase ‘bird’s-eye’ suggests. This is what 
Comte means when he calls sympathy  a ‘barren feeling’, which leaves the present 
‘rootless’ and the future ‘undetermined’. It may sound as though it does justice to 
everyone, but it may also be a ‘maze’ in which one gets trapped. In avoiding preference, 
Deronda finds action impossible. In comparison, partiality grounded in the union with his 
ancestors is nobler because it gives him ‘strength’, which is the motivation of action and 
condition of moral force. It is the feeling of having obtained an ‘added soul’.   
 
This passage also shows that thin relations need to be grounded in thick relations. 
Deronda’s relation with his ancestors is a thick relation, as the phrases ‘closer fellowship’, 
‘shoulder to shoulder’ and ‘noble partiality’ suggest. By contrast, his relation with the 
people around him is a thin relation, as the phrase ‘bird’s-eye’ points out. Thin relations 
need to be grounded in thick relations, otherwise sympathy will not be practical. 
 
The ultimate goal of Eliot’s humanitarian project, which is strengthened by the 
memory of both present and the past generations, is individual and collective happiness. 
Eliot remarks in one of her letters that ‘the principle that that which is best in ethics is the 
only means of subjective happiness’ [sic], by which she means that of an individual.67 
However, this happiness is not obtained at the expense of another person’s loss, but is in 
harmony with his happiness: ‘The good of one is the good of all’ (ET, p. 169). This 
attitude is in line with the utilitarian morality advocated by Mill, who tries to rescue 
utilitarianism from its Benthamite calculating and quantitative principles. In his view, 
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pleasure is the ultimate pursuit of man, but there is a distinction between higher and lower 
pleasures. Happiness, as a criterion of ‘morality’, is one of these higher pleasures.68 ‘The 
good of others’ becomes something with which an individual identifies, and the 
‘prevention or mitigation of unhappiness’ is what he always bears in mind.  
 
The unity between the happiness of the helper and the helped permeates Daniel 
Deronda. The salvation obtained through idealized human relations not only brings about 
salvation to the sufferer, but also happiness to those who offer the help. After ‘set[ting] to 
some hidden work of reclaiming a life from misery’, the narrator announces, we will 
‘look for our triumph in the secret joy’ this brings (DD, p. 349). Moreover, through the 
sympathy we show to others, we ‘make others glad that they were born’ (DD, p. 754). 
This unity can also be found in Middlemarch, in which Dorothea’s happiness lies in 
making everybody’s life 'beautiful’ (M, p. 205).   
 
The ability to remember the needs of fellow men, however, is not something that 
Eliot believes comes easily. Quite the opposite, it is a cultivated virtue, which relies on 
habit cultivation for its development. In Comte’s cerebral theory there are ten ‘affective 
motors’, seven of which are ‘personal’ and three ‘social’. The point of positive morality 
lies in ‘compressing egoism’ and ‘developing altruism’ (Comte, IV, p. 246). As the 
narrator of Middlemarch points out, ‘we are all of us born in moral stupidity, taking the 
world as an udder to feed our supreme selves’ (M, p. 198). Selfish as we are by nature, 
however, we have the potential to develop our altruistic feelings by meditation and 
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practice. Through taking care of a creature we have rescued, we are able to exercise and 
consequently to strengthen our faculties of love and caring. In the end, ‘our pride 
becomes loving, our self is a not-self for whose sake we become virtuous’ (DD, p. 349). 
Many of her characters, Gwendolen and Esther, for example, gradually develop a 
capacity for altruism. On the other hand, Charles Bray’s idea that all the faculties exist in 
different people in different degrees can also be found in Eliot’s novels. ‘Our 
consciences’, the narrator of Daniel Deronda tells us, ‘are not all of the same pattern’; 
they are ‘as various as our memories’ (DD, p. 475). Some people, such as Deronda and 
Dorothea, are born with a much higher degree of moral sense than others, and are more 
capable of caring for people around them. But even in these people, if this inherited 
capacity is not exercised, it will decline and decay. 
 
No passage makes clearer the importance of developing innate altruism through 
exercise than the following from Daniel Deronda:  
 
Suppose the stolen offspring of some mountain tribe brought up in a city of 
the plain, or one with an inherited genius for painting, and born blind—the 
ancestral life would lie within them as a dim longing for unknown objects 
and sensations, and the spell-bound habit of their inherited frames would 
be like a cunningly-wrought musical instrument, never played on, but 
quivering throughout in uneasy mysterious moanings of its intricate 
structure that, under the right touch, gives music. (DD, pp. 697-8) 
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 In both this passage and the one quoted earlier in this section, Eliot compares moral sense 
to the potential for performing music. While the previous passage points out that 
cultivation is necessary to bring this aptitude into full play, this passage goes a step further 
by emphasizing the psychological disturbance which can arise when the claims of 
inherited habit are not satisfied: this will cause poverty of mental life, uneasiness, and 
unfulfilled longing. ‘Quivering’ suggests that in spite of the lack of proper conditions for 
its growth, inner aptitude refuses to be altogether stifled. It stirs with life, with the desire 
to grow. The phrase ‘uneasy mysterious moanings’ further implies the painful feeling of 
this sense of restlessness and lack of fulfilment.  
 
The references to ‘dim longing’ and ‘mysterious moanings’ indicate that the 
object that Deronda longs for is not quite clear. He suffers from a lack of fulfilment, but is 
not quite sure to what he should commit himself. Only ‘the right touch’, that is to say, the 
proper initiation and cultivation, can release his altruism from its ‘spell-bound’ habit and 
render it active and effective. Deronda confesses to Mordecai that ‘[i]t is through your 
inspiration that I have discerned what may be my life’s task. It is you who have given 
shape to what, I believe, was an inherited yearning’ (DD, p. 697). 
       
Exercise, then, in Eliot’s view, is important in nurturing the habit of caring for 
one’s fellow creatures. This exercise, however, cannot take place without the interaction 
with a social medium. Lydgate’s habit of ‘car[ing] much for those who suffered 
hardships’, for example, is facilitated by his profession as a doctor. The narrator tells us 
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that ‘his profession had familiarised him with all grades of poverty’ (M, p. 327). This 
enables him to understand the difficulties of others and develop his altruistic instincts. As 
a result, unlike Dorothea’s unsympathetic sister Celia, he can form ‘some true conclusion’ 
of her trials after her husband’s death (M, p. 462).  
 
The social medium can even bring about the early development of certain habits. 
The effect of Deronda’s unknown parentage is an example of this. This unique 
environment develops an ‘early-wakened sensibility’ and raises in him a ‘premature 
reflection on certain questions of life’ in him (DD, p. 160). It enables Deronda to develop 
the habit of thinking imaginatively about other people’s suffering. We are told that 
Deronda suffers from a feeling of injury because his unknown parentage gives him the 
impression that he might be Sir Hugo’s illegitimate son (DD, p. 162). This painful 
experience nurtures in him a ‘hatred’ of all injury, and he develops a habit of ‘learning 
how human miseries are wrought’ (DD, p. 163). It also prompts him to ‘construct the 
hidden story of his own birth’ from an the early age. The exercise of imagination in this 
way enables him to imagine similarly miserable elements in other people’s lives. He is 
able to ‘weav[e] probabilities’ about Gwendolen’s unhappy marriage and ready to assist 
Mirah in finding her brother (DD, p. 404).69   
 
The cultivation of the habit of caring for others, as is shown in the above examples, 
                                                 
69 This analysis tends to simplify the relationship between individual habits and the medium in which he is 
set, but this relationship is more complicated than discussed above. Individuals in the same medium can 
develop very different habits because their own physiological and psychological conditions also play a 
crucial role. The same medium which prompts Deronda to develop sympathy with the less fortunate can, in 
many cases, ‘turn a self-centred, unloving nature into an Ishmaelite’ (DD, 160). A more detailed discussion 
of this issue is beyond the scope of this study. Here I am just showing the importance of social medium in 
the formation of moral habits. 
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need not be deliberate. Lydgate and Deronda do not make conscientious efforts to 
remember others’ needs. Rather, the habit is developed through their adaptation to the 
social medium in which they are set. To borrow Wordsworth’s phrase, they are 
‘insensibly disposed’ (OCB, l. 96) to virtue and goodness. This unconscious mode of 
habit formation is somewhat similar to what Wordsworth advocates in ‘The Old 
Cumberland Beggar’ and the education he receives from nature in The Prelude.   
 
The cultivation of a sense of other people’s needs, however, enacted through an 
individual’s interaction with the social medium, can also be a conscious process. In this 
case, I would like to suggest, the social medium is often constituted by the opinions and 
teachings of those to whom we are thickly related, who are at the same time morally 
superior to us. Our love of and respect for them render us receptive to their teaching and 
motivate us to bring our thoughts beyond ourselves through conscious efforts. As the 
narrator of Middlemarch summarizes, men hold half their rectitude in the mind of the 
being they ‘love best’ (M, p. 227). The narrator of Daniel Deronda also points out that 
another person’s opinion is ‘the breathing-medium of all our joy’, and may be ‘our virtue 
in the making’ (DD, p. 709). Through love of Felix Holt and admiration of his virtue, 
Esther overcomes her self-centredness and remembers the needs of others, including 
those of her father. Gwendolen’s conscientious efforts to reach out to those for whom she 
initially showed no concern comes from Deronda. He thus becomes ‘a part of her 
conscience’ (DD, p. 386). By following his guidance and adapting herself to his standard, 
she gradually comes to remember more of the need of others. He urges her to  
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look on other lives besides your own. See what their troubles are, and how 
they are borne. Try to care about something in this vast world besides the 
gratification of small selfish desires. Try to care for what is best in thought 
and action—something that is good apart from the accidents of your own 
lot. (DD, p. 416) 
 
Deronda encourages Gwendolen to struggle to take her thoughts beyond the narrow circle 
of self and extend it to other people. If habit is a mechanism which propels one to repeat 
an action with ease, the imperatives ‘look on’, and ‘try to’ suggest that Deronda wants 
Gwendolen to make a deliberate effort to instil this habit. It is apparent that Deronda’s 
teaching works through Gwendolen’s memory when she emphasizes that ‘I shall 
remember your words—every one of them’ (DD, p. 717). Towards the end of the novel, 
she writes to Deronda and says once again that ‘I have remembered your words’ (DD, p. 
754). Quite distinct from Lydgate and Deronda, as well as the villagers in ‘The Old 
Cumberland Beggar’, who are ‘insensibly disposed’ to showing more concern for others 
(OCB, l. 96), in Gwendolen’s case there is a clear will to remember, a consciousness on 
her part of the need to develop altruistic habits. A similar case can be found in Felix Holt, 
in which the moral education Holt gives to Esther is made effective through its 
registration in her memory: ‘Every word Felix had said to her seemed to have burnt itself 
into her memory’ (FH, p. 110). The word ‘burnt’ highlights the fact that what he says has 
forced its way into her consciousness.    
 
Although the social medium can develop in an individual the habit of caring more 
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about others either unconsciously or consciously, Eliot suggests that the passive and 
unconscious process can be transformed into an active and conscious one. As Deronda 
tells Gwendolen: 
 
Take the present suffering as a painful letting in of light. […] You are 
conscious of more beyond the round of your own inclinations. —You 
know more of the way in which your life presses on others, and their life 
on yours. […] When we are calm we can use our memories and gradually 
change the bias of our fear, as we do our tastes. Take your fear as a 
safeguard. It is like quickness of hearing. It may make consequences 
passionately present to you. Try to take hold of your sensibility, and use it 
as if it were a faculty, like vision. (DD, pp. 421-2)  
 
One who has committed irremediable errors may be scourged by that 
consciousness into a higher course than is common. […] Feeling what it is 
to have spoiled one life may well make us long to save other lives from 
being spoiled. (DD, p. 420) 
 
Gwendolen realizes even at this stage that her wrongdoing has caused irrevocable 
suffering to others, and her remorse is intense. However, she has not yet realized that it 
can be the starting point of her moral reformation. Through this painful experience, she 
can come to know the interconnectedness between her life and that of others. Deronda 
wants her to transform her guilt into positive action, as the phrase ‘letting in of light’ 
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suggests. She can use this event to guard herself against similar mistakes in future. 
 
The interaction between recollective memory and habit-memory mentioned in the 
Introduction to this thesis is manifested in this passage. To make ‘consequences 
passionately present’, Deronda insists, involves the vivid recollection of a particular 
wrong Gwendolen has committed and the harmful consequence it has brought about to 
others. She should use the recollection of this particular event, Deronda suggests, as an 
‘aide-mémoire’.70 It will gradually help her to form the habit of taking other people’s 
feelings into account when performing an act.  I will deal with the relation between guilt 
and the formation of moral habits in greater detail in Chapter Three, but here we see the 
effect of one kind of memory on another. 
 
Deronda draws a parallel between Gwendolen’s guilt about the wrongs she has 
committed and such biological properties as ‘tastes’ and ‘quickness of hearing’, and says 
that the former can be ‘gradually changed’ through the use of memory. This shows Eliot’s 
belief that moral habits, though physiologically based, can be enhanced through proper 
exercise.  
 
While Gwendolen develops the habit of reaching out to others with the help of 
Deronda, Eliot tells us that art can also extend memory from oneself to one’s fellow man:    
 
                                                 
70 A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1956), p. 137. 
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The greatest benefit we owe to the artist, whether painter, poet, or novelist, 
is the extension of our sympathies. […] When Wordsworth sings to us the 
reverie of ‘Poor Susan’, […] more is done towards linking the higher 
classes with the lower, towards obliterating the vulgarity of exclusiveness, 
than by hundreds of sermons and philosophical dissertations. Art is the 
nearest thing to life; it is a mode of amplifying experience and extending 
our contact with our fellow-men beyond the bounds of our personal lot.71  
 
In this world there are so many of these common, coarse people, who have 
no picturesque sentimental wretchedness! It is so needful we should 
remember their existence. […] Let Art always remind us of them. (AB, p. 
178)  
 
As opposed to ‘obliterating’, the words ‘remember’ and ‘remind’ suggest that the lower 
classes are forgotten. Art, in other words, has the social function of promoting social 
cohesion and the capacity to do so more effectively than religion and philosophy. It works 
through memory. By ‘remind[ing]’ the rich of a world of suffering beyond their own 
privileged lives, it takes people out of their narrow self-concern and nurtures their 
sympathy so that they will be able to reach out to the lower classes, thus healing the 
division between different classes within the social hierarchy. Eliot’s affinity to 
Wordsworth is again recognized here in her mention of his poem ‘Poor Susan’. As 
discussed above, Wordsworth also believed that art could and should reform the moral 
                                                 
71 Eliot, ‘The Natural History of German Life’, pp. 263-4. 
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habits of his readers.  
 
Eliot thus assigns to art a significant role in the development of moral habits, in 
curing us of our initial selfishness and in making us aware of the need of others. She sees 
it as a possible step towards the realization of idealized human relation, which answers 
needs and alleviates difficulties. With everybody caring about the well-being and 
suffering of others, she believed, the world could gradually be brought into brotherhood.        
 
Coda 
Having looked individually at Wordsworth and Eliot’s humanitarian projects, I 
will conclude this chapter with a summary of the affinities and differences between the 
two writers. Unlike Avishai Margalit, who contends that we can only love those with 
whom we are thickly related, both Wordsworth and Eliot believe that morality and 
memory should be directed towards general humanity. We need to feel internally bonded 
with and care about the well-being of our fellow creatures in general, both those closest to 
us and people of chance encounter. Universal humanity is the ultimate goal of their 
humanitarian projects.  
 
However, the two writers tackle different issues and respond to the particularly 
pressing circumstances of their time. In response to the ever-widening gap between the 
rich and the poor during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Wordsworth 
intends to bridge this division, and see how society can be thickly related throughout in a 
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Christian brotherhood. Though linking the higher classes with the lower is also one of 
Eliot’s concerns, her project is more to do with the problem of salvation as a result of the 
loss of religious faith in her time. Since there was no metaphysical God to give people 
strength when they were in trouble, Eliot suggested an alternative source of comfort in 
her writing: an idealized human relation, strengthened by concern for the well-being of 
one’s fellow creatures. Moreover, with the dissolution of the Christian brotherhood 
knitted together by God’s love, she sees memory as an alternative method of binding 
people together. It can be argued that memory is central to her secular religion of 
humanity. 
 
Another difference lies in the two writers’ treatment of thick and thin relations. 
For Wordsworth, as for Margalit, concern for thick relations is of inherent importance. 
Wordsworth teaches that this concern needs to be extended to thin relations as well, 
especially to the poor and the marginalized people in society. Eliot, on the other hand, 
contends that concern for oneself is stronger in most than concern for others. We have to 
work hard to extend our thoughts and memories to other people, whether thickly or thinly 
related to us.  
 
Eliot’s implicit treatment of thick and thin relations is also more dynamic than that 
of Wordsworth. Wordsworth simply suggests that it is far from adequate to remember 
only one’s immediate relatives, and suggests that strangers also deserve attention. He 
implies that we should care about them as much as about our nearest and dearest. Eliot’s 
case is more complicated. She suggests that memory of thick relations, especially those 
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who are morally superior, can enhance our relations with others, whom we do not initially 
care about. On the other hand, thin relations need to be grounded in thick relations. 
Otherwise sympathy will be so diffusive that action will be impossible. We may in this 
case find ourselves in a similar situation to that of Deronda, trapped in a sense of 
indecision and an inability to follow a definite line of action.        
 
For Wordsworth as well as for Eliot, habit is an important vehicle in leading 
characters to better remember their fellow creatures, and towards a sense of universal 
humanity. Moral virtue produces in their characters a feeling of happiness. It is worth 
pointing out, however, that in ‘The Old Cumberland Beggar’ Wordsworth seems to be 
more concerned about the happiness of those who perform charitable deeds than that of 
the recipient of charity. We are not told how the beggar feels after receiving the 
involuntary charities from the villagers. In Eliot’s novels, however, the alleviation of 
other people’s pain produces a sense of happiness in both the giver and the recipient. 
 
Compared with Wordsworth, Eliot investigates the mechanism of habit in greater 
depth. While Wordsworth’s theory of habit can be seen in the light of Hume’s 
associationist philosophy, Eliot is engaged with evolutionary associationism as a result of 
the development of evolutionary theory in her time. Hence, habit cultivation becomes a 
much more complicated issue. It involves not only the matter of forming a moral habit 
through the repetition of a certain action, as is discussed in ‘The Old Cumberland Beggar’, 
but also its relationship with habit inherited from previous generations. Her discussion of 
the social medium and the physiological basis of moral habit is also a fruit of the scientific 
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developments of her time. As we have seen, Eliot situates habit cultivation within a much 
wider context.    
 
Reliant as they are on habit in the reformation of our moral life, the two writers are 
aware that habit can work both ways. Whereas a proper medium can nurture one’s 
memory of other people, and ‘keep alive / The kindly mood ’, an improper medium may 
reinforce one’s habitual apathy towards them, as the phrase ‘else unremembered’ suggests 
(OCB, ll. 83-4).  
 
In spite of their agreement that habit is a mechanism which disposes men to the 
reformation of their moral habits, the two writers differ over who is responsible for 
installing this mechanism and setting it in motion. For Wordsworth, humble people and 
natural objects perform this role. These people themselves do not necessarily carry moral 
agency, as is the case with the Cumberland beggar, who remains unaware of his effect 
upon others. Eliot’s case is very different: she proposes that a morally exemplary person 
leads us towards remembering more of other people.  
 
Another difference lies in the fact that for Wordsworth, habit formation is an 
unconscious process, and occurs without the agent’s realization of his moral 
improvement. ‘Insensibly disposed’ and ‘unpursued’ are phrases he uses to describe it 
(OCB, l. 95; l. 96). The education of the villagers in ‘The Old Cumberland Beggar’ and 
the poet in The Prelude provide an example of this kind. For Eliot, this process can be 
either conscious or unconscious. But she emphasizes more the conscious effort exerted by 
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her characters to reform their moral habits. Gwendolen’s promise ‘I shall try’, ‘I shall 
remember your words’ is a good example of her conscientious attempt to cultivate 
altruism (DD, p. 717).   
 
Lastly, both writers see art as a means of reforming the habit of their audience. As 
Stephen Gill has noticed, what Wordsworth did in poetry, George Eliot seeks to do ‘sixty 
years later for the novel’.72  While the poem and the novels reproduce the experience of 
being converted by habit and disposed to ‘virtue and true goodness’ (OCB, l. 97), a 
similar process takes place among the readers whom Wordsworth and Eliot wish to 
address. Both writers are aware of the tensions between classes, which prevent the rich 
from reaching out to the poor. They see it is their responsibility as writers to correct this 
mistake by changing their readers’ habits. The process of reading itself, they hope, can be 
the mechanism by which their readers overcome their narrow self-concern and come to a 
better understanding of human nature.  
 
 
 
72 Stephen Gill, Wordsworth and the Victorians (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 153. 
Chapter Two 
Duty and the Accumulative Force of the Past  
in ‘Ode to Duty’, Romola and Silas Marner  
 
 
Introduction 
In the first chapter, I contended that moral sense is physiologically based and 
discussed how the development of moral habits can nurture a sense of universal 
humanity. In this chapter I will explore the physiological mechanism of habit formation 
in more detail and discuss its relationship with duty.    
 
Commenting on Wordsworth’s ‘Ode to Duty’, Stephen Gill says that it is ‘no 
one’s favourite poem’. It is ‘quoted by the sterner Victorians, but by hardly anyone 
else’.1 As a Victorian moralist, Eliot certainly admires this poem, for she uses lines 49 
to 56 as the motto for Chapter LXXX of Middlemarch.2 Her interest in Wordsworthian 
duty also finds expression in Daniel Deronda. Lines 237-9 of Book IX of The 
Excursion were considered for the motto of Chapter XLIII, though they were later 
substituted by Keats’s ‘Sonnet on Seeing the Elgin Marbles’: 
 
The primal duties shine aloft like stars; 
The charities that soothe, and heal, and bless 
Are scattered at the feet of men like flowers.3  
 
                                                 
1 Stephen Gill, William Wordsworth: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989; repr. 1990), p. 226. 
2 George Eliot, Middlemarch, ed. by David Carroll (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 737. All 
subsequent quotations of this novel, abbreviated M, are from this edition with page numbers given in 
parentheses. 
3 Editor’s note in George Eliot, Daniel Deronda, ed. by Graham Handley (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1984), p. 501. 
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Although Eliot is interested in Wordsworth’s vision of duty and quotes him now 
and then for the mottos of her novels, her understanding of duty is not exactly the same 
as that of her predecessor. Despite their similar views on the importance of man binding 
himself to duty and the close-knit relationship of habit and duty, there are several points 
on which they diverge from each other. For example, Wordsworth’s duty has a 
Christian connotation. It is the ‘Stern Daughter of the Voice of God’, as he calls it.4 
Eliot’s duty is divorced from Christian connotations. To borrow Basil Willey’s phrase, 
her intellectual trajectory ‘begins with God’ but ‘ends in Duty’. 5   Moreover, Eliot 
sanctions rebellion against false duties. Thus her notion of duty is more radical than that 
of Wordsworth. 
 
The Wordsworthian Duty: Newton and Hartley 
In this section, I will argue that for Wordsworth, the sense of duty is cultivated 
through habit. Wordsworth’s notion of duty, as a universal law which governs both the 
natural and the human world, is formed under the influence of Newton’s law of nature. 
It is different from Kantian duty which is a priori, and is instead cultivated through 
experience. I will then draw on David Hartley’s theory on reflex-action and the 
dialectical relationship between automatic and voluntary action to show that 
Wordsworth particularly emphasizes the role of habit, the accumulative force of the past, 
in moulding an individual into a duty-bound being.      
  
The Wordsworthian sense of duty can be seen to have developed from Newton’s 
discovery of the law of nature. Newton’s theories of physics are one of the most 
important contributions to eighteenth-century science. Among them is the theory on the 
                                                 
4 William Wordsworth, ‘Ode to Duty’, in The Major Works, ed. by Stephen Gill (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), line 1. All subsequent quotations of this poem, abbreviated OTD, are from this 
edition with line numbers given in parentheses. 
5 Basil Willey, Nineteenth-Century Studies: Coleridge to Matthew Arnold (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1964), p. 215. 
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forces that cause motion. In the Opticks, Newton proposes that ‘particles exert attractive 
and repulsive forces upon each other’. These ‘attractive repulsive forces’ include 
gravitation, cohesion, electricity, heat, etc. They work on both the macrocosmic and the 
microcosmic levels. For example, ‘gravitation acts on the macrocosmic level to draw 
apples to earth and the planets toward and hence around the sun, while cohesion acts at 
the microcosmic level to hold atoms together in molecules’. Newton’s images of the 
cosmos can be briefly described as ‘a vast empty space in which a walnutful of atomic 
matter has crystallized into lattices, […] which are held in positions of more or less 
stable equilibrium by forces of attraction and repulsion’. 6  Newton considers these 
principles by which things are formed as general laws of Nature.  
 
However, Newton remains puzzled over the causes of these principles. In the 
Opticks he declares that the First Cause ‘certainly is not mechanical’. He thus concludes 
that it is God who preserves and maintains the universe: ‘Lest the systems of the fixed 
Stars should, by their gravity, fall on each other mutually, he hath placed those systems 
at immense distances one from another’.7  
 
By regarding God as the designer of the universe, Newton follows an old 
tradition within Christian doctrine – natural theology. Its main assumption is that 
without the need for ‘special revelation’, any individual can ‘discern certain 
fundamental truths about the existence of a Supreme Being’ by ‘observing the physical 
creation and consulting one’s internal dispositions’.8  
 
                                                 
6 Richard Allen, David Hartley on Human Nature (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), 
pp. 88-9. 
7 Isaac Newton, Opticks, quoted from Ben Schneider, Wordsworth’s Cambridge Education (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 170.   
8  Robert Ryan, The Romantic Reformation: Religious Politics in English Literature, 1789-1824 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 64. 
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 Natural theology dates back to as early as the medieval theologian Thomas 
Aquinas, who attributes the order in the inanimate world to the direction of ‘a 
transcendent being having intelligence and intention’. 9  Copernicus and Kepler, 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century scientists, follow the idea of natural theology, but it 
is Newton who gives it ‘the most decisive impetus’. He sees evidence of design in the 
structure of the universe, arguing that only ‘an intelligent being’ could have ‘calculated 
the correct tangential component of each planet’s velocity to ensure that it went into a 
stable orbit’.10 
 
Wordsworth was well acquainted with Newton’s works. At Hawkshead 
Grammar School, he enjoyed reading Newton’s Opticks.11 He was examined on it at St. 
John’s College in Cambridge in December 1789. He ‘thought well of its author’, 
thinking him ‘perhaps the most extraordinary man that this country ever produced’.12 In 
1790, he read Principia. Newton is also one of the few personages mentioned by the 
poet in The Prelude. From his bedroom Wordsworth could see on moonlit nights ‘[t]he 
antechapel, where the statue stood / Of Newton with his prism and silent face’.13 
 
Taking into consideration Wordsworth’s familiarity with and admiration of 
Newton’s works, it is not surprising that he was also a follower of Newton’s religious 
outlook. Robert Ryan’s book explains why he disagrees with Jonathan Wordsworth that 
Wordsworth’s dominant religious belief in the 1790s was pantheism. He suggests that 
                                                 
9 John Brooke, ‘Natural Theology’, in The Oxford Companion to the History of Modern Science, ed. by J. 
L. Heilbron <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.thml?subview=Main&entry=t124.e0504> 
[accessed 16 November 2009]  
10 John Brooke, ‘Natural Theology’, in The History of Science and Religion in the Western Tradition: An 
Encyclopedia (New York: Garland, 2000), pp. 58-63 (pp. 59-60). 
11 For more details, see Gill, William Wordsworth: A Life, p. 28. 
12 Duncan Wu, Wordsworth’s Reading 1770-1799 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 
107. 
13 William Wordsworth, The Prelude, 1799, 1805, 1850: Authoritative Texts, Context and Reception, 
Recent Critical Essays, ed. by Jonathan Wordsworth, M. H. Abrams and Stephen Gill (New York: Norton, 
1979), The 1805 Edition, Book III, lines 60-1. All subsequent quotations of this poem are from this 
edition with book and line numbers given in parentheses. 
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Wordsworth believed in natural theology, a belief popular in the eighteenth century 
whose main proponent was Isaac Newton. Though it gradually gave way to more 
orthodox Christian belief later on, natural theology never totally disappeared in 
Wordsworth’s religious outlook. Its coexistence with orthodox Christianity is best 
exemplified in the dialogue between the Wanderer and the Pastor in The Excursion.14  
 
Newton’s theory on the laws of nature illuminates our understanding of 
Wordsworth’s thinking about duty, the timeless truth and universal law that governs 
both natural objects and the human world. If the forces of motion are the laws through 
which Newton believes natural objects themselves are formed, ‘duty’ is the word 
Wordsworth uses to describe the law that governs the universe. During the five years 
starting with the composition of ‘Ode to Duty’ in 1804 throughout the writing of the 
essay ‘Reply to “Mathetes”’, ‘duty’ is an issue which continually engages the poet’s 
mind. In the Ode, which was composed in 1804 and published in 1807, he passionately 
eulogizes ‘duty’ as the ‘Stern Lawgiver’, which ‘preserve[s] the Stars from wrong’ 
(OTD, l. 49; l. 55). More importantly, ‘duty’ also prevents human beings from 
wandering off the right path. It is ‘a Rod / To check the erring’ (OTD, ll. 3-4), ‘From 
vain temptations dost set free’ (OTD, l. 7). In ‘Reply to “Mathetes”’, written about two 
years after the Ode was published, Wordsworth quotes lines from it towards the end, 
maintaining that all modes of existence, both moral and physical laws, are ‘subservient 
to’ the spirit of ‘Duty’.15  
 
                                                 
14 For a detailed discussion, see Ryan, pp. 80-119. Ryan contends that the reason for Wordsworth’s shift 
to a more orthodox Christianity was his gradual reintegration into the religious life of his community, and 
his belief that a national Church would bring order and stability to the whole nation. 
15 Wordsworth, ‘Reply to “Mathetes”’, in The Prose Works of William Wordsworth, ed. by W. J. B. Owen 
and Jane Worthington Smyser, 3 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), II, 24. All subsequent quotations 
of this article, abbreviated RTM, are from this edition with page numbers given in parentheses. 
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While Newton sees God as the maintainer of the law of nature, Wordsworth sees 
God as the producer of duty. Though the ‘Ode’ is dedicated to ‘duty’, the poet keeps 
emphasizing that duty comes from God, not anywhere else. Duty is the ‘Stern Daughter 
of the Voice of God’ (OTD, l. 1), which ‘dost wear / The Godhead’s most benignant 
grace’ (OTD, ll. 49-50). Schneider points out that the line ‘Thou dost preserve the Stars 
from wrong’ (OTD, l. 55) in this poem comes from Newton’s idea that God preserves 
the universe in the scholium at the end of Principia.16 
 
As a universal law which governs both the natural and the human world, 
Wordsworthian duty is different from Kantian duty. Kantian duty is a priori, not 
derived from experience. An action has moral worth only if it is free from inclination or 
desire. It is done ‘for the sake of duty alone’.17 Quite the opposite, Wordsworthian duty 
is not a priori, but obtained through experience. Man is not born with the ability to 
abide by this law. It is an ideal for which he can strive through learning. Habit 
cultivation, as I will show later, is the most reliable means of approaching this ideal. 
The work of habit involves bringing unruly instincts under control and regulating them 
into dutiful channels. It also involves forming the right moral behaviour through making 
mistakes. Duty, in other words, can only become habitual through these experiences.  
 
While setting itself in contrast with Kantian duty, Wordsworthian duty, I would 
suggest, is in alliance with David Hartley’s theory on the formation of moral habit. 
Hartley’s moral philosophy is developed from Newton’s scientific system. His 
Observations of Man: His Frame, His Duty and His Expectations, published in 1749, 
well before Wordsworth was born, formed part of the intellectual landscape in the 
                                                 
16 Schneider, pp. 170-1. 
17 Immanuel Kant, The Moral Law: Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. and ed. by H. J. 
Paton (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 70. 
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eighteenth century to ‘equate the moral with the physical world’.18 The work not only 
shows on many occasions Hartley’s admiration of, and indebtedness to, Newton, but 
also adopts Newton’s system in his analysis of ‘the mechanism of all our mental 
processes’. Moreover, he uses it to explain ‘the evolution of our moral characters from 
childhood to manhood, and the development of the moral sense out of simple sensation’ 
(ECB, p. 137).  
 
In Hartley’s opinion, moral sense is not inborn, but ‘factitious’.19  The OED 
quotes Hartley’s usage of this word and explains it as ‘arising from custom, habit, or 
design; not natural or spontaneous; artificial, conventional’. Moral sense is not innate. It 
is acquired through an individual’s interaction with the external world. For Hartley, the 
world is designed by Providence as ‘a system of benevolence’ (Hartley, II, p. 131), so 
that ideally, ‘through the association of pleasurable sensations with certain objects’, the 
mind will go through an evolutionary process from sensation, imagination, ambition and 
self-interest to sympathy and the acquisition of a moral sense. Thus human individuals 
may be regarded as ‘a sort of refinery in which the loftiest spirituality is being 
mechanically distilled out of sense’ (ECB, p. 143; p. 144). 
 
Critics have long recognized that Wordsworth’s poetry can be seen as in 
dialogue with this aspect of Hartley’s moral theory. Basil Willey suggests that in terms 
of Hartley’s delineation of the development of the mind ‘from sensation, through 
imagination to reflexion’, he can be seen as a ‘spiritual forerunner of Wordsworth’ 
(ECB, p. 137). Alan Grob remarks that the mental evolution from simple sensation to 
                                                 
18 Basil Willey, The Eighteenth Century Background: Studies on the Idea of Nature in the Thought of the 
Period (London: Chatto & Windus, 1946), p. 137. All subsequent quotations of this book, abbreviated 
ECB, are from this edition with page numbers given in parentheses. 
19 David Hartley, Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations, 3 vols (London, 
1791), I, 420. All subsequent quotations of this book are from this edition with volume and page numbers 
given in parentheses. 
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moral sense theorized by Hartley is best exemplified in Tintern Abbey. 20  Douglas 
Kenning points out that the seven steps of the development of the mind from sensation 
to moral sense, where virtue eventually ‘becomes habit’, can be found in some ‘rejected 
drafts for book eight of The Prelude’.21  
 
For the purposes of my discussion, I would like to concentrate on one particular 
point of Hartley’s moral system, which has escaped critical attention: the physiological 
process of the formation of habit, and the dialectical relationship between automatic and 
voluntary actions. This seems to me to be helpful in understanding the work of habit in 
‘Ode to Duty’. Discussing the physiological basis of habit, Hartley starts with the 
analysis of automatic actions such as the jerking back of the finger when touching a hot 
poker. This sort of action is generated by automatic reflexes. It involves ‘a circuit by 
which an impulse travels up the sensory nerves to the brain and then from the brain 
down the “motory” nerves to the muscles’. 22  This automatic action can become 
voluntary through repetition. The motion of grasping in a child may be automatic at the 
very first. But through sufficient repetition, ‘the will to grasp is generated, and 
sufficiently associated with the action to produce it instantaneously’. In this case, the 
action of grasping becomes ‘perfectly voluntary’ (Hartley, I, p. 105).  
 
By the same token, voluntary actions can also become ‘secondarily automatic’ 
through repetition. Hartley uses ‘secondarily automatic’ to describe reflex actions that 
are not inborn, but are performed as though they were so because through practice, they 
have passed the stage of voluntariness. At the early stage of learning to play a 
harpsichord, the player moves his fingers from key to key slowly. Gradually, the acts of 
                                                 
20  Alan Grob, The Philosophic Mind: A Study of Wordsworth’s Poetry and Thought 1797-1805 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1973), pp. 135-6. 
21 Douglas Kenning, Necessity, Freedom and Transcendence in the Romantic Poets: A Failed Religion, 
Studies in Art and Religious Interpretation, XXIII (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1998), pp. 16-7. 
22 Allen, p. 163. 
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volition grow ‘less and less express’, until finally, there is no intervention by voluntary 
will. The movement becomes ‘secondarily automatic’ (Hartley, I, p. 109; p.105). As can 
be seen, automatic and voluntary actions are not mutually exclusive, but dialectical and 
mutually convertible.  
 
Memory plays a key role in the mutual conversion between these two types of 
action. From the above analysis, we discover that sufficient repetition is the condition of 
conversion between automatic and voluntary actions, and further between voluntary and 
secondarily automatic actions.  Repetition enables the body to remember, and to 
perform an action through the guidance of the conscious will. Hartley points out that ‘all 
our voluntary powers are of the nature of memory’ (Hartley, I, p. 381). They are the 
manifestation of the accumulative force of the past, and the re-enactment of the past in 
the present. Likewise, repetition can also enable the body to remember very well, so that 
the performance can be carried out in spite of the control of the conscious will. 
Secondarily automatic actions, in this light, are also of the nature of memory. Adequate 
repetition enables us to remember so well that we can perform certain actions 
automatically, without the need to resort to voluntary efforts. 
 
Hartley’s idea of the dialectical relation of automatic and voluntary actions and 
the work of memory sheds light on the way habit works in ‘Ode to Duty’. I will start 
with how the poet believes that habit can curb the unruly instincts that threaten to drive 
him away from his poetic calling.  
 
‘Ode to Duty’ 
The problem of how a writer was to fulfil his duty was a major concern for 
Wordsworth during the first decade of the nineteenth century. In a letter written to 
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Thomas Poole, he laments Coleridge’s inability to dedicate himself to his duty as a 
writer of genius: 
  
I give it to you as my deliberate opinion, formed upon proofs which have 
been strengthening for years, that he neither will nor can execute any 
thing of important benefit either to himself his family or mankind. 
Neither his talents nor his genius mighty as they are nor his vast 
information will avail him anything; they are all frustrated by a 
derangement in his intellectual and moral constitution — In fact he has 
no voluntary power of mind whatsoever, nor is he capable of acting 
under any constraint of duty or moral obligation.23 
  
What stands out in the above passage is the relationship between duty and imagination. 
Duty means constraint. But instead of hindering imagination, it is in Coleridge’s case 
the very condition that makes artistic creation possible. Coleridge is duty-bound to write 
something worthy of his talent and beneficial to himself and to other people. His failure 
to do so cannot be explained away simply as a consequence of writer’s block. It results 
from a lack of self-control and is therefore a failure in duty. For Wordsworth, as I will 
explain later, ‘voluntary power’ is crucial if a writer is to bring his unruly instincts 
under control and fulfil his literary duty. It is also significant for an individual’s moral 
development, as morality implies ‘voluntary obedience’ (RTM, p. 24). In this letter 
written in 1809, Wordsworth assumes the moral high ground. Several years earlier, in 
1804, however, Wordsworth was himself plagued by Coleridge’s problem. 
 
                                                 
23 William Wordsworth, The Letters of William and Dorothy Wordsworth, ed. by Alan G. Hill and others, 
2nd edn, 8 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967-93), II: The Middle Years, rev. by Mary Moorman (1969), 
p. 352.  
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It is now generally agreed that ‘Ode to Duty’ was composed in the early months 
of 1804, roughly the same time when lines 55-271 of Book I of the 1805 Prelude were 
written.24 These lines can therefore be read as a context for the Ode. In The Prelude, 
Wordsworth presents himself as a predestined great poet: ‘I was a chosen son’, 
endowed with ‘holy powers / And faculties, whether to work or feel’ (III, ll. 82-4). His 
poetic mission is to ‘dedicate’ himself to ‘chosen tasks’ (I, l. 34), which refers to the 
writing of The Recluse, assigned by Coleridge in the spring of 1798 in Somerset. In both 
of the quoted lines, Wordsworth emphasizes the word ‘chosen’, which ‘entails 
responsibility and risk as well as privilege’.25  The poet privileges himself over his 
fellow creatures because of his unusual poetic power. By acknowledging this 
superiority, he also accepts the duty of completing the grand poetic task that Coleridge 
has laid on his shoulders. But more importantly, ‘chosen’ also entails ‘risk’, the danger 
that the task may be left unfulfilled. In that case, it may end up with anxiety, guilt and 
endless self-blame. This is exactly what is tormenting Wordsworth. From line 142 
onwards, the poet is troubled by being constantly driven away from his desire for an 
epic subject by ‘less quiet instincts’: 
 
The mind itself,  
The meditative mind, best pleased perhaps 
While she as duteous as the mother dove 
Sits brooding, lives not always to that end, 
But hath less quiet instincts – goadings on 
                                                 
24 For the time of the composition of the Ode, see the editor’s note in William Wordsworth, Poems, in 
Two Volumes, and Other Poems, 1800-1807, ed. by Jared Curtis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 
p. 104. For the time of the composition of lines 55-271 of Book I of The Prelude, see the editor’s note in 
William Wordsworth, The Prelude: The Four Texts (1798, 1799, 1805, 1850), ed. by Jonathan 
Wordsworth (London: Penguin, 1995), p. 556, and ‘The Texts: History and Presentation’, in William 
Wordsworth, The Prelude: 1799, 1805, 1850, Authoritative Texts, Context and Reception, Recent Critical 
Essays, pp. 510-26.  
25 The Oxford Companion to the Bible, ed. by Bruce Metzger and Michael Coogan (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), p. 110. 
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That drive her as in trouble through the groves. (I, ll. 149-54) 
 
The mind is compared to a brooding dove, following duty when engaged in creative 
activity. But there are ‘less quiet instincts’, which make the workings of imagination 
‘unwelcome tasks’. In pushing these tasks away, the poet is haunted by guilt in 
deserting his duty, just like the mother dove, who walks ‘in trouble’ through the groves. 
Instincts may sometimes prove troublesome and hinder artistic creation, which is 
considered a duty. Like the servant who has buried the talent his master gives him in 
Matthew 25: 14-28, Wordsworth sees himself as one who has wasted the talent God has 
given him: ‘Like a false steward who hath much received / And renders nothing back.’ 
(I, ll. 270-1). 
 
The vocabulary of the Ode is similar to Wordsworth’s complaint in these lines. 
As Angela Esterhammer observes, the passage and the Ode are similar in ‘both theme 
and structure at the point where Wordsworth expresses his intense frustration about his 
inability to begin a poetic project’.26 In the Ode Wordsworth depicts himself as a prey 
of ‘less quiet instincts’ as in the first book of The Prelude. He is overwhelmed by ‘the 
weight of chance desires’ (OTD, l. 38) that distract him from his duty of poetic creation. 
As he describes, he ‘shoved unwelcome tasks away’ because he does not want anything 
to ‘press / Upon’ his ‘present happiness’ (OTD, ll. 29-31). In ‘Too blindly have reposed 
my trust’, ‘Too blindly’ reveals the poet’s remorse, guilt and sense of betrayal (OTD, l. 
28). It points to the lack of human agency, a similar force that drives the mother dove 
away from the maternal duty God selects it to perform. An early draft contains the 
following line, which Wordsworth eventually deleted: ‘Foresight does but breed 
                                                 
26 Angela Esterhammer, ‘Wordsworth’s “Ode to Duty”: Miltonic Influence and Verbal Performance’, 
Wordsworth Circle, 24 (1993), 34-7 (p. 36). 
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remorse for times to come’.27 It reveals the guilt by which Wordsworth is overwhelmed 
for not being able to fulfil his commitment. Such guilt does not come from his self-
blame alone, as he confesses, ‘Transgressor indeed I have been, from hour to hour, from 
day to day’, but also from the reproach by his own family:  ‘Many and Many a time 
have I been twitted by my wife and sister for having forgotten this dedication of myself 
to the stern lawgiver’.28  
 
The form of the Ode also calls for attention. It is modelled after Gray’s ‘Ode to 
Adversity’, which in turn resembles Horace’s ‘Ode to Fortune’. However, it deploys 
aspects of the elevated, sublime idiom associated with the traditional, Pindaric ode. 
Hartman comments that ‘childhood and practical duties are not traditional themes for 
elevated treatment’. As a result, according to his view, the form is used as a ‘serious 
parody’ here, because Wordsworth is determined to ‘take common household duties as 
seriously as if they were indeed divine law’.29 If the Ode is about the poet’s anxiety 
over his inability to complete The Recluse, then one can understand why the poet 
chooses the Ode form. The writing of The Recluse, which the poet regards as an 
‘honorable field’, a ‘holy life of music and of verse’ (I, l. 52; l. 54), certainly fits in with 
the elevated and sublime idiom of Pindaric ode.   
                                                
 
Some critics see the Ode as an expression of Wordsworth’s desire to abandon 
imagination in favour of the submission to duty. Harold Bloom claims that ‘what 
Wordsworth seeks to abandon here is the autonomy of his own imagination, which is 
 
27 MS. 44, Commonplace Book, quoted from Wordsworth, Poems, in Two Volumes, and Other Poems, 
1800-1807, p. 105.  
28 Quoted from the editor’s note in William Wordsworth, The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth, ed. 
by E. de Selincourt and Helen Darbishire, 5 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940-49), IV, (1947), 418. 
29 Geoffrey Hartman, Wordsworth’s Poetry 1787-1814 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964; repr. 
1967), p. 282. 
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one with his freedom’. 30  David Bromwich suggests that a major concern for 
Wordsworth in his poetry between 1798 and 1807 is ‘the opposition between 
imagination and duty’. Through the Ode, he argues, the poet is ‘asking duty to save him 
from the fate of a being as accidental and changeable as the young man […] recalled in 
“Tintern Abbey”’, who is the prey of the freedom of imagination.31 If we read the lines 
quoted from The Prelude together with the Ode, it is apparent that the Ode is not a 
farewell to imagination in favour of duty. The tension is not between imagination and 
duty, but between imagination as a duty and the less quiet instincts which prevent him 
from the fulfilment of this duty. In a broader sense, it is between the poet’s sometimes 
troublesome instincts and duty. The Ode invokes the help of duty to set artistic 
imagination going.   
 
Though similar in vocabulary, the Ode is very different to the ‘Mother Dove’ 
episode of The Prelude. In the ‘Mother Dove’ episode, the poet seems not to be able to 
do anything about the unmanageable thoughts that disrupt his poetic creation: ‘With me 
is now such passion, which I blame / No otherwise than as it lasts too long’ (I, ll. 155-6). 
He is simply an unfortunate prey to his unruly but overwhelming instincts. But in the 
Ode, Wordsworth presents himself as having found a way of bringing these unruly 
instincts under control. 
  
The means to rescue lie in habit. David Bromwich has divided Wordsworth’s 
poetic development between 1798 and 1807 into five phases. The first phase is the 
premoral state, a state of primitive pleasure, during which the mind is not ‘aware of a 
conscience that would judge’. During the second phase, the poet begins to fear his own 
power and desires to control his action. Phases three and four are ‘the world of habit’, 
                                                 
30 Harold Bloom, The Visionary Company (London: Cornell University Press, 1971), p. 188. 
31 David Bromwich, ‘The “Ode to Duty” and the Idea of Human Solidarity’, Wordsworth Circle, 40 
(2009), 9-16 (pp. 9-10). 
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where Wordsworth both uses habit to control moral conduct, and reflects upon this 
reliable guide. The last phase is the world of duty, in which ‘the resolution takes on for 
Wordsworth a permanent authority and the appeal becomes impersonal’.32 Rather than 
seeing the phases of habit and duty as divided, I would suggest, they are fundamentally 
linked. Duty, as a law coming from an external authority, can best be approached 
through the modification of personal habit, the gradual accumulation of a particular way 
of acting. Through ‘denial’, ‘restraint’ (OTD, l. 47), or ‘self-sacrifice’ (OTD, l. 62), it 
can counter-balance the unruly animal instincts that the poet is powerless to control and 
make fundamental changes in him. And as the word ‘breed’ suggests (OTD, l. 48), it 
will gradually mould him into a duty-bound being, travelling along his poetic orbit as do 
‘the Stars’ and ‘the most ancient Heavens’ (OTD, ll. 55-6). The result is a self with ‘a 
second Will more wise’ that is far superior to the one under the sway of unruly instincts 
(OTD, l. 48), with ‘second Will’ emphasizing the birth of a new self through the work 
of habit. 
 
The epigraph added in 1837 further expresses the poet’s belief in the sort of 
conversion brought about by habit. The motto is adapted from Seneca’s Moral Epistles 
upon the suggestion of Barron Field, the poet’s disciple. The English translation is ‘Not 
only sound in his judgment but trained by habit to such an extent that he not only can 
act rightly, but cannot help acting rightly’.33 This reminds us of Hartley’s example of 
the harpsichord player. At the initial stage the learning was painful, laborious and 
conscientious. But eventually memory settles in so well that he can play while talking to 
someone else. He no longer needs voluntary efforts to ensure the carrying-out of the 
right performance. Habit has established a well-worn path so that the right movement 
takes care of itself. The same holds true for the cultivation of moral habits. The phrases 
                                                 
32 For a detailed discussion see Bromwich, 9-16. 
33 The translation is quoted from the editor’s note in Wordsworth, Poems in Two Volumes, and Other 
Poems: 1800-1807, p. 407. 
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‘can act rightly’ and ‘cannot help acting rightly’ point to the two Hartleian stages of 
habit acquisition: the voluntary and the automatic stage. When the bodily reflex is well 
established, an individual will not only perform the right moral action consciously, but 
automatically follow the well-worn path habit has cut out. The accumulative force of the 
past has become self-regenerative, and he does not need to think before acting out. 
However, the difficulty during the earlier stage is great, as is embodied in such words as 
‘denial’, ‘restraint’ (OTD, l. 47), and ‘self-sacrifice’ (OTD, l. 62). These words are 
suggestive of a struggle, involving great efforts of self-control under the command of a 
strong will. This is quite different from the way habit is shown to develop in Chapter 
One, where the virtuous habits of the villagers in ‘The Old Cumberland Beggar’ are 
formed imperceptibly. No wonder the poet uses the word ‘Stern’ to describe duty, the 
‘Lawgiver’ (OTD, l. 49). It gives full expression of the pain he felt when trying to give 
up his waywardness. But it remains worthwhile because when the right habit settles in 
and has its way, carrying out his duty will be pleasant and enjoyable, as shown by the 
lines ‘thou dost wear / The Godhead’s most benignant grace’ (OTD, ll. 49-50) which 
come immediately after ‘Stern Lawgiver’, to temper its severity.      
 
Throughout, the poem is invaded by a tension between Wordsworth’s 
determination to relinquish unruly instincts and a sense of doubt about whether he can 
indeed carry out his poetic task: ‘But thee I now would serve more strictly, if I may’ 
(OTD, l. 32). The subjunctive mood and the concession he makes indicate that though 
the desire to serve duty is whole-hearted, the poet lacks confidence in his commitment. 
In this light, the poem reads more like an on-going struggle than a look back at a 
problem that has been resolved. Also, the poet claims that the decision to submit to duty 
is made ‘through no disturbance’ of his soul, nor is there any ‘strong compunction’ 
(OTD, l. 33; l. 34). This is certainly not true. The relevant lines from The Prelude and 
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the deleted line of the Ode which I mentioned earlier reveal that he is suffering from 
intense guilt. Moreover, his promise that he will submit to Duty’s guidance ‘from this 
hour’ and the exclamation ‘Oh! let my weakness have an end!’ (OTD, l. 59; l. 60) 
suggest that he is full of fears that he is still prey to such weakness, and that it will not 
come to an end as he has hoped. His eventual inability to complete The Recluse proves 
this.     
 
So far I have been focusing on the duty of poetic creation. But the poem also 
seems to me to be discussing moral duties in general. There are two reasons for this. 
First, though the poet does not say explicitly that this poem also applies to general 
moral issues, the epigraph added in 1837 depicting a morally righteous man suggests 
that the desire for self-discipline in poetic creation also applies to moral behaviour. 
Secondly, in ‘Reply to “Mathetes”’, a letter discussing how youth can reach moral 
perfection by self-education through interaction with nature, Wordsworth concludes by 
quoting the last stanza of the Ode (OTD, ll. 57-64), contending that moral law is 
‘subservient’ to ‘the power of Duty’(RTM, p. 24). Therefore I find it insufficient to 
discuss the Ode without reference to moral duties in general.  
 
Since ‘Reply to “Mathetes”’ concludes with the final stanza of the Ode, it can be 
seen as a further context for this poem. The letter was written five years after the Ode 
was composed. In answer to Wilson and Blair’s letter submitted to The Friend in 1809 
that youth is in need of a moral teacher in what they term a ‘degenerate’ age, 
Wordsworth replies that young people should rely on themselves, instead of a moral 
instructor, to solve their moral problems.34 An important part of this scheme of self-
                                                 
34 Owen and Smyser, ‘Introduction’ to ‘Reply to “Mathetes”’, II, 3-5 (p. 4). 
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education is that moral behaviour will eventually become a habitual part of us through 
the mistakes we make: 
 
As that Man cannot set a right value upon health who has never known 
sickness, nor feel the blessing of ease who has been through his life a 
stranger to pain, so can there be no confirmed and passionate love of 
truth for him who has not experienced the hollowness of error. […] There 
is nothing whereupon the Mind reposes with a confidence equal to that 
with which it rests on those conclusions, by which truths have been 
established the direct opposite of errours once rapturously cherished and 
which have been passed through and are rejected for ever. (RTM, p. 21)  
 
To use Derrida’s term, there is a hauntology at work in this passage. The term is 
introduced in Specters of Marx, which Derrida uses as a pun for the philosophical term 
‘ontology’, a term about which he is sceptical.35 In spite of Marx’s preoccupation with 
getting rid of the ghosts of the past, Derrida says that he can never be successful. A 
presence is not a pure and self-sufficient element. It can only exist with reference to the 
non-presence which is its very constituent. The pairing of the antonyms ‘health’ and 
‘sickness’, ‘ease’ and ‘pain’, and ‘truth’ and ‘error’, and the assertion that the meaning 
of the former can never be fully recognized without reference to its opposite clearly 
points to the Derridean notion that presence is haunted by non-presence, without which 
it cannot function as it is. This Derridean notion is further confirmed by the poet’s 
statement that ‘truths have been established the direct opposite of errours’. The desire 
for ‘repose’ and ‘rest’ indicates the haunting of toil and turmoil from which one wants 
                                                 
35 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Working of Mourning, and the New 
International, trans. by Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 138-76.  
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to escape. But more importantly, without it, the value of repose and rest can never be 
fully valued.  
 
The concept of hauntology is helpful in our understanding of the role memory 
plays in present choices. The poet wants to convince his readers that the past is inherent 
in the present. Memory of the mistakes we make is the very constituent of our 
understanding of truth. Our wrong-doings haunt us, and it is this very haunting which 
directs our present choice, compelling us to seek virtue, like the search for harbour in 
the face of a stormy voyage of mistakes.  
 
Nowhere is this hauntology more prominent than in ‘Ode to Duty’: 
 
Me this unchartered freedom tires; 
I feel the weight of chance desires: 
My hopes no more must change their name, 
I long for a repose which ever is the same. (OTD, ll. 37-40) 
 
The haunting of unease is the very constituent of the desire for repose in duty. Behind 
the phrase ‘long for’ and the word ‘repose’ is the torment of changeable desires to 
which the poet falls prey. Only a person who has suffered long enough from it can cry 
out for a resting place in such a way. The memory of the unease of ‘unchartered 
freedom’ and ‘the weight of chance desires’ are the driving forces which prompt the 
poet to seek a regulated course in duty. ‘Ever’ and ‘the same’ counterbalance ‘change’. 
They reveal the poet’s yearning for an eternal law, a timeless truth which will guide him 
towards a fixed destination.  
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The quotations from ‘Reply to “Mathetes”’ and the Ode also show that moral 
duty is acquired through experience. The very suffering of wrong-doings will instil in 
an individual the sense of how important it is to settle on the right track. The experience 
of mistakes prompts him to yearn for the unwavering submission to duty. This proves 
the point I made earlier in this section: Wordsworthian duty is different from Kantian 
duty. Rather than being a priori, it cannot be developed without experience. The poet’s 
desire to cling to duty comes from the experience of suffering from wandering off its 
track.  It is a repose he ‘longs for’, an ultimate end of happiness he seeks after suffering 
from the unease of deviations from it (OTD, l. 40). As Chandler observes, Wordsworth 
is ‘arguing against Kant’s absolute rationalist distinction between will and inclination in 
favor of the concept of the “second Will” which coincides with inclination and derives 
from experience’.36  
 
In this way we come to a better understanding of the poet’s claim towards the 
end of ‘Reply to “Mathetes”’ that morality implies ‘voluntary obedience’. When an 
individual reaches this stage, his time will be ‘surrendered through an act of obedience 
to a moral law established by himself’, and he can thus ‘move […] along the orbit of 
perfect liberty’ (RTM, p. 24). ‘Voluntary’ has a different meaning in the context of 
physiology from feelings or actions. In physiology, it means ‘regulated or governed by 
the volitional faculty; subject to the will’. When used to describe feelings, it means 
‘arising or developing in the mind without external constraint’ (OED). ‘Voluntary’ 
means, then, both regulated by the will and not constrained or dictated by an external 
force.  
 
                                                 
36 James Chandler, Wordsworth's Second Nature: A Study of the Poetry and Politics (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 252. 
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 These two meanings can both be found in Wordsworth’s thinking about 
morality. On the one hand, submission to morality is subject to the control of the will, 
because it is a considered choice after deviations from the path of duty. This willing 
submission is also pronounced in the Ode, for the poet confesses that ‘my 
submissiveness was choice’. It is reinforced by the exclamation at the end of the poem, 
‘in the light of truth thy Bondman let me live!’ (OTD, l. 44; l. 64). On the other hand, 
moral actions are also involuntary. Once an individual has made the choice of 
submitting to moral duty, his actions are comparable to the movement of a celestial 
object, travelling along its ‘orbit’ freely and beyond any external control (RTM, p. 24). 
This suggests that for the poet, voluntary and involuntary obedience to moral duty are, 
on some level, fundamentally linked.     
 
The word ‘voluntary’ also echoes Hartley’s idea that ‘all our voluntary powers 
are of the nature of memory’ (Hartley, I, p. 381). Either through making mistakes, or 
through repeated practice, memory is so well registered in our consciousness that we 
know well how to act in accordance with the moral law.  Here Wordsworth also puts 
forward his idea of liberty. Freedom does not mean doing whatever one likes, but 
knowing what the right course is and following it. In its ideal form, freedom is at one 
with duty.  
 
To conclude, Wordsworth sees habit as a reliable means of developing in man a 
sense of duty—a universal law that governs the natural and the human world, but which 
man can only learn through experience. Two aspects of duty have been discussed: duty 
in poetic creation and moral duties in general. Both rely on habit to establish themselves. 
In poetic creation, habit, the accumulative force of the past, can help bring unruly 
instincts under control and enable the poet to devote himself to his poetic calling in a 
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better way. The adherence to moral duty is also the result of habit cultivation. Through 
the mistakes we make, we learn eventually to submit to duty voluntarily.      
 
Eliot’s Notion of Duty: The Habitual 
In this section, I will discuss Romola and Silas Marner. Drawing on Lewes’s 
theory on reflex-action, I will show that Eliot identifies duty with the habitual feeling of 
the body, which is the accumulative force of the past re-enacted in the present. Such a 
notion of duty was revolutionary in her time, because it challenged the Christian notion 
that duty comes from God and an individual has no choice but to submit 
unquestioningly to his will. Eliot’s notion of duty also legitimizes rebellion against false 
duties, which are not an expression of inner needs. However, Eliot does not mean that 
an individual should enjoy absolute freedom. Human beings need to bind themselves to 
the collective. If old duties prove not to be trustworthy, they should cast them off and 
bind themselves to new groups and new duties. Such a radical revision of the traditional 
notion of duty is counterbalanced by Eliot’s recognition that the false duty one struggles 
to cast off may also have some validity. By rebelling against it one also positions 
oneself against the good society has sanctioned in the past. This struggle shows that the 
desire to obtain individual freedom is by no means easy, and that it is not possible to 
totally abandon the past. The right thing to do, as the endings of Romola and Silas 
Marner show, is to devote oneself to new duties while maintaining a critical connection 
with the past.     
 
As in my discussion of Wordsworth, I will discuss Eliot’s relationship with 
Christianity first, as it registers a significant departure from the Wordsworthian duty 
which comes from God and is represented as a universal law. In March 1851, an official 
census was conducted of attendance at all places of religious worship. The result came 
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as a shock to many mid-Victorian believers. Only ‘half the nation’ was ‘attending 
religious services’; only ‘a quarter’ was attending the services of the established 
national Church. The official report on the census concluded that ‘“a sadly formidable 
portion of the English people are habitual neglecters of the public ordinances of 
religion”’.37  
 
One of these neglecters was George Eliot. In 1842 she broke with Christianity 
and refused to go to church. Writing to her father on 28 February 1842, she said that 
though she admired the moral teaching of Jesus, she considered the Christian doctrine 
the ‘most dishonourable to God and most pernicious in its influence on individual and 
social happiness’, because it ‘operates unfavourably on moral beauty by disturbing that 
spontaneity, that choice of the good, for its own sake, that answers my ideal’.38 But 
something needs to fill the void left by the loss of faith. Recording a conversation with 
George Eliot at Cambridge in 1873, F. W. H. Myers writes that:   
 
[Eliot], stirred somewhat beyond her wont, and taking as her text the 
three words which have been used so often as the inspiring trumpet-calls 
of men, — the words God, Immortality, Duty, —pronounced, with 
terrible earnestness, how inconceivable was the first, how unbelievable 
the second, and yet how peremptory and absolute the third.39   
 
As I discussed in Chapter One, the void was filled by Eliot’s religion of 
humanity based on Feuerbach’s religious humanism and August Comte’s Religion of 
                                                 
37 Philip Davis, 1830-1880: The Victorians, The Oxford English Literary History, VIII (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), p. 98. The quotation, which is from the official report on the census, is also from 
this book. 
38 George Eliot, The George Eliot Letters, ed. by Gordon Haight, 9 vols (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1954, repr. 1975), I, 128, 144. All subsequent quotations from these books, abbreviated Letters, are 
from this edition. 
39 Quoted from Willey, Nineteenth-Century Studies, p. 214 (original emphasis). 
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Humanity. With the help of these strands of thought, she was able to replace duty to 
God with a secularized duty, duty to humanity.  
 
It is still important to consider what became of Eliot’s relationship with 
Christianity. Seventeen years after her abandonment of her religious faith, her 
antagonism towards Christianity became milder. Writing to François D’Albert-Durade 
on 6 December 1859, she said: 
 
I have no longer any antagonism towards any faith in which human 
sorrow and human longing for purity have expressed themselves. […] I 
have not returned to dogmatic Christianity—to the acceptance of any set 
of doctrines as a creed, and a superhuman revelation of the Unseen—but 
I see in it the highest expression of the religious sentiment that has yet 
found its place in the history of mankind.40 
 
Eliot has certainly moved on, but without totally abandoning her Christian faith. She has 
absorbed its positive elements while discarding the dogmatic doctrines, maintaining the 
essence of Christian ethics without accepting its dogma. 
 
The date of the letter is crucial. It slightly precedes the composition of Romola 
and Silas Marner. About half a year later, in June 1860, Eliot embarked on the writing 
of Romola, and between September 1860 and March 1861, she finished the composition 
of Silas Marner. It is fair to assume, therefore, that these two novels in some way reflect 
Eliot’s treatment of her own past during that period of time. Like Eliot, Romola and 
Silas are betrayed by their past, the religious beliefs that are the anchorage of their early 
                                                 
40 Eliot, Letters, III, 231.  
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life. They are left in a void in which devotion to the old duties has become impossible. 
But like Eliot, they eventually manage to move on and devote themselves to their duty 
to humanity. At the same time, they maintain a critical relationship with the past that 
has betrayed them. I am not attempting a biographical reading of the two novels here. 
What I would suggest, instead, is that Eliot’s devotion to the service of humanity and 
her new relationship with Christianity shed light on our understanding of the quest for 
new duties and the relationship with the past in Romola and Silas Marner. 
 
In recent years, moral duty in Eliot criticism has increasingly been seen to be 
connected to habitual and instinctive feelings rather than being based on reason and 
principle. Commenting on the idea of duty in Daniel Deronda, Horowitz contends that 
this ‘involuntary agency’ is tied to ‘duty’: ‘Duty follows from feeling, and it makes 
choice possible’. The discovery of duty is more a ‘recognition’ than a ‘decision’, and is 
discovered at key moments in life.41 Terence Cave remarks that Silas Marner’s decision 
to keep Eppie ‘comes about by reflex action in response to an unexpected challenge. 
Exactly the same psychological response will determine Daniel’s sense of a mission’.42 
In a similar vein, Stefanie Markovits notices that duty in Eliot does not really ‘mean 
much in the abstract’. It is defined by a ‘habitual inclination’.43 The example she gives 
is Romola’s activity in the plague-stricken village, which I will discuss in this section. 
Though these critics have identified the instinctive nature of the recognition of duty, the 
mechanism itself has not been fully explored. In what follows, I will investigate the 
mechanism of habit and consider the way in which it constitutes Eliot’s secular notion 
of duty. 
                                                 
41 Evan Horowitz, ‘George Eliot: The Conservative’, Victorian Studies, 49 (2006), 7-32 (p. 29). I think 
that the conclusion Horowitz draws from Daniel Deronda applies to Eliot’s other novels as well.  
42 Editor’s note in George Eliot, Silas Marner: The Weaver of Raveloe, ed. by Terence Cave (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 188. All subsequent quotations from this novel, abbreviated SM, are 
from this edition with page numbers given in parentheses. 
43 Stefanie Markovits, The Crisis of Action in Nineteenth-Century Literature (Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 2006), p. 94. 
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 The identification of duty with physical needs is no coincidence. Following the 
trend of Victorian materialism, most Victorian scientists take pains to give the workings 
of the mind a physiological explanation. Sally Shuttleworth studies its relationship with 
moral choice and contends that ‘the physiological principles of reflex action, to which 
Lewes devoted much of his attention […], are used […] to sustain a moral theory of 
social progress’. 44  Michael Davis’s comprehensive research shows how Victorian 
scientists see the human will as something physical rather than a transcendent force. 
Alexander Bain, John Stuart Mill, Lewes and Huxley follow Spinoza, whose Ethics 
Eliot translated, in maintaining that will is closely connected to reflex action, which 
belongs to the general relations of cause and effect in the universe.45     
 
Eliot’s explanation of duty in terms of physical necessity is part of this scheme. 
Duty is an action one is ‘bound to do’ (OED). This binding is depicted as an involuntary 
force, rather than a conscious choice or decision. In her novels, Eliot often uses a cluster 
of terms closely related with one another to depict the involuntary nature of the 
performance of moral duty: ‘reflex action’, ‘instinct’, ‘impulse’, ‘habit’. Before 
discussing them in detail, I would like to explore Lewes’s theory of the way moral 
instincts are developed and how these terms are related, as this will illuminate our 
understanding of Eliot’s notion of duty.  
 
For Lewes, ‘reflex action’ is the basic term used to describe the physical 
mechanism of muscular contraction which produces a sensation. In The Physiology of 
Common Life, he points out that ‘[i]n those parts of the organism which are so arranged 
                                                 
44 Sally Shuttleworth, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Science: The Make-Believe of a Beginning 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 107. 
45 For a detailed discussion, please see Michael Davis, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Psychology: 
Exploring the Unmapped Country (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 122-3. 
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that the easiest, readiest path for the issue of a sensation is that of muscular contraction, 
we shall find that every stimulus produces Reflex-Action’. Some of these reflex-actions 
can cause reflex-feelings, which in turn, by reflex, cause another feeling.46 There are, 
Lewes tells us, two kinds of reflex actions: connate and acquired. Connate reflex actions 
are the result of generations of habituation. Although in an individual they precede 
experience, they are inherited by the individual from his ancestors. Acquired reflex 
actions, by contrast, are the result of long-term, laborious training:  
 
Habits, Fixed Ideas, and what are called Automatic Actions, all depend on 
the tendency which a sensation has to discharge itself through the readiest 
channel. In learning to speak a new language, […] great difficulty is felt, 
because the channels through which each sensation has to pass have not 
become established; but no sooner has frequent repetition cut a pathway, 
than this difficulty vanishes; the actions become so automatic that they can 
be performed while the mind is otherwise engaged. (PCL, pp. 58-9)  
 
An acquired reflex action is established through the creation of new channels through 
which a sensation has to discharge itself. ‘Frequent repetition’, which can be achieved 
through training and exercise, is important, because this paves the way for the creation 
of the new channels. In stressing the formation of ‘Automatic Actions’ through 
repetition, Lewes’s view is surprisingly similar to that of Hartley, whose harpsichord 
player is slow and attentive in his performance at the beginning but can play while 
talking to someone else through adequate practice. This similarity is no coincidence. In 
The History of Philosophy, Lewes speaks highly of Hartley’s ideas on voluntary and 
                                                 
46 George Henry Lewes, The Physiology of Common Life, 2 vols (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood, 1859-60), II, 
57. All subsequent quotations of this book, abbreviated PCL, are from this edition with page numbers 
given in parentheses. 
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automatic actions, saying that they ‘deserve to be read even at the present day’.47 It is 
no wonder that Lewes’s analysis of the process of habit acquisition bears a clear imprint 
of his predecessor.  
                                                
 
From this passage, it is also evident that Lewes identifies ‘habit’ with ‘reflex 
action’ and ‘reflex feeling’. Corresponding to the differentiation between connate and 
acquired reflex actions, there are connate and acquired habits. Both ‘instinct’ and 
‘impulse’ are identified with connate reflex actions, which the organism inherits from 
its ancestors. ‘Impulse’ is slightly different from ‘instinct’ as the former is driven purely 
by physiological need while the other is guided by ‘discernment of relations’. For 
example, the nutritive impulse urges an animal to search food, but the instinct causes it 
to ‘select only one kind of food from out of several kinds accessible’.48 Eliot’s use of 
the two terms, however, is much looser than that of Lewes. In her novels, they are used 
rather interchangeably to refer to either inherited or acquired habits. 
  
Having discussed ‘reflex action’ and its relationship with ‘habit’, ‘instinct’ and 
‘impulse’, I would like to explore its relationship with memory. For Lewes, 
physiologically-speaking, memory is nothing but acquired reflex actions: 
 
What is Memory—on its physiological side—but an organized tendency 
to react on lines previously traversed? […] Indeed if, as we have seen, 
reflex actions are partly connate, and partly acquired, it is obvious that 
 
47 George Henry Lewes, The History of Philosophy from Thales to Comte, 3rd edn, 2 vols (London: 
Longmans, 1867), II, 354.  
48 George Henry Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind: First Series: The Foundation of a Creed, 2 vols 
(London: Trübner, 1874-75), I, 227-8. All subsequent quotations of this book, abbreviated FC, are from 
this edition with page numbers given in parentheses. 
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the second class must involve that very reproduction of experience, 
which in the sphere of Intellect is called Memory.49 
 
Acquired reflex actions involve the act of remembering because through the 
accumulative force of repetition, the body has remembered to discharge a sensation 
through a newly established channel without any difficulty.     
 
Lewes goes on to explore the mechanism of moral habits. Like the acquisition of 
other habits which lead to the establishment of new reflexes, the development of moral 
habits involves the creation of new paths through which sensations can traverse easily: 
‘The habit of right action is the securest preparation for acting rightly under 
emergencies.  […] All men are trained to act rightly on emergencies by what is a kind of 
moral instinct, organized in previous habit of acting rightly’ (FC, p. 306). Since memory 
is what we call an acquired reflex action, the very process of the acquisition of moral 
habit involves the process of remembering. What we do in an emergency is the result of 
memory, the accumulated force of our past, habitual action. As the word ‘instinct’ 
suggests, it is independent of the conscious will.  
 
Romola 
Eliot’s notion of duty is built upon Lewes’s reflex theory. The recognition of 
moral duty is the result of habit. It is an involuntary force of the body, which the 
conscious self has no choice but to follow. When Romola rescues the people in the 
plague-stricken village:  
 
                                                 
49 George Henry Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind: Second Series: The Physical Basis of Mind (London: 
Trübner, 1877), pp. 462-3. 
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She had not even reflected, as she used to do in Florence, that she was 
glad to live because she could lighten sorrow—she had simply lived, 
with so energetic an impulse to share the life around her, to answer the 
call of need and do the work which cried aloud to be done, that the 
reasons for living, enduring, labouring, never took the form of 
argument.50 
 
Stefanie Markovits has noticed the ‘habitual nature of Romola’s activity in the 
valley’. 51  Romola has changed from the time when she was in Florence. Her 
philanthropic action is now based on ‘impulse’ rather than on reflection. The phrases 
‘not even reflected’, ‘so energetic an impulse’ and ‘never took the form of argument’ all 
point to the involuntary nature of Romola’s recognition of duty.  It is a habitual 
movement of the body, a blind impulse rather than a rational decision made by the 
conscious will.  
                                                
 
This instinctive act of duty is the result of long-term training over two years, 
which leads to the occurrence of Romola’s acting out in and of itself. We are told that 
Romola ‘had no innate taste for tending the sick and clothing the ragged. […] Her early 
training had kept her aloof from such womanly labours’ (R, p. 366). The habit of 
tending the sick is nurtured by her admiration for Savonarola’s personality, her 
conscious effort to follow the road he has directed for her, and the numerous occasions 
on which she tended the sick in Florence during the two years of plague and famine. As 
a result, the habit of care, first new and laborious, gradually becomes automatic and 
self-generative. As a result, when Romola is filled with conflicting feelings when she 
 
50 George Eliot, Romola, ed. by Andrew Brown (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 527. All 
subsequent quotations of this novel, abbreviated R, are from this edition with page numbers given in 
parentheses. 
51 Markovits, p. 94. 
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comes across Baldassarre, the escaped prisoner her husband tries to guard against, she 
still ‘leaned towards him’ and tries to help him in his  illness: ‘Her hands trembled, but 
their habit of soothing helpfulness would have served to guide them without the 
direction of her thought’ (R, p. 353). In a similar vein, when Romola feels deeply upset 
upon discovering that Tessa is Tito’s other wife and wants to be alone ‘as soon as 
possible’, she still, in spite of her wish, ‘put her hand in a friendly way on Monna Lisa’s 
shoulder’ and made a farewell sign. The narrator tells us that this is the result of her 
‘habitual care for the least fortunate’ (R, p. 441). Both cases are the result of the work of 
habit. The repeated practice of tending the sick in the past has developed in her a 
propensity of acting in the same way on similar occasions. Habit has become a guide by 
itself. Even though her conscious will is not disposed to perform benevolent acts, the 
habitual impulse to help has travelled alongside the well-worn path.  
e channels, in 
rn, direct one’s future behaviour independent of the conscious mind.52  
 
                                                
 
This is a good example of Lewes’s idea that once a path of discharge has been 
established, ‘along these paths the sensation must discharge itself’ (PCL, pp. 58-9). The 
word ‘must’ highlights the fact that duty is a physical necessity. It is predetermined not 
by a metaphysical God, but by habit, under the effect of which we cannot but act in the 
same way in the present. This compels Romola instinctively to help the people in the 
plague-stricken village. Here Eliot clearly echoes Lewes in her suggestion that the way 
we act in an emergency is the result of the accumulative force of the past. As Sally 
Shuttleworth points out, for both Lewes and Eliot, moral instinct is based upon 
physiological channels established in the mind by previous actions. Thes
tu
 
52 Shuttleworth, p. 108. 
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Like Wordsworth, in other words, Eliot highly values habit in the development 
of moral behaviour. The performance of virtuous acts upon conscious reflection is not 
enough. What the two writers value more is the unconscious following of habit, the 
blind but most reliable guide. However, habit works in both ways. Tito’s abandonment 
of duty and his gradual downfall are also the work of habit. Eliot always situates the 
making of moral decision in an emergency, when her characters have no time to think 
and can only rely on impulse. When Tito disowns his foster father, ‘he hardly knew how 
the words had come to his lips: there are moments when our passions speak and decide 
for us, and we seem to stand by and wonder’ (R, p. 209). This impulsive and 
unselfconscious reaction, however, is by no means the random and unpredictable choice 
it might appear. Tito’s reaction is gradually prepared by his moral decisions on similar 
occasions in the past. We are told that Tito has long been thinking of abandoning 
Baldassarre in spite of his conscience. But eventually, ‘the little rills of selfishness had 
united and made a channel, so that they could never again meet with the same 
resistance’ (R, p. 97). Tito’s habit of thinking selfishly and acting for his own benefit 
has gradually created a pathway along which similar ways of thinking and behaving are 
bound to take place on similar occasions. Tito’s disowning of Baldassarre, therefore, is 
simply
the other metaphorical, touch upon the key point of character building. As Markovits 
 this habitual past re-enacted in the present, independent of his conscious will.  
 
The narrator further explores the impact of habitual behaviour on character 
formation: ‘We prepare ourselves for sudden deeds by the reiterated choice of good or 
evil which gradually determines character’ (R, p. 212). This physiological process is 
seen to be as inevitable as the laws of economics: ‘[Tito] had borrowed from the terrible 
usurer Falsehood, and the loan had mounted and mounted with the years, until he 
belonged to the usurer, body and soul’ (R, p. 335). The two quotations, one literal and 
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comments, ‘Romola’s virtue and Tito’s evil are both emphatically the product of 
habituation’.53 Habit is such a powerful force that it not only prompts individuals to act 
in similar ways in an emergency, but can eventually change the person fundamentally. 
We become what we habitually are. The second quotation emphasizes rather the 
negative impact of habit. One does not need to be intrinsically evil to perform bad 
actions, as the word ‘borrow’ suggests. However, the repeated bad action has an 
accumulative force, like the loan that has ‘mounted’. It eventually makes us evil. As the 
narrator tells us, Tito does not mean to be vicious but his repeated abandonment of duty 
ultimately es him a villain. 
                                                
mak
     
Duty, as a reflex action of the body, is also closely tied up with the desire to 
remember. Romola’s ‘piety’ towards her father’s ‘memory’ makes her feel that ‘the 
fulfilment of her father’s life-long ambition about this library was a sacramental 
obligation’ (R, p. 233). Her ‘memories’ of the duties she has performed to her fellow-
citizens in Florence give her a feeling of ‘gladness’ (R, p. 366). The abandonment of 
memory, on the other hand, is parallel with the renouncement of duty. Tito’s 
renouncement of duty towards his foster father goes hand-in-hand with the banishment 
of his memory of him. His parting with Baldassare’s ring, which is the symbol of 
‘peculiar memories and predilections’, implies his ‘shrinking from what his fellow-men 
called obligations’ (R, pp. 155-6). As Caroline Levine insightfully notes, ‘Tito’s 
rejection of duty and responsibility is […] intimately intertwined with the refusal to 
remember’.54 Besides trying to free himself from his obligations, he also wants to dip 
Romola ‘in the soft waters of forgetfulness’ (R, p. 269), so that she will become less 
eager to fulfil the duty of realizing her father’s wish and taking care of her godfather. 
 
53 Markovits, p. 93. 
54  Caroline Levine, ‘The Prophetic Fallacy: Realism, Foreshadowing and Narrative Knowledge in 
Romola’, in From Author to Text: Re-reading George Eliot’s Romola, ed. by Caroline Levine and Mark 
Turner (Hampshire: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 135-63 (p. 154).  
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Tito’s betrayal of the parties he serves is the result of his lack of collective memory for 
any of them. Collective memory, as I will show in Chapter Four, refers to a habitual 
way of thinking and acting, which bears the imprint of our ancestors and is a re-
enactment of our collective past. It is also manifested in our habitual attachment and 
loyalty to the group into which we are born.  Tito does not have any sense of duty 
towards the parties he serves and is ready to betray them for his own interest because 
his mind is void of the collective memory of any of these groups. Bernardo tells us that 
‘his mind is a little too nimble to be weighted with all the stuff we men carry about in 
our hearts’ (R, p. 184). Such ‘stuff’ includes the love, care, faithfulness and sense of 
belonging that make up collective memory, which can only be developed through a long 
association with the place in which we are born and the group of which we have been 
part. Tito, who is ‘of no particular country’ (R, p. 184), never knows what such 
attachm nts really mean.   
ing with ‘the great work by which God will purify 
Florence’ (R, p.  338; p. 343).  
e
 
By identifying duty with the habitual, Eliot is giving priority to inner needs, and 
thus challenging the Christian notion of duty which comes from God and which an 
individual has no choice but to obey. The Christian duty in the novel is embodied in 
Savonarola’s teaching, which advocates that we should ‘renounce our own will to bow 
before a divine law’ (R, p. 343). Man’s lot is preordained by God. He has no choice but 
to be content with this allocated place and perform the duties related to that place. 
Romola’s breaking of her marriage tie and her resolution to leave Florence, in 
Savonarola’s eyes, are thus a religious offence. Her marriage pledge is made ‘in the face 
of God’ and her ‘fellow-men’ (R, p. 340). By breaking it, she is being disrespectful to 
God. By flying from Florence, the ‘true place’ in her life, she is ‘escaping from the lot 
God has laid upon’ her: help
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 Savonarola’s teaching is reminiscent of Wordsworth’s ‘Stern Lawgiver’ in ‘Ode 
to Duty’, though the two doctrines are very different. Wordsworth is a follower of 
eighteenth-century natural theology, whereas Savonarola preaches the ethic of medieval 
Christianity. However, they are similar in their emphasis on the fact that an individual 
should abandon his unruly instincts and submit to the divine law stipulated by God. 
Both give priority to the external, expecting an individual to strive to internalize the 
external through the work of habit. For Eliot, it is the other way round. The internal 
feeling is given priority. There is no authoritative law from God to which man has to 
submit unconditionally. Eliot’s ideal is to externalize the internal. The duty stipulated 
by the external law should be an expression of the inner, habitual feelings between man 
and man: ‘[Romola] felt that the sanctity attached to all close relations, and, therefore, 
pre-eminently to the closest, was but the expression in outward law of that result 
towards which all human goodness and nobleness must spontaneously tend’ (R, p. 442). 
‘Spontaneously’ highlights the instinctive and habitual nature of duty. What makes a 
relationship sacred is not that it is stipulated by an outward law, but that it is an 
instinctive love and habitual desire to be true towards our close relations. This inner 
inclination is sacred in itself. It is our deep, ingrained memory, manifested in the 
spontaneity of the acts performed for the people we love. This instinctive feeling, as the 
narrator makes clear, ‘that supremely hallowed motive which men call duty’, should 
have the ‘inward constraining existence’ (R, p. 471).   
 
Christian duties, which are imposed from the outside and are not an expression 
of inner needs, should be cast off. This is what prompts Romola to leave her husband 
twice. Instead of supporting Savonarola’s teaching that she should renounce her own 
will in favour of a divine law, the narrator boldly announces, ‘there had come one of 
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those moments in life when the soul must dare to act on its own warrant’ (R, p. 442). 
This puts an individual’s own will prior to the law stipulated by God. Divine law can be 
discarded when it is in conflict with inner feelings. When her love for Tito is gone, all 
Romola has to obey is ‘the instinct to sever herself from the man she loved no longer’ 
(R, p. 306). Her flying away from him is legitimized, because their external union has 
now become ‘a set of false duties on her’. Under such circumstances, she is entitled to 
free herself from it. ‘The law was sacred. […] But rebellion might be sacred too’ (R, p. 
528; p. 442).  
 ‘fret not’ with the social place he has been allocated and be 
content with his lot.55  
                                                
 
By pointing out the sacredness of the rebellion against false duties, Eliot proves 
herself more radical than Wordsworth, who does not support rebellion against religious 
duties. For Wordsworth, an individual’s ultimate goal is to move along the path God has 
preordained. He should
 
Though she legitimizes rebellion against false duties, Eliot does not suggest that 
an individual should enjoy absolute freedom. Absolute freedom is not the road to 
happiness. In a letter to Charles Lee Lewes, commenting on his ‘longing for more 
freedom’, Eliot said ‘happiness depends much more on “must do” than “may do”’.56 
Duties are not ‘air-woven fetters’, as Tito claims (R, p. 270). Tito’s very downfall 
shows that duties are not mere fantasies of the mind. They are essential and effective 
forces at work that cannot be ignored without punishment. Neither are they fetters 
hindering the freedom of an individual. Duties consist of a web of social ties that 
provide anchorage for man’s existence as a social being and ensure his mental health. 
As Durkheim’s ground-breaking studies on suicide show us, social ties are essential for 
 
55 Wordsworth, ‘Nuns Fret not at Their Convent’s Narrow Room’, in The Major Works, line 1. 
56 Eliot, Letters, V, 176-7 (original emphasis).  
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an individual’s mental health. Durkheim owes a great debt to Comte. He shares Comte’s 
view that an individual is closely dependent on the collective. He points out that the 
causes for suicide are more social than individual. One of the reasons that people kill 
themselves is because ‘social bonds become weakened and ultimately break down in 
modern societies’.57 In one of the lectures made between 1902 and 1903, later published 
as L’Éducation Morale, he further explores the reasons for suicide:  
 
ed from any 
collectivity, that is to say, the more he lives as an egoist.58   
dom is a state of ‘lawlessness’ (R, 
p. 343), which can bring nothing but absolute misery. 
                                                
Like everything which exists, man is a limited being: he is part of a 
whole. Physically, he is part of the universe; morally, he is part of society. 
[…] Whenever the individual disassociates himself from collective goals 
in order to seek only his own interests, […] suicide increases. Man is the 
more vulnerable to self-destruction the more he is detach
 
Romola’s suicidal intention is a good example of the danger of disassociating oneself 
from ‘collective goals’ in pursuit of one’s own interest. After freeing herself from all 
her ties, she is preoccupied with the idea of drifting down the river and seeking death. 
And ‘she had felt herself without bonds, without motive; sinking in mere egoistic 
complaining that life could bring her no content’ (R, p. 527). Human beings are 
essentially social beings. Duty takes an individual out of his narrow self-interest and 
binds him to the collective. It makes life meaningful and worthwhile. In this respect 
Eliot supports Savonarola’s teaching that absolute free
 
 
57 Steven Lukes, Émile Durkheim: His Life and Work (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981), pp. 67-8; p. 205.  
58  Emile Durkheim, Emile Durkheim: Selected Writings, ed. by Anthony Giddens (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 111-3. 
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This disapproval of absolute freedom demonstrates Eliot’s similarity with 
Wordsworth. Romola’s aimless drifting down the river after having freed herself from 
all claims is a metaphor of the ‘unchartered freedom’ Wordsworth describes in ‘Ode to 
Duty’, which causes a great deal of unease and frustration. While Wordsworth laments, 
‘Me this unchartered freedom tires’ (OTD, l. 37), Romola’s state after being freed from 
old ties is even worse. If Wordsworth points out that absolute freedom will cause 
frustration, Eliot goes a step further by suggesting that it will increase suicidal instincts. 
The harm it does to man’s mental health is even more severe than Wordsworth has 
shown.   
 
If an individual should neither stick to false duties, nor seek absolute freedom, it 
is reasonable to wonder what alternative he should take. I would suggest that for Eliot, 
when old duties become questionable, individuals should bind themselves to new 
groups and new duties. The novel shows how Romola, after suffering from the 
frustration of fulfilling false duties and of absolute freedom, is redeemed by devoting 
herself to the rescue of the people in the plague-stricken village. Here the habit 
cultivated in Florence of taking care of the sick becomes self-regenerative. The narrator 
depicts the dramatic change Romola undergoes from being full of doubt to having all 
her doubt cleared away. She feels ‘no burthen of choice on her’ and life becomes 
meaningful again: ‘This suffering that I can help is certain’ (R, p. 523; p. 527). Before, 
she was overwhelmed by frustration, and life had come to a standstill. Now her strength 
comes back again, ‘with so energetic an impulse’ she is ready to ‘share the life around 
her’. She has actually become a fountain of strength: ‘While the strength is in my arm I 
will stretch it out to the fainting; while the light visits my eyes they shall seek the 
forsaken’ (R, p. 527). The realization that where there is need, there is duty also paves 
the way for future redemption. Taking care of Tessa and her children is but the 
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continuation of the redemptive power of the pure, simple human relations that she 
enjoys in the plague-stricken village. Towards the end of the composition of Silas 
Marner, Eliot told John Blackwood that the story was intended to show ‘the remedial 
influences of pure, natural human relations’.59 This is also the case, I suggest, with 
Romola. In the end, with the help of this ‘pure, natural human relation’, the heroine is 
able to find not only a more authentic duty, but also a better way of coping with her 
relationship with her own community. In Chapter One, I contended that thick relations 
can enhance our thin relations. This chapter shows that when thick relations become 
problem
ws is the nourishing power of habit-memory: how the mere 
repetition of a customary act enables an individual to re-evaluate himself and his 
relation
vertheless, still have a valid claim. 
In ‘The ntigone and Its Moral’, an essay often regarded by critics as an anticipation of 
Romola, Eliot 
  
                                                
atic, thin relations are a worthwhile alternative. 
 
Here memory’s remedial power is different from the Wordsworthian spots of 
time, the revival of a particular event in the past which provides nourishing power for 
the present. While Wordsworth emphasizes the redemptive power of recollective 
memory, what Eliot sho
 with the past.    
 
Though an individual should cling to new groups and rebel against old duties 
when the latter becomes problematic, old duties, ne
 A
points out the difficulty of rebellion:  
Reformers, martyrs, revolutionists, are never fighting against evil only; 
they are also placing themselves in opposition to a good—to a valid 
principle which cannot be infringed without harm. […] Wherever the 
 
59 Eliot, Letters, III, 382. 
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strength of a man’s intellect, or moral sense, or affection brings him into 
opposition with the rules which society has sanctioned, there is renewed 
the conflict between Antigone and Creon; such a man must not only dare 
to be right, he must also dare to be wrong—to shake faith, to wound 
friendship, perhaps, to hem in his own powers. […] He can never earn 
the name of a blameless martyr any more than the society […] can be 
                                                
branded as a hypocritical tyrant.60 
 
Hegel’s theory on tragedy is illuminating here. He contends that ‘the original essence of 
tragedy consists then in the fact that within such a conflict each of the opposed sides if 
taken by itself, has justifications’.61 And just as Eliot recognizes that through rebellion, 
reformers and martyrs are setting themselves against a ‘valid principle’, Romola in the 
novel comes to a similar recognition. This is not only because ‘the rules which society 
has sanctioned’ are the timeless truths and practices before which we as individuals 
should bow down with reverence, but also because they have a firm physiological basis. 
Old habits thus remain part of us. The narrator emphasizes many times that the 
physiological residue of the old ties still palpitates within Romola, resuming its well-
worn paths in spite of her desire to rebel against it. After the rescue in the plague-
stricken village is over, Romola’s emotions ‘rushed back into the old deep channels of 
use and affection’; ‘Florence, and all her life there, had come back to her like hunger’ (R, 
p. 528). ‘Hunger’ here describes a physical want, showing that life in Florence has 
become deeply rooted within her; it is as indispensable as food. Her deep concern for 
the well-being of Tito and the Florentine people proves the validity of Savonarola’s 
teaching that she cannot turn her back on the duties that have been assigned to her: 
 
60 George Eliot, ‘The Antigone and Its Moral’, in Selected Critical Writings, ed. by Rosemary Ashton 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 246 (original emphasis). 
61 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Hegel Reader, ed. by Stephen Houlgate (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1998), p. 451 (original emphasis). 
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‘Could anything utterly cease for her that had once mingled itself with the current of her 
heart’s blood?’ (R, p. 528). The conflict between rebellion and obedience remains 
problem e the duty of obedience ends, and the duty of resistance 
begins,
                                                
atic: ‘the question wher
 could in no case be an easy one’ (R, p. 431).  
 
Such a difficulty leads to the controversial ending of the novel. Commenting on 
Romola’s final return to Florence, Julian Corner holds that it is similar to Maggie 
Tulliver’s return to St. Ogg’s, which is ‘impelled’ by ‘a sense of duty operating as the 
enforcer of continuity’.62 I do not, however, see Romola and Maggie’s homecomings as 
of the same nature. I agree that Maggie’s return is motivated by duty to her past and her 
community, but Romola’s case is far more complicated. Apparently, she has come back 
to her community, to her old ties and to her duty as a Florentine citizen. Yet she does 
not eventually submit unquestioningly to Savonarola’s teaching, though she recognizes 
its validity. As George Levine has noticed, the book will ‘not settle for the restraints that 
Savonarola imposes and Romola, for a while, accepts’. What makes her action 
revolutionary is her creation of new duties: taking care of Tessa and her children and 
living with them. By doing this, she ‘creates […] new obligations that are […] more 
authentic and valuable than the merely legal ones she had been forced to flee’. 63 And 
this is what differentiates her from Maggie. Maggie goes back to St. Ogg’s only to 
remain loyal to old duties and to die there. Romola’s home-coming is the start of a new 
life. In returning to Florence, she manages both to keep old duties at work and to devote 
herself to new duties. She remains faithful to her duty as a Florentine citizen, to the past 
that has nurtured her, but at the same time, she does not bind herself uncritically to it. 
She also devotes herself to her duty to humanity. She takes care of Tessa and her 
 
62 Julian Corner, ‘“Telling the Whole”: Trauma, Drifting and Reconciliation in Romola’, in From Author 
to Text: Re-reading George Eliot’s Romola, ed. by Caroline Levine and Mark Turner (Hampshire: 
Ashgate, 1998), pp. 67-88 (p. 70). 
63 George Levine, ‘Introduction: George Eliot and the Art of Realism’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
George Eliot, ed. by George Levine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 1-19 (p. 15).  
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children not because Tessa was her late husband’s mistress and thus closely related to 
her, but simply because of their humanity. They are in a miserable condition and need 
help. As Romola tells Monna Brigida, ‘they are quite helpless’ (R, p. 531). This is a 
continuation of what she does in the plague-stricken village: where there is need, there 
blem of betrayal and being left 
in a void where devotion to old duties becomes impossible, and the same outcome of 
redemp
is duty.  
 
Silas Marner 
The composition of Silas Marner interrupted Eliot’s thinking about the writing 
of Romola. Owing to the overlap in the composition of the two novels, it is no 
coincidence that they are both engaged with the issue of duty. As I have mentioned 
earlier in this section, Silas Marner details the same pro
tion through devotion to one’s duty to humanity. 
 
Silas Marner resembles Romola in many ways.  Like Romola, Silas’s 
recognition of duty towards Eppie is the work of instinct, independent of conscious will. 
When asked to leave the child he has just found in his house, his decision to keep the 
child comes ‘abruptly’: ‘The proposition to take the child from him had come to Silas 
quite unexpectedly, and his speech, uttered under a strong sudden impulse, was almost 
like a revelation to himself’ (SM, p. 113). ‘Abruptly’, ‘quite unexpectedly’ and ‘a strong 
sudden impulse’ underline the involuntary nature of his reaction. Like Romola’s 
decision to rescue the villagers in the valley, it is performed without reasoning and 
reflection. This philanthropic instinct, however, is not a random decision, but the 
accumulative force of the past.  We are told that in Lantern Yard, Silas was in the habit 
of performing benevolent acts. He used to spend ‘a large proportion’ of his weekly 
earnings on ‘objects of piety and charity’. His life before coming to Raveloe had been 
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filled with ‘close fellowship’ (SM, p. 16; p. 7). It is these repeated acts of benevolence 
which gradually prepare him for similar philanthropic acts in future. The old habit has 
created a well-worn path along which similar actions are bound to be taken in similar 
situations. The ‘impulse’ of keeping Eppie is nothing but the work of habit resuming its 
long-es
 her that 
the duty she owes to her lawful father is stronger than her duty to Silas, she answers 
‘impetu
tablished path.    
 
Eppie’s decision to stay with her foster-father when her real father comes to 
claim her is also an instinctive rather than a rational choice: ‘Not that these thoughts, 
[…] determined her resolution—that was determined by the feelings which vibrated to 
every word Silas had uttered’ (SM, pp. 165-6). When Nancy tries to persuade
ously’, with ‘tears gathered’, that Silas is her only father (SM, p. 167).  
 
Eppie’s instinctive decision, like Silas’s earlier decision to keep her, is an effect 
of the long, accumulative force of the past. For Eppie, Silas is a habitual part of her life 
while Godfrey is not. Silas is her ‘old long-loved’ father, whereas Godfrey is the ‘new 
unfamiliar father’ who is ‘newly revealed’ and who comes to her ‘suddenly’ (SM, pp. 
165-6). The contrasts made here all point to the fact that Godfrey is not a part of the 
habitual past to which she belongs. She cannot go back to him because she was not 
‘brought up to be a lady’, and therefore is not ‘used to’ the life he offers her. She cannot 
give up the people she has been ‘used to’ (SM, p. 168; p. 163). By saying so, Eppie is 
also telling Godfrey that she is not a part of his habitual life. The repetition of the phrase 
‘used to’ reveals that habit is the sole force behind her decision. To stick to Marner is 
something she is bound to do because it has always been her way and she therefore 
cannot do otherwise. The long, accumulative force of the past has nurtured in her a 
strong attachment to him and the life to which she is accustomed. She cannot, as a result, 
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choose but to follow the old, well-worn way. Nothing can drive her from her long-
traversed course. Argument and reasoning, whether Godfrey’s offer of a promising 
future or Nancy’s belief that it is the right thing to do to be restored to her birth right, 
are pow
or the necessity of deviating from custom in order to achieve 
personal fulfilment, Eliot pays more respect to customary duty when it is the expression 
of habi
r natural father, Eliot again 
gives priority to the internal, rather than the external, which is stipulated by law but 
which i
                                                
erless in the face of this blind and predetermined force.    
 
If Romola reflects Eliot’s challenge to the Christian concept of duty, Silas 
Marner involves more of a negotiation between hereditary and customary duty. Eliot’s 
point of view can be seen to differ from that of Mill, who holds that individuals should 
be brave enough to cast off the yoke of custom. Mill warns people against ‘the 
despotism of custom’. It is a ‘standing hindrance to human advancement’ and the spirit 
of progress. When the mind is bowed to its yoke, ‘human capacities are withered and 
starved: they become incapable of any strong wishes or native pleasures, and are 
generally without either opinions or feelings of home growth, or properly their own’.64 
While Mill argues f
tual feelings. 
 
Eppie, unlike Mill, is willing to be restrained by the yoke of custom. For her, the 
sole determining element of duty is the inner, the habitual, not the legal.  By assuming 
that Eppie’s duty to Silas is more authentic than that to he
s not an expression of an individual’s inner feelings. 
 
By suggesting that an individual should cast away false duties if they are not 
habitual, Eliot does not mean that people should embrace absolute freedom. As 
 
64 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Writings, ed. by Stefan Collini (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), pp. 61-70.  
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Durkheim has shown, an individual is an inseparable part of the society in which he 
lives. Disassociation from it will make him more liable to self-destruction. If cutting 
herself from this whole can only breed suicidal instincts in Romola’s case, it drives 
Silas in
s us of a similar situation in Romola: in taking care 
of Tessa and her children, what the narrator emphasizes is Romola’s desperate need for 
them ra
to a solitary and numb life of fifteen years, which is equally destructive.  
 
Absolute freedom is not for Eliot the only alternative to the abandonment of 
false duties. The best thing to do is to embrace new groups and new duties. Silas is 
rescued from his insect-like life by devoting himself to a new duty: the fostering of an 
orphan who is not a blood relation and who has no shared past with him. When Eppie 
expresses her gratitude towards Silas, he acknowledges that ‘the blessing was mine’ 
(SM, p. 160). It seems odd to say that in bringing up an orphan, the foster-father benefits 
more than the child, but this actually points towards the essence of the novel: duty to 
humanity can offer tremendous redemptive power when duty to the past, to the near and 
dear, becomes problematic. It remind
ther than their need for her.  
 
Eliot’s position in Silas Marner is that one should embrace new groups and new 
duties not because one can thus take refuge in the present and banish the past, but 
because a healthier relationship with the past can then be established. We are told that 
because of the traumatic experience in Lantern Yard, Silas’s habitual practice of 
benevolence is blocked. The ‘old narrow pathway was closed’ and ‘affection seemed to 
have died under the bruise’ (SM, p. 15). His new devotion to the child is redemptive 
because it can reopen the blocked pathway and activate the old habit that has died out 
under the ‘bruise’. Earlier in the novel, through tending to the cobbler’s wife, Silas 
experiences ‘a rush of pity at the mingled sight and remembrance’ (SM, p. 16). ‘A rush 
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of pity’ describes the momentary reopening of the old channels of kindness and 
affection through an act of benevolence. Unfortunately, the momentary breakthrough 
does not last long because of the villagers’ misunderstanding about the source of his 
healing powers. It is the bringing-up of Eppie which eventually enables Silas to resume 
his habitual benevolence to others and hence recover his habitual self. We are told that 
through tending Eppie, ‘he began to look for the once familiar herbs’ (SM, p. 124). 
More importantly, the old memories that have died out under the bruise are revived: ‘As 
the child’s mind was growing into knowledge, his mind was growing into memory’. 
Eventually, Silas is able to evaluate the traumatic event in a new light and ‘recovered a 
conscio
nts from his past and 
integrated them into his new duty. This is probably the best way of treating a past that 
has bet
lp, but also themselves. It further directs them to their duty 
towards their fellow creatures, a more authentic duty than any religious or legal ones 
posed from the outside.  
 
usness of unity between his past and present’ (SM, p. 124; p. 138). 
 
At the end of the novel, Silas returns to his old community, only to find it has 
disappeared. This seems to suggest that the community did not deserve to survive but 
more importantly, perhaps, that one should not be bonded to the past uncritically, for it 
can be painful, and even traumatic. Silas has drawn positive eleme
rayed him, but it is nevertheless an inseparable part of him. 
 
Romola and Silas Marner are very different novels. One is set in Renaissance 
Italy and the other in nineteenth-century rural England. However, they both explore the 
nature of duty and how it is closely woven with habitual feelings. This force, which is 
not innate but acquired through repeated practice, enables Romola and Silas to rescue 
not only those in need of he
im
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iot’s understanding of duty, 
I would like to bring them together in this final section by discussing the extent to 
which t
ty turns out to be very 
destruc ve. Romola becomes suicidal after she is cut off from all her ties while Silas’s 
self-ali
illagers out of their difficulty. In Silas Marner, Silas is rescued from 
his insect-like life by bringing up Eppie, which makes him once more an active part of 
his com
Coda 
Having devoted a section each to Wordsworth and El
hey are similar as well as different from each other.  
 
Both writers condemn ‘unchartered freedom’. Far from being the road to 
happiness, absolute freedom can only leave man adrift with no purpose and therefore 
miserable. In ‘Ode to Duty’, ‘unchartered freedom’ is tiring. Paradoxically, freedom 
from all restraint provides no relief but is instead an unbearable heavy ‘weight’ (OTD, l. 
37; l. 38). In the cases of Romola and Silas, freedom from du
ti
enation tragically reduces him to mere animal existence. 
 
For both Wordsworth and Eliot, duty gives one a sense of purpose and peace of 
mind.  Romola finds duty redemptive. Her discovery of duty is described as a ‘resting-
place of her mind’ and ‘a firm footing’ (R, p. 366), which echoes the ‘repose’ in ‘Ode to 
Duty’. Moreover, for both writers, duty offers relief from doubt and hesitation. The poet 
in the Ode is no longer prey to ‘chance desires’ (OTD, l. 40; l. 38). Likewise, Romola’s 
doubt disperses when she tends the sick among her fellow-citizens. Her egoistic 
complaint about the course her life should take stops when she is able to deliver the 
plague-stricken v
munity. 
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Though both Wordsworth and Eliot see the state of being duty-bound as far 
better than ‘unchartered freedom’, they understand duty in different ways. Eliot’s 
conception of duty is secular. In contrast, Wordsworth’s duty has a marked religious 
leaning. In the eighteenth century, science and religion were sometimes perceived as 
going hand in hand. Wordsworth, operating under the sway of the natural theology of 
the eighteenth century, sees duty as coming from God. It is the law which governs both 
the natural and the human world. In the nineteenth century, with the further 
development of natural science, especially the theory of evolution, the survival of the 
fittest through a process of natural selection, science and religion had entered into 
opposition. Eliot’s duty is not to God, but to humanity. Though in her youth she was a 
devout evangelical, she soon abandoned Christian dogma, breaking with the religion 
which had been the anchorage of her earlier life. Her secular notion of duty developed 
alongside her alienation from Christianity. Romola and Silas Marner, who are betrayed 
by their past, but eventually move on and devote themselves to duties to humanity, can 
be seen as a reflection of this intellectual trajectory.  
 
Eliot’s notion of duty is thus more radical than that of Wordsworth. Wordsworth 
sees duty as a law coming from God, before which an individual has no choice but to 
bow down with reverence. One should bring his unruly instincts under control and 
submit to the course God has preordained. In other words, one should internalize the 
external. The priority given to the external leaves virtually no room for rebellion against 
religious duties and highlights the poet’s emphasis on submission and docility. For Eliot, 
it is the other way round. Eliot identifies duty with an individual’s habitual needs. An 
individual feels his duty as an inner, irresistible force. It is this force which motivates 
people to act philanthropically. The duty stipulated by law and religion should be an 
expression of this inner need. Thus Eliot suggests that the internal should be 
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externalized. This priority given to the inner is a drastic revision of the Christian 
concept of duty. By allowing her protagonists to throw away false duties and seek new 
ones, she gives them more freedom. If, for Wordsworth, freedom is the state of 
‘voluntary obedience’ to duty (RTM, p. 24), a state of successful internalization of the 
moral law God preordains, for Eliot, freedom means something different. It means 
casting away religious and legal duties imposed on an individual from the outside that 
do not 
 the past. Thus rebellion is perhaps more 
important for Eliot, whereas submission is more important for Wordsworth, not only on 
a perso
answer his inner needs.   
 
What produces such a difference is partly that the two writers are writing at 
different historical moments. Wordsworth, on the whole, is concerned with self-
discipline. Both the Ode and ‘Reply to “Mathetes”’ reflect his thinking about how to 
bring about self-control and gradually commit to an external authority. At a time when 
there was a breakdown of social order as a result of the Napoleonic Wars, advocating 
self-discipline was by no means personal. It helped maintain social order. Both the 
poem and the letter could be seen as anticipating Wordsworth’s later work, The 
Excursion, in the last book of which the poet argues that moral excellence in individuals 
will be conducive to the welfare of the nation. By contrast, Eliot is engaged with totally 
different issues: the loss of faith, the reconnection with the Christian tradition and how 
to move on without total abandonment of
nal level but on a nationwide scale.  
 
Though the two writers see duty differently as a result of their different beliefs 
and the different social contexts in which they write, both regard it as empirically based. 
In contrast with the Kantian a priori notion of duty, they see duty as something that is 
obtained through experience. For Wordsworth, though duty is a law coming from God, 
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we are not born with the capacity to act unswervingly according to this law. We only 
learn to abide by it through experience, particularly through the mistakes we make. 
Eliot’s duty is also closely related to experience. As a form of habitual feeling, duty is 
not inborn but the result of long-term training. Romola’s discovery of duty in the 
plague-stricken village is not a chance decision, and nor is Silas’s decision to bring up 
Eppie. Both are gradually prepared by acting in similar ways on similar occasions in the 
past.  
 creates villains like Tito, who is not 
intentionally vicious in the beginning, but whose repeated abandonment of duty makes 
him de
 the sway of habit, ‘cannot help acting rightly’.65 Romola and Silas’s 
instinctive recognition of duty in an emergency is also the work of this irresistible 
physical force.   
                                                
 
Both writers value this powerful and accumulative force. In it, we see the work 
of memory. Memory not only prepares us for similar acts upon similar occasions, but 
ultimately moulds us into what we are. Habit creates in Wordsworth a ‘second will 
more wise’ (OTD, l. 48). It creates in Eliot’s novels characters like Romola and Silas, 
whose repeated acts of benevolence rescue not only others, but also enable them to save 
themselves from self-destruction. It also
generate into an evil person. 
 
Moreover, both Wordsworth and Eliot recognize that habit cultivation is 
voluntary and conscious at first but automatic and spontaneous later on. This process is 
not only reflected in ‘Ode to Duty’, but in the change Romola goes through from 
Florence to the plague-stricken village. Interestingly, both writers value highly the 
automatic performance of duty. The motto of ‘Ode to Duty’ depicts a morally-upright 
man, who, under
 
65 The epigraph added to the 1837 edition of the Ode, adapted from Seneca’s Moral Epistles The 
translation is quoted from the editor’s note in Wordsworth, Poems in Two Volumes, and Other Poems: 
1800-1807, p. 407. 
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eaction is our habitual way of behaving in the 
past, which is re-enacted in the present.  
x’, which are no part of Wordsworth’s vocabulary, are 
constantly seen in her novels.  
ord which can work both ways. Where it heads depends upon 
where we direct it.    
 
 
 
What makes Eliot different from Wordsworth is her emphasis on the recognition 
of duty in an emergency. This is perhaps because of the influence of Lewes, who 
emphasizes that the right action taken in an emergency is the result of habitualisation. 
Eliot often demonstrates the making of moral decisions in this way. It is on these 
occasions that we best see the work of habit, because we have no time to reflect and can 
only act upon instinct. This instinctive r
 
Also, perhaps because of Eliot’s engagement with Victorian science through 
Lewes and Spencer, she is more scientific than Wordsworth. She often probes the 
physiological process of the work of habit in great depth. Scientific terms such as 
‘channel’, ‘pathway’ and ‘refle
 
Lastly, while Wordsworth is positive about habit and sees it as the surest means 
of approaching duty, Eliot can sometimes be more critical of it. She sees its powerful 
potential to convert her protagonists to humanitarian acts, but is also alert to its negative 
impact. The very force of habit which leads Romola to the discovery of her duty to 
humanity also leads Tito to his downfall. For her, habit itself is neither good nor bad. It 
is a double-edged sw
Chapter Three 
Guilt and Recovery in Book X of 
The Prelude, Adam Bede and ‘Janet’s Repentance’ 
  
 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters, I examined habit-memory and its relationship with 
universal humanity and duty. In this chapter, I will discuss the relationship between 
habit-memory and recollective memory. I will concentrate on one particular form of 
recollection—guilt over wrongdoings in the past—and explore its relationship with the 
development of moral habits.  
 
Both Wordsworth and Eliot are interested in guilt. Many of Wordsworth’s 
poems, including ‘Salisbury Plain’, The Borderers, ‘Peter Bell’ and some of the spots of 
time in The Prelude, explore not the external punishment of a wrong-doing, but rather 
the inner feeling of remorse and its effect upon the psyche. In a similar way, many of 
Eliot’s characters, such as Janet, Mr. Tryan, Arthur, Hetty, Bulstrode and Gwendolen, 
are burdened with a heavy load of guilt. Like Wordsworth, Eliot is more interested in 
representing their internal contrite feelings, rather than the external punishment they 
endure. 
 
That Eliot developed her notion of guilt partly in response to Wordsworth is 
evident from some of the comments she added while editing Lewes’s posthumous work, 
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The Study of Psychology, which she saw through the press after his death.1 These few 
touches highlight how her views on the origin of remorse differ from those of Lewes. 
For Lewes, conscience is not innate, but a social product. Remorse is thus internalized 
social disapprobation for doing wrong. Man’s dread of punishment or social 
disapprobation ‘soon grows into terror of their own disapprobation’ (original emphasis). 
There is also another type of remorse which is more positive. It results from a 
sympathetic imagination of what others may suffer because of one’s own action. 
Consequently, remorse can be the pain experienced ‘in sympathetic & in egoistic vision 
of consequences’.2  
 
Compared with Lewes, Eliot’s emphasis is not on external punishment. In a 
warm affirmation of humanity, she observes that moral sense can arise ‘without the idea 
of an uplifted rod’.3 She deletes Lewes’s original text on remorse, which states that man 
‘forever sees the Eumenides in pursuit’, adding the comment: ‘Remorse has no relation 
to an external source of punishment for the wrong committed: it is the agonised sense, 
the contrite contemplation, of the wound inflicted on another’.4 She goes on to point out 
that “Wordsworth has depicted a remorse of this kind”, quoting from Book III of The 
Excursion:  
 
Feebly must they have felt 
Who, in old time, attired with snakes and whips 
The vengeful Furies. Beautiful regards 
Were turned on me —the face of her I loved; 
The wife and mother, pitifully fixing  
                                                 
1 Gordon Haight, George Eliot: A Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 527. 
2 For a comparison between Lewes’s unpublished version and Eliot’s revision of it, see the appendix of K. 
K. Collins, ‘G. H. Lewes Revised: George Eliot and the Moral Sense’, Victorian Studies, 21 (1978), 463-
92  (p. 485). 
3 Collins, 485. 
4 Collins, 489. 
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Tender reproaches, insupportable!5   
 
What Wordsworth emphasizes here is the change from external to internal punishment 
after one has made a transgression. A series of contrasts—ugly versus beautiful, hate 
versus pity—bring out the paradoxical insight that revenge through violent punishment 
is less terrible than tender reproach, especially when that reproach is mixed with pity 
from the wrongdoer’s loved ones. The unbearable nature of this tenderness is 
emphasized by the word ‘insupportable’, through its position at the end of the line and 
its isolation from the other words by a comma. It can be argued that Eliot consciously 
follows Wordsworth in exploring the internal effect of guilt rather than the external 
punishment, not only in this passage but also in her fiction.  
 
My focus in this chapter is on a special type of guilt which results from what 
Frances Ferguson terms ‘circumstantial memory’, a remorse that occurs when the 
unforeseen outcome of an action is interpreted in such a way that it seems, in retrospect, 
as though it were subliminally intended. Even though it is artificial and imaginary, the 
damage such remorse inflicts on the psyche is no less severe; in extreme cases, it can 
traumatize. This chapter will explore the similarities and differences between 
Wordsworth and Eliot with regard to this type of memory, which Ferguson claims that 
Wordsworth initiates and Eliot develops.6 It will also look at the different recovery 
patterns proposed by the two writers as far as the psychic wound produced by 
circumstantial memory is concerned.        
 
                                                 
5 The quotation Eliot cited is from The Excursion (III, ll. 850-5). 
6 Frances Ferguson, ‘Romantic Memory’, in The Wordsworthian Enlightenment: Romantic Poetry and 
the Ecology of Reading, ed. by Helen Regueiro Elam and Frances Ferguson (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2005), pp. 71-93 (p. 90). All subsequent quotations of this article are from this edition 
with page numbers given in parentheses. 
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Circumstantial Memory 
According to Ferguson, John Locke marks a turning point in the conception of 
memory when he states that one no longer needs to repeat trademark actions to assert 
one’s identity since memory suffices to ensure ‘a sense of individual continuity over 
time’ (Ferguson, p. 71). Memory as such is no longer simply a passive reproduction of 
the past, but becomes an active examination of what past actions could have developed 
into. It also involves a constant comparison between the present and the past. Such 
examination and comparison naturally lead to judgment about earlier actions—whether 
they are right or wrong—which characterizes what Ferguson terms ‘Romantic Memory’: 
‘[T]he special pressure that romanticism brings to bear on memory is the pressure of an 
expanded moral obligation, an obligation to reexamine one’s own past actions to see if 
their value has been altered by subsequent events’. Romantic memory is concerned not 
so much with the ‘truthfulness or even accuracy’ (Ferguson, p. 87) of memory as it is 
about the moral judgment of one’s earlier actions in the light of later developments. 
 
 Anne Whitehead observes that memory since Locke has shifted ‘from the stasis 
favoured by the classical mnemonic system to a more temporal, narrative conception’.7 
As far as Romantic memory is concerned, the revaluation of earlier actions means that 
some new narrative elements trigger a re-configuration of the original events. The result 
is a new story in which the original elements take on a new meaning. In other words, the 
meaning of an earlier action may not have been intended but may be the result of the 
structuring effect of the narrative. As ‘a continual review of actions through the lenses 
of a variety of different sets of consequences’, Romantic memory has the potential to 
wound, because it may cause individuals to hold themselves responsible for actions that 
result in negative, though unintended and unforeseen, consequences (Ferguson, p. 87). 
                                                 
7 Anne Whitehead, Memory (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 51. 
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As Helen Regueiro Elam comments, ‘responsibility inheres in the consequences’, and 
‘we are responsible despite our blindness, as Oedipus is’.8 Ferguson goes on to point 
out that this does not mean one should ‘never feel retrospective grief over an action’ 
(Ferguson, p. 85). Her point is that, ‘[w]ere this expansive memory to expand forever, it 
would produce a kind of anticipatory guilt of massive—indeed, paralyzing—
proportions’ (Ferguson, pp. 89-90). In other words, it has the potential to traumatize. 
 
If Romantic memory has the potential to wound, it also has the ability to cure. 
Ferguson remarks that one’s retrospective moral review is not an ‘entirely undesirable 
state’ (Ferguson, p. 88). Otherwise it would be difficult to explain the ‘Waiting for the 
Horses’ episode in The Prelude, in which Wordsworth, through reflection, feels that his 
anxious waiting for the horses has somehow led to his father’s death. After listing a 
series of detailed circumstances, Wordsworth tells us: 
 
All these were kindred spectacles and sounds 
To which I oft repaired, and thence would drink, 
As at a fountain… 9 
 
As Ferguson notes, this traumatic memory seems to be also a pleasurable one, which is 
puzzling. The answer lies in another characteristic of Romantic memory. Romanticism 
brings to memory not only the pressure of an obligation to re-examine past actions in 
the light of consequences, but also ‘the increasing pressure’ to ‘provide convincing 
evidence that one hasn’t acted, that one hasn’t yet seen things that would make one 
regret one’s past for the consequences that have attended it’ (Ferguson, p. 89, original 
                                                 
8 Helen Regueiro Elam and Frances Ferguson, ‘Introduction’ in The Wordsworthian Enlightenment, 
Romantic Poetry and the Ecology of Reading, pp. 1-25 (p. 10). 
9 These are lines 324-6 from Book XII of the 1850 edition of The Prelude, quoted in Ferguson, ‘Romantic 
Memory’, p. 88. 
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emphasis). The circumstances Wordsworth lists serve exactly this purpose in that they 
‘never sort themselves into a causal chain’. The result is the comforting knowledge that 
‘there is no news, that nothing has happened’ (Ferguson, p. 88; p. 89, original emphasis). 
There is no evidence therefore to implicate Wordsworth in his father’s death.  
 
It must be pointed out that there seems to be some ambiguity in Ferguson’s 
conceptualization of Romantic memory, which she also calls circumstantial memory. 
According to Anne Whitehead, the two terms designate different types of memory. The 
former is a moral review of one’s earlier actions and may be poisonous. The latter is an 
‘alternative form of remembering’. It cures by clustering around the description of an 
event a series of elements that disrupts a coherent narrative so that there is insufficient 
evidence to substantiate an accusation of guilt. However, the opposition between 
Romantic memory and circumstantial memory is not so clear-cut. It is true that 
Ferguson herself writes that circumstantial memory is ‘an alternative history’, which 
seems to justify Whitehead’s interpretation (Ferguson, p. 89). However, Ferguson also 
writes: 
 
Thus, if Wordsworth’s account of circumstantial memory enables him to 
accuse himself of having, perhaps, been at fault in the occurrence of 
events that he never meant to originate, it also seeks to cure such 
potentially illimitable self-accusation by producing a transcript of images 
that never cohere into a causal pattern. (Ferguson, p. 89) 
 
The conditional clause makes it clear that circumstantial memory can lead to self-
accusation. The word ‘also’ in the main clause further shows it can both wound and 
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cure.  Ferguson further clarifies the self-incriminating tendency of circumstantial 
memory:  
 
The tricky thing about circumstantial guilt is that it activates memory in 
an unusual way, because it combines a consciousness that one did 
something with a revaluation in the light of the negative consequences 
that one’s action seemed to have produced.10 
 
The term Ferguson uses may be distinct here—‘circumstantial guilt’—but it is still 
about the kind of memory that re-evaluates earlier actions. It is corrosive as well as 
curative. Romantic memory and circumstantial memory may well be two sides of the 
same coin.   
 
Despite the ambiguity in Ferguson’s conceptualization, circumstantial 
memory—in the sense of being both corrosive and curative, as I understand it—can 
help us to understand Wordsworth’s memory of his involvement in the French 
Revolution and his guilt over his ardent support for it in Book X of The Prelude. In 
what follows, I will show how the poet overloads himself with a massive amount of 
guilt after the Revolution goes wrong, and how this guilt becomes less keen through the 
enlistment of circumstantial evidence which seeks to disrupt the self-incriminating 
narrative. Nevertheless, guilt is not undone. Instead, there is a tug-of-war in the poet’s 
psyche. 
 
                                                 
10  Frances Ferguson (ff1@jhu.edu). “Re: A Question from a Faithful Reader.” E-mail to Yu Xiao 
(Yu.Xiao@newcastle.ac.uk). 2 November 2007.  
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Self-Incrimination  
Critics have discussed Wordsworth’s guilt about his initially ardent support of 
the French Revolution. Commenting on the poet’s dream of the ‘implements of death’, 
and ‘innocent victims sinking under fear’ in Book X of The Prelude,11 David Bromwich 
remarks that ‘the self-accusation goes deeper than chagrin or mere regret. Only one who 
felt himself somehow implicated in the regime of terror would resort to this particular 
tone of confession’.12  Duncan Wu also points out that ‘in the wake of Robespierre’s 
execution’, the poet begins to ‘question his fervent support for the execution of Louis 
XVI’. He may even have felt that ‘he was in some way implicated in it’.13 However, 
Bromwich and Wu do not proceed to explore the psychological process at work in 
Wordsworth’s sense of guilt. Wordsworth’s analysis of criminal psychology during the 
French Revolution, read with an understanding of Ferguson’s conception of 
‘circumstantial memory’, can help to explain this psychological process:  
 
The study of human nature suggests this awful truth, that, as in the trials 
to which life subjects us, sin and crime are apt to start from their very 
opposite qualities, so are there no limits to the hardening of the heart, and 
the perversion of the understanding to which they may carry their slaves. 
During my long residence in France, while the revolution was rapidly 
advancing to its extreme of wickedness, I had frequent opportunities of 
being an eye-witness of this process.14  
                                                 
11 William Wordsworth, The Prelude, 1799, 1805, 1850: Authoritative Texts, Context and Reception, 
Recent Critical Essays, ed. by Jonathan Wordsworth, M. H. Abrams and Stephen Gill (New York: Norton, 
1979), 1850, X, lines 403, 404. Though here I am quoting from Bromwich who discusses the 1850 edition 
of The Prelude, my own focus in this section is mainly the 1805 edition. All subsequent quotations of this 
poem are from this edition with book and line numbers given in parentheses unless otherwise noted. 
12 David Bromwich, Disowned by Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 86.  
13 Duncan Wu, ‘Wordsworth’s Poetry to 1798’, in The Cambridge Companion to Wordsworth, ed. by 
Stephen Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 22-37 (p. 31). 
14 Quoted from W. J. B. Owen and Jane Smyser, ‘Introduction to “Preface to The Borderers”’, in The 
Prose Works of William Wordsworth, ed. by W. J. B. Owen and Jane Smyser, 3 vols (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1974), I, 69. This passage was written as Wordsworth traced the origin of The Borderers. This 
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 If Wordsworth feels guilty because of his support for the French Revolution, then this 
passage, as strange as it seems, may also explain something about the poet himself. He 
is not merely an innocent witness to the process that turns a virtuous person into a 
demon; he himself has been through that process. When he looks back on his fervent 
support for the Revolution in the aftermath of the Reign of Terror, it takes on a sinister 
meaning. It has hardened his heart and perverted his understanding. Ferguson’s 
circumstantial memory renders an innocent person guilty by holding him responsible for 
the ‘unmeant’ and ‘unforeseen’ consequences.15 In Wordsworth’s case, such memory is 
even more poisonous than neutral actions such as those explored in the ‘Waiting for the 
Horses’ episode. The consequences are not only ‘unmeant’ and ‘unforeseen’, they are 
initially meant to be the opposite, the pursuit of good. If Ferguson believes that 
circumstantial memory renders ‘the experience of living in a world in which undesirable 
things happen [to] look like its own variant on the notion of original sin’ (Ferguson, p. 
87), Wordsworth gives a gloomier picture of human life, which suggests that even in the 
pursuit of good we cannot entirely free ourselves from original sin.  
 
The likelihood of virtuous people committing crimes increases with the 
institutionalisation of a more advanced political system. During the French Revolution, 
for example, politics became a justification for violence. As Owen and Smyser suggest 
in the introduction to ‘Preface to The Borderers’, there is ‘ample evidence’ in French 
history for Wordsworth’s statement that ‘sin and crime are apt to start from their very 
opposite qualities’, for the ‘transformation of liberal thinkers into political tyrants’.16  
                                                                                                                                               
chapter is not an extended investigation of the play, as the nature of Mortimer’s guilt is different from that 
of Wordsworth. Mortimer is responsible for Herbert’s death because there is a causal link between his 
action and Herbert’s death. Wordsworth is not actually responsible for the bloodshed in the French 
Revolution. He imposes the self-recrimination upon himself through circumstantial memory.      
15 Regueiro Elam and Ferguson, p. 10. 
16 Owen and Smyser, ‘Introduction to “Preface to The Borderers”’, in Prose Works, I, 71. 
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As Burke points out, ‘by hating vices too much, they come to love men too little’17. 
This intolerance of vices can have serious political implications: ‘Men of excessive 
virtue may take excessive measures to bring ordinary men into the path of virtue’.18 
Robespierre was, writes Slavoj Žižek, ‘personally honest and sincere’. Everyone is 
ready to recognize ‘his moral integrity and full devotion to the revolutionary cause’. The 
problem is his ‘very purity’, which is ‘the cause of all trouble’.19 Both his tyranny and 
his downfall originate from his excessive aspiration for virtue. Although the nature of 
Wordsworth’s crime is vastly different from that of Robespierre, since Wordsworth 
does not actually implement the killing, their experiences seem to suggest a universal 
truth about human nature: in the pursuit of good, man cannot totally free himself from 
evil. As Wordsworth writes of the mistakes he made during this period of time, even 
though it was an erring ‘on the better side’, it was still an erring (X, l. 740).   
 
Wordsworth’s attitude towards the French Revolution was different before and 
after it descended into violence. Before the onset of the violence he believed that it was 
a noble cause, aiming to ‘build liberty / On firm foundations’ (IX, l. 368). His memory 
of this time in The Prelude is pleasant and optimistic.  When he climbs the Alps in 
Book VI of The Prelude, the poet recalls ‘France standing on the top of golden hours, / 
And human nature seeming born again’ (ll. 353-4). After the Revolution’s descent into 
violence, Wordsworth’s memory of it is different, focussing on the bloody ramifications 
and undesirable consequences, which he was not capable of understanding when the 
Revolution was at its peak. Circumstantial memory, I suggest, may explain the way 
Wordsworth sees the French Revolution after its disastrous turn: in retrospect, it is not 
                                                 
17 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. by Conor Cruise O’Brien (London: 
Penguin, 1986), p. 283. 
18 Michael Freeman, Edmund Burke and the Critique of Political Radicalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), 
p. 41. 
19 For a detailed discussion, see Žižek, Slavoj, ‘Introduction: Robespierre, or, the “Divine Violence” of 
Terror’, in Maximilien Robespierre, Virtue and Terror, trans. by John Howe (London: Verso, 2007), pp. 
vii-xxxix (p. xxxviii).  
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so much a noble cause as a well-planned murderous scheme. The Borderers, which is 
often seen by critics as a delineation of the psychology of the Revolution, shows that 
Wordsworth sees it as ‘a damned plot against the soul of man’20: 
 
There is a kind of superstition which makes us shudder when we find 
moral sentiments to which we attach a sacred importance applied to 
vicious purposes. […] We are lulled asleep by its agency, and betrayed 
before we know that an attempt is made to betray us.21  
 
‘Superstition’ is a deprecatory word. It is used by the French revolutionaries to describe 
belief in Christianity and the divine right of the monarchy, which they reject. It is 
striking that here Wordsworth bitterly turns this word against itself and mocks the belief 
in reason and atheism that the French revolutionaries advocate. He not only mocks them 
but paints an even more terrible picture of them finding excuses for massacre under the 
guise of the pursuit of liberty. ‘Lulled asleep’ gives full expression to his belief that they 
are cheating innocent people into participating in this murderous scheme.  
 
Such an interpretation of the French Revolution is perhaps too harsh and 
unsparing. Historical accounts show that rather than being a pre-planned murderous 
scheme, the ‘Reign of Terror’ was a product of circumstance: 
 
‘Nobody’, recalled one deputy later, ‘had dreamed of establishing a 
system of terror. It established itself by force of circumstances.’ But that 
meant that nobody had control of it either, even among those with a 
vested interest in its continuance. And nobody, above all, seemed to have 
                                                 
20 William Wordsworth, The Borderers, ed. by Robert Osborn, (1797-99 text) (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1982), V, iii, 28-9. 
21 Wordsworth, ‘Preface to The Borderers’, in Prose Works, I, 79-80. 
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the power to end it, even when its purpose and achievements came to 
seem less and less self-evident.22    
 
This chapter, of course, cannot provide an in-depth study of the nature of the French 
Revolution. But from the above account, we can at least come to the conclusion that the 
violence of the Revolution was not a pre-planned murderous scheme under the guise of 
the pursuit of liberty. Its disastrous turn has many complicated reasons, one of them 
being the pressure of circumstances. And it is circumstantial memory, I suggest, which 
enables Wordsworth to see the violence in that way.    
 
With his revaluation of the French Revolution, Wordsworth interprets his 
involvement in it in a different light. Before his change in thinking, he had identified 
himself as a supporter of this noble cause. In ‘A Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff’, 
written about half a year before the ‘Reign of Terror’, Wordsworth defends the 
execution of Louis XVI and revolutionary violence in general: 
 
A time of revolution is not the season of true Liberty. Alas! the obstinacy 
& perversion of men is such that she is too often obliged to borrow the 
very arms of despotism to overthrow him, and in order to reign in peace 
must establish herself by violence. She deplores such stern necessity, but 
the safety of the people, her supreme law, is her consolation.23  
 
What the poet admits is the paradox of political revolution: violence is quite often the 
means to achieve liberty. ‘Borrow’ suggests that the violence is temporary, that it does 
not intrinsically belong to liberty. Being a ‘stern necessity’ which we have to bear, it 
                                                 
22 William Doyle, The Oxford History of the French Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 
p. 266. 
23 Wordsworth, ‘A Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff’, in Prose Works, I, 33-4. 
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proves worthwhile because the means will eventually be justified by the ends. By 
supporting the violence, Wordsworth indicates that he sees himself as one who fights 
for the ‘government of equal rights / And individual worth’ (IX, ll. 248-9).  
 
After the Revolution goes wrong, the poet’s memory not only includes this 
immediate experience, but also all that he has come to know about a revolution that has 
abandoned its ideal. This time he no longer sees himself as a guardian of liberty as is 
represented in ‘A Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff’. Instead, he identifies himself as an 
accomplice in this well-planned crime against society and human nature:  
 
   I took the knife in hand,  
And, stopping not at parts less sensitive, 
Endeavoured with my best of skill to probe 
The living body of society 
Even to the heart. I pushed without remorse 
My speculations forward, yea, set foot 
On Nature’s holiest places. (X, ll. 872-8) 
 
These lines have often been interpreted as a critique of Godwinism. I would, however, 
agree with Dart, who sees the passage as an internalization of the Reign of Terror in the 
poet’s psyche: ‘in a radical internalisation of the executive practice of the Terror, the 
poet’s mind has become transformed into a kind of court-room for the pursuit of 
philosophical truth’.24  
 
                                                 
24 Gregory Dart, Rousseau, Robespierre and English Romanticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), p. 197.  
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What is striking in this description of memory is that it extends beyond the 
capacity to retrieve events. Rather, it involves a moral obligation on the part of the poet 
to re-examine his past action in order to see whether its meaning has been altered by 
what has subsequently taken place. Wordsworth re-evaluates his former attitude—his 
ardent support for the violence of the Revolution—in the light of the woeful 
consequences of the Revolution. His memory is thus concerned not so much with what 
he was conscious of at the time when he supported the violence, but with its aftermath. 
This re-experience of the past through circumstantial memory is entirely different from 
the initial experience. The tone of confidence in ‘A Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff’, 
which suggested that the ends would justify the means, has disappeared. What we find 
instead is a monster applying his best skills to conduct vivisection. The phrase ‘pushed 
without remorse’ highlights the cruelty of his crime: he has committed an unforgivable 
religious offence. It is reminiscent of the lines quoted earlier from ‘Preface to The 
Borderers’: ‘so are there no limits to the hardening of the heart, and the perversion of 
the understanding to which they may carry their slaves’.25  Wordsworth’s revaluation of 
his involvement in the Revolution upon seeing its disastrous turn sees the birth of a 
heavy load of guilt, which Ferguson describes as ‘massive’ and ‘paralyzing’ (Ferguson, 
pp. 89-90).  
 
Self-Exculpation 
In recent years, critics have noticed that Book X of The Prelude is not merely a 
narrative of the poet’s guilty confession of his involvement in the French Revolution. At 
many points it is a reaffirmation of his revolutionary ideal. Richard Gravil, for example, 
suggests that in describing the horror of the revolutionary violence, Wordsworth seems 
capable of ‘finding images expressive of something which is not merely horror, but a 
                                                 
25 Owen and Smyser, ‘Introduction to “Preface to The Borderers”’, in Prose Works, I, 69. 
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kind of dreadful fascination’. The poet appears to have become aware that ‘the rage for 
destruction is something he had shared’.26 In a similar way, Howard Erskine-Hill points 
out that the stanza beginning with ‘Come now, ye golden times’ (X, l. 541) might imply 
‘the lasting nature of his [Wordsworth’s] early radicalism’.27 Dart goes a step further by 
demonstrating that in The Prelude, the Revolution is represented ‘simultaneously as a 
disastrous crime against nature and a paradigm for the acquisition of freedom and self-
consciousness’.28 I will follow this line of augment, particularly Dart’s emphasis on the 
co-existence of the two strands of narrative at once for and against the Revolution. 
However, my focus is rather on how Wordsworth’s reaffirmation of his revolutionary 
ideal is achieved through circumstantial memory, which has a self-healing mechanism, 
and which can thus cure the wound it has produced through self-incrimination.  
 
Book X of The Prelude provides several examples of this self-healing process. 
Exceptionally vivid recollections constantly rise up to disrupt the self-incriminating 
narrative by providing an alternative narrative, reassuring the poet that he is not guilty 
of the crime for which he holds himself responsible. Wordsworth’s self-blame never 
comes without immediate self-justification, which reassures him that he has been 
making the right choice throughout.  
 
First, Wordsworth enlists circumstances to show that the Revolution is 
absolutely necessary. Just before the appearance of the ‘knife’ image which he uses to 
portray the crime he has committed against society, he interjects with the following 
lines: 
 
                                                 
26 Richard Gravil, ‘“Some Other Being”: Wordsworth in The Prelude’, The Yearbook of English Studies, 
19 (1989), 127-43 (pp. 134-5). 
27 Howard Erskine-Hill, Poetry of Opposition and Revolution: Dryden to Wordsworth (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1996), p. 239. 
28 Dart, p. 178 (original emphasis). 
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      the advocates themselves  
Of ancient institutions had performed 
To bring disgrace upon their very names; 
Disgrace of which custom, and written law, 
And sundry moral sentiments, as props  
And emanations of these institutes, 
Too justly bore a part. (X, ll. 849-55) 
 
The Revolution is necessary because the ‘ancient institutions’, manifested in ‘custom’, 
‘written law’ and ‘sundry moral sentiments’, have become corrupted. They are now the 
source of evil. The hunger-bitten girl and the tragic love story of Julia and Vaudracour 
which occupies more than one third of Book IX illustrate how human nature is abused 
under such a corrupted system. These lines are a refutation of the divinity of the time-
honoured hereditary system advocated by Burke, making clear that contemporary 
society has become an abuse of human nature.  
 
The Prelude provides additional evidence that revolution is necessary not only 
because it can sweep away social corruption, but also because it can restore man to a 
state of freedom and equality, a belief shared by both Wordsworth and Rousseau. The 
word ‘revolution’ comes from the Latin word revolvere, meaning a ‘revolving 
movement in space or time’.29 Thus, it indicates a return to the starting point. Rousseau 
was seen in the eighteenth century as the foremost exponent of the view that human 
nature needs to be restored to its original purity, because it has been corrupted by 
civilization and culture. The Prelude may be seen to advocate this viewpoint in many 
ways. Though Rousseau himself never favours revolution, Wordsworth suggests that 
                                                 
29 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (London: Fontana, 1987), p. 270 
(original emphasis). 
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revolution can restore the corrupted human nature back to a state of purity. He insists 
that his devotion to the Revolution is an extension of ‘those affections’ that ‘from the 
cradle had grown up with me’ (X, ll. 753-54). In Book VIII, he recollects how love of 
nature leads him on to love of man. In Book IX, he accounts how it further leads him to 
the love of ‘mountain liberty’ (IX, l. 242), a political ideal manifested by the Lake 
District people who enjoyed both freedom, ‘[m]an free, man working for himself’ (VIII, 
l. 153), and virtue through their interaction with nature: ‘which yet / Retaineth more of 
ancient homeliness, / Manners erect, and frank simplicity, / Than any other nook of 
English land’ (IX, ll. 218-21). As Eugene Stelzig suggests, ‘Love of nature may have 
led Wordsworth to the love of man, as he insists with the tendentious title of Book VIII, 
but in France it also led him to the love of revolution’.30 Thus, revolution is legitimized 
because, in abandoning law and custom, it returns to nature, which ensures a better 
prospect for humankind.    
 
As well as defending the necessity of the Revolution, The Prelude also justifies 
its violence. Not long after the depiction of the cruelty of the ‘domestic carnage’ and the 
condemnation of this ‘lamentable time for man’, the poet launches a full-scale defence 
of revolutionary violence (X, l. 329; l. 355). His justification of the violence in these 
lines can be seen as moving gradually from doubt to affirmation: 
 
But as the ancient prophets were enflamed,  
Nor wanted consolations of their own 
And majesty of mind, when they denounced  
On Towns and cities, wallowing in the abyss 
Of their offences, punishment to come; 
                                                 
30 Eugene Stelzig, ‘“The Shield of Human Nature”: Wordsworth’s Reflections on the Revolution in 
France’, Nineteenth-Century Literature, 45 (1991), 415-31 (p. 421).  
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Or saw like other men with bodily eyes 
Before them in some desolated place  
The consummation of the wrath of Heaven; 
So did some portion of that spirit fall 
On me to uphold me through those evil times, 
And in their rage and dog-day heat I found 
Something to glory in, as just and fit, 
And in the order of sublimest laws. (X, ll. 401-13) 
 
The poet evokes vivid biblical images to disrupt his previous narrative, which suggested 
that the Revolution was a historical failure. The sudden identity shift from the previous 
criminal to the ‘ancient prophet’ forecasting the ruin of human beings for their 
corruption reveals the instability of the identity the poet has previously constructed. The 
word ‘uphold’ fully expresses the spiritual anchorage provided by these images. It 
works in a similar way as the word ‘impelled’ about forty lines later, at which point the 
poet reassures himself that the ‘disastrous period’ is not short of ‘human excellence’: he 
is ‘impelled to think / Of the glad time when first I traversed France’ (X, l. 442; l. 443; 
ll. 448-9). Both express the urge to resort to comforting images to disrupt the self-
incrimination narrative Wordsworth has been weaving.  
 
While deriving comfort for the mind unsettled by the bloody Revolution, the 
recourse to the violent imagery of the Bible also shows that Wordsworth is not 
advocating a peaceful approach to change. In this way, his psychology ‘comes 
dangerously close to the very psychology of Terrorism itself’.31 Wordsworth implies 
that the present disaster is the necessary evil, the righteous ‘punishment’ from ‘Heaven’, 
                                                 
31 Dart, p. 195. 
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out of which a new social order will soon spring. The idea expressed here, in an oblique 
way, repeats what Wordsworth has in mind during his most radical years: that the 
violence is ‘convulsion from which is to spring a fairer order of things’, though the tone 
is more tentative at this later stage.32 His belief is soon tempered by the modification, 
‘So did some portion of that spirit fall / On me’. Although it may serve as a justification 
of the revolutionary violence, it is at the most ‘some portions’, not powerful enough to 
legitimize the bloodshed.  
 
Such a betrayal of the poet’s diffidence is further confirmed by the concession 
he makes five lines down: ‘even if that were not’. This suggests that the he is not totally 
certain about the validity of such an explanation. In this way, the sense of doubt is 
immediately followed by the poet’s second attempt at justification: 
 
And even if that were not, amid the awe  
Of unintelligible chastisement 
I felt a kind of sympathy with power –  
Motions raised up within me, nevertheless, 
Which had relationship to highest things.  
Wild blasts of music thus did find their way 
Into the midst of terrible events, 
So that worst tempests might be listened to. (X, ll. 414-21) 
 
The poet admits that the ‘chastisement’ is ‘unintelligible’. By acknowledging this he is 
to some extent invalidating his previous justification for the revolutionary violence and 
admitting that he cannot quite make sense of it. However, in spite of its unintelligibility, 
                                                 
32 Wordsworth, ‘A Letter to the Bishop of Llandaff’, Prose Works, I, 34. 
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he still believes in its legitimacy. ‘Music’ is normally used to describe something 
harmonious and pleasant to the ear. Here, however, it paradoxically modifies the 
‘domestic carnage’ (X, l. 329), which the poet describes as the most woeful time of the 
year. It gives full expression to the beauty, the harmony the poet derives from the 
terrible bloodshed in spite of its discordance. Though discordance is converted into 
concordance, neither is this a fully valid justification of the violence, as the word 
‘might’ in ‘worst tempests might be listened to’ suggests.  
 
With the third attempt at justification made, the poet eventually moves from 
self-doubt to affirmation: 
 
Then was the truth received into my heart 
That under heaviest sorrow earth can bring, 
Griefs bitterest of ourselves or of our kind, 
If from the affliction somewhere do not grow  
Honour which could not else have been—a faith, 
An elevation and a sanctity—  
If new strength be not given, or old restored,  
The blame is ours, not Nature’s. When a taunt  
Was […]  
Saying, ‘Behold the harvest which we reap  
From popular government and equality’, 
I saw that it was neither these nor aught  
Of wild belief engrafted on their names 
By false philosophy, that caused the woe, 
But that it was a reservoir of guilt 
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And ignorance, filled up from age to age,  
That could no longer hold its loathsome charge,  
But burst and spread in deluge through the land. (X, ll. 422-39) 
 
Like Rousseau’s ‘anxious concern to list all of the possible circumstances surrounding 
his false accusation of Marion’ in The Confessions to disrupt the self-incrimination 
narrative, 33  Wordsworth lists all the possible circumstances surrounding his self-
accusation to show that the violence of the Revolution does not mean that human nature 
is intrinsically bad, or that the revolutionary ideal and theories which aim at a better 
future of human nature are faulty. Instead, they are the result of the unfortunate way in 
which people have been governed. That is to say, the fault lies with the hereditary 
aristocratic system, which the Revolution aims to destroy. The analysis— evil comes 
from social corruption—echoes Rousseau’s view that ‘all our vices stem ultimately not 
from our nature but from the ways in which we have been badly governed’.34 It is also 
reminiscent of Thomas Paine, who holds that ‘these outrages were not the effect of the 
principles of the Revolution, but of the degraded mind that existed before the 
Revolution, and which the Revolution is calculated to reform’.35   These arguments 
provide a sharp contrast to the pejorative words Wordsworth adopts to describe the 
Reign of Terror just about a hundred lines above: ‘such a sound was ever heard / As 
Liberty upon earth – yet all beneath / Her innocent authority was wrought’ (X, ll. 348-
50).  The violence can be seen as ‘innocent’ because it is in such a good cause. 
 
These examples illustrate Wordsworth’s preoccupation with listing all the 
possible circumstances surrounding his self-incrimination narrative. Their aim is to 
show that the crime for which Wordsworth holds himself responsible is not so evil, that 
                                                 
33 Whitehead, p. 74. 
34 Robert Wokler, Rousseau: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 34.  
35 Thomas Paine, Rights of Man (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), p. 81. 
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‘there is no news’, ‘nothing has happened’ (Ferguson, p. 89, original emphasis). And 
indeed they serve his purpose well, as Dart argues, these passages stage ‘such a striking 
interruption of the poetic narrative’ which ‘instantly serves to disturb that sense of the 
Revolution as a historical failure, […] and reintroduces it into the body of the text as a 
still-nourishing […] spot of time’.36 
 
Tug-of-War 
While Ferguson suggests that circumstantial memory can heal the wound it has 
produced by providing an ‘alternative history’ (Ferguson, p. 89), I would like to depart 
from her judgment that the poet’s guilt is thus undone. Instead, his self-recrimination 
and self-justification are intertwined. There is a tug-of-war going on in his psyche even 
at the moment of writing The Prelude. It is hard to say which one triumphs over the 
other. The psyche, being in a state of ‘oscillating dynamic of confession and self-
exculpation’, is forever an arena of contestation.37  
 
This inner struggle can be seen in the general shape of Wordsworth’s narrative. 
Neither his self-recrimination nor his self-justification is linear. They constantly shift 
from one to the other. Book X on the whole reads more like two strands of thought 
struggling with each other. Wordsworth recounts his experience during the French 
Revolution twice. In the first account, lines 1 to 380 are focused on the disastrous turn 
of the Revolution and Wordsworth’s self-incrimination. From line 381 up to line 440, 
the narrative of self-incrimination suddenly stops and gives way to self-justification. 
With the start of line 657 begins the poet’s second account of his involvement in the 
French Revolution. In contrast with the first account, which starts with the narrative of 
self-incrimination, the poet starts at line 657 with a full-scale self-defence which 
                                                 
36 Dart, p. 199. 
37 Dart, p. 182. 
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culminates in his eulogy of the Revolution, ‘O pleasant exercise of hope and joy’ (X, l. 
689). The tone of confidence continues up to line 728, after which he plunges into a 
lamentation that his mind is given to ‘false imagination, placed beyond / The limits of 
experience and of truth’ (X, ll. 847-8), and that the cause is an utter failure: ‘a land […] 
/ Now without one memorial hope, not even / A hope to be deferred’ (X, ll. 960-4). But 
the sense of decline is not uniformly expressed. Amid the tone of utter disillusionment 
crop up now and then justifications of his starting point: ‘For howsoe’er unsettled, never 
once / Had I thought ill of human-kind, or been / Indifferent to its welfare’ (X, ll. 830-2). 
The repetition is very suggestive, implying that the poet has never fully escaped this 
chain of traumatic events. It keeps coming back, with both its honour and its shame. 
Only through the process of telling and retelling can Wordsworth make sense of it and 
find relief. 
 
We can also look closely at the way Wordsworth’s memory works in a particular 
passage. Take lines 830-850 for example, where the narratives of self-justification and 
of self-incrimination struggle to gain the upper hand:  
 
For howsoe’er unsettled, never once  
Had I thought ill of human-kind, or been  
Indifferent to its welfare, but, enflamed 
With thirst of a secure intelligence,  
And sick of other passion, I pursued  
A higher nature […] 
A noble aspiration! – yet I feel 
The aspiration – but with other thoughts 
And happier: for I was perplexed and sought  
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To accomplish the transition by such means 
As did not lie in nature. (X, ll. 830-43) 
 
The poet is confessing how he was betrayed into committing a crime against nature. 
However, in the opening lines, ‘For howsoe’er unsettled, never once / Had I thought ill 
of human-kind’ (X, ll. 830-2), the negative ‘never once’ and the inversion that follows it 
read more like a man desperately exculpating himself from a false accusation.  A few 
lines down, the poet describes his ‘wrong’ pursuit of revolutionary rationalism as ‘a 
noble aspiration! - yet I feel / The aspiration’ (X, ll. 839-40). Jonathan Wordsworth 
explains in his note on this passage that the line ‘yet I feel’ means ‘to this day I feel’.38 
The 1850 version is even more straightforward: ‘Nor shall ever cease / To feel it’ (XI, ll. 
257-8). Both suggest that the poet still clings to his revolutionary ideal in spite of its 
disastrous turn. He still cherishes the sweet memory even when he is writing this 
passage. He seems to take pains to counterbalance the sad memory of disillusionment 
by repairing to this spectacle as though he ‘would drink / As at a fountain’ (XI, ll. 383-
4). However, after the momentary surge of joyful recollection, the tone goes back once 
more to a deep sense of failure; he sees himself as being misled by ‘false imagination 
placed beyond / The limits of experience and of truth’ (X, ll. 847-8).  
 
There is also a moment when the narratives of self-incrimination and self-
justification confront each other:  
 
 Most melancholy at that time, O Friend! 
 Were my day-thoughts, — my nights were miserable; 
 Through months, through years, long after the last beat  
                                                 
38 Wordsworth, The Prelude: The Four Texts (1789, 1799, 1805, 1850), ed. by Jonathan Wordsworth 
(London: Penguin, 1995), p. 640. 
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 Of those atrocities, the hour of sleep  
 To me came rarely charged with natural gifts,  
Such ghastly visions had I of despair 
 And tyranny, and implements of death;  
 And innocent victims sinking under fear, 
 […] Then suddenly the scene  
 Changed, and the unbroken dream entangled me 
 In long orations, which I strove to plead  
Before unjust tribunals,—with a voice 
Labouring, a brain confounded, and a sense, 
Death-like, of treacherous desertion, felt 
In the last place of refuge—my own soul. (1850, X, ll. 397-415) 
 
I quote from the 1850 edition, which reveals more clearly Wordsworth’s oscillation 
between self-incrimination and self-justification. Jonathan Wordsworth comments on 
these lines that ‘Wordsworth in his nightmares is a victim of the Terror, and falsely 
accused, yet cannot wholly absolve himself from collusion in the violence. His heart has 
been given to the Revolution for better or for worse’.39 This rightly points out the two 
sharply contradictory and yet paradoxically coexisting modes of self-representation. On 
the one hand, the lines portray an ardent supporter of the Revolution who, on seeing the 
implementation of the Terror, cannot wholly absolve himself of it and is tormented by 
guilt through days and nights. On the other hand, when actually charged with the crime, 
he labours desperately to exculpate himself, as the phrase ‘strove to plead’ suggests.  
Though Wordsworth does not specify the content of the ‘long orations’, they may well 
be the self-justifications made throughout Book X. ‘Suddenly’ denotes not only the 
                                                 
39 Wordsworth, The Prelude: The Four Texts (1789, 1799, 1805, 1850), p. 633.  
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quickness with which the narratives of self-incrimination and self-exculpation shift 
from one to the other, but also the randomness of such a shift. The two contradictory 
narratives together produce a sense of betrayal deep within his heart.  
 
In contrast to the psychological war in which the poet is engaged, the image of 
‘fireside’ towards the end of the book carries a special connotation of calmness and 
cosiness: ‘Thus I soothe / The pensive moments by this calm fireside’ (X, ll. 1027-8). 
Obviously he is tormented by both the reflection itself and the unsettled tug-of-war 
between the conflicting memories. Hence he finds that the ‘calm fireside’ gives him 
great emotional tranquillity. It gives him all that he needs, appeasing his mental turmoil 
and providing him with comfort and quietude.   
 
Circumstantial memory, in Wordsworth’s handling of it, is a double-edged 
sword which can both wound and cure. In this section, I have explored how it appears to 
make him feel implicated in the bloodshed of the French Revolution, and thus 
overwhelms him with a massive amount of guilt.  I have also demonstrated how it seeks 
to cure such an illimitable guilt by disrupting his self-incriminating narrative. However, 
the disruption is not powerful enough to free the poet entirely from the torment of guilt. 
What we see, as a result, is a tug-of-war in his psyche. 
 
*                 *                  * 
‘[A] possibility that Wordsworth raises but that George Eliot continually 
engages’ surrounds the way in which circumstantial guilt—a guilt that arises on seeing 
negative outcomes that one might have initiated, even without having intended to—
works.40 Eliot’s treatment of guilt in Adam Bede and ‘Janet’s Repentance’ may also be 
                                                 
40 Ferguson, ‘Re: A Question from a Faithful Reader’.  
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discussed in the light of Ferguson’s circumstantial memory. In Adam Bede, Thias’s 
death is not caused by Adam’s harshness towards him. However, on retrospection 
Adam holds himself responsible for it as though it had been his full intention. In 
‘Janet’s Repentance’, Mr. Tryan’s guilt over Lucy’s death is of a similar nature. Mr. 
Tryan holds himself responsible for Lucy’s death because of his flirtation with her, even 
though the consequence of his actions is unforeseen and unmeant. However, there is a 
fundamental difference between Wordsworth and Eliot. For Wordsworth, the 
unforeseen consequences derive from an individual’s aspiration for virtue. For Eliot, the 
consequences are somehow related to each character’s inherent flaw. Therefore, in spite 
of their lack of evil intention when performing the seemingly harmless action, Eliot still 
wants to hold her characters responsible for the unmeant consequences, because 
according to her determinism, to which both Christianity and Victorian science make a 
contribution, an individual’s moral blemish causes irrevocable sufferings to others.  
 
Eliot’s Determinism  
In Eliot’s view, human nature is inherently flawed: 
 
Ships, certainly, are liable to casualties, which sometimes make terribly 
evident some flaw in their construction, that would never have been 
discoverable in smooth water; and many a ‘good fellow,’ through a 
disastrous combination of circumstances, has undergone a like betrayal.41 
 
Casualties of ships are caused by the ‘flaw in their construction’. Likewise, 
wrongdoings are caused by inherent flaws in character. What the narrator wants to 
emphasize in this passage is not simply that human nature, like ships, has its inherent 
                                                 
41 George Eliot, Adam Bede, ed. by Valentine Cunningham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 
126. All subsequent quotations of this novel, abbreviated AB, are from this edition with page numbers 
given in parentheses. 
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flaws, but that these flaws are not ‘discoverable’ in ‘smooth water’. We may never be 
able to recognize our flaws until they cause others to suffer, and we can only realize our 
mistakes through hindsight. Eliot uses the word ‘betrayal’ like Wordsworth in his 
analysis of the criminal psychology in The Borderers, but its meaning is different. For 
Eliot, it is not a real ‘betrayal’. It originates from the flaw of one’s character.  
 
Although it is natural for an individual to have inherent flaws in his character, in 
a deterministic system such as Eliot’s, it is by no means insignificant. It can cause 
terrible suffering to others. George Levine outlines the main components of Eliot’s 
determinism: first, the universe is a ‘marvelously complex unit’, in which ‘all parts are 
intricately related to each other’. Everybody’s life is ‘at the center of a vast and complex 
web of causes’. Secondly, every act is ‘related in some way to every other’. ‘The most 
apparently unimportant act may have important ramifications’. Finally, since man lives 
in a world in which ‘every act, no matter how trivial, has a vast number of consequences, 
not all of them traceable’, every human being should ‘exercise the greatest care in his 
actions to avoid causing misery to others’.42   
 
Eliot’s determinism has its sources in both Christianity and Victorian science. In 
her early days she was a pious Calvinist, imbued with a strong sense of original sin, that 
flaw in human nature inherited from the fallen Adam. Calvinism ‘instilled in her a belief 
in rigid laws exacted by a strict and implacable deity; it had stressed the irrevocable 
“consequences” of human behavior: every single act, gesture, or thought could lead to 
the salvation or damnation of the believer’.43 Although she later abandoned Christianity, 
                                                 
42 George Levine, ‘Determinism and Responsibility in the Works of George Eliot’, PMLA, LXXVII 
(1962), 268-79 (pp. 270-2). 
43 U. C. Knoepflmacher, Religious Humanism and the Victorian Novel: George Eliot, Walter Pater, and 
Samuel Butler (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 31. 
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Calvinism’s emphasis on ‘rigid laws’ and their ‘irrevocable “consequences”’ remained 
influential in her thinking. 
 
After her abandonment of Christianity, like many other Victorian intellectuals of 
her age, Eliot sought to use scientific laws to replace the old theological world. In 
science, she found ‘an equally implacable but this-worldly power’, whose ‘grim 
emphasis on “consequences” was almost identical to that of the old religion’.44 The 
emphasis on consequences is not only implicit in Newton’s physics and the theory of 
the association of ideas, with which Eliot was well acquainted through Lewes and 
Spencer, but was also to be found in the scientific and intellectual works she translated 
or reviewed. Strauss’s The Life of Jesus, which Eliot translated in 1846, clearly states 
the existence of ‘the law of succession’, which ‘controls the course of events’. All 
occurrences, Strauss emphasizes, ‘not excepting the most violent convulsions and the 
most rapid changes […] follow in a certain order of sequence of increase and 
decrease’.45  The belief in scientific law can also be found in R. W. Mackay’s The 
Progress of the Intellect, which Eliot reviewed in 1851. ‘The undeviating law in the 
material and moral world’, she argues, is ‘invariability of sequence’. It is not only ‘the 
basis of physical science’, but also permeates ‘our social organization, our ethics and 
our religion’. Unfortunately, however, the significance of the latter is ‘still perversely 
ignored’.46 As many critics have pointed out, Eliot is keen to show the workings of this 
law in the social sphere, especially in ‘our ethics’.   
 
Eliot’s determinism is also clearly shown in her response to the second edition 
of Charles Bray’s Philosophy of Necessity on 15 November, 1857:  
                                                 
44 Knoepflmacher, Religious Humanism and the Victorian Novel, p. 31.  
45 Eliot, ‘Strauss’s The Life of Jesus’, in Selected Critical Writings, ed. by Rosemary Ashton (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 4. 
46 Eliot, ‘R. W. Mackay’s The Progress of the Intellect’, in Selected Critical Writings, p. 21. 
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 In the fundamental doctrine of your book—that mind presents itself 
under the same condition of invariableness of antecedent and consequent 
as all other phenomena (the only difference being that the true antecedent 
and consequent are proportionately difficult to discover as the 
phenomena are more complex)—I think you know that I agree. And 
everyone who knows what science means must also agree with you that 
there can be no Social Science without the admission of that doctrine.47 
 
The mind is subject to the same law of antecedence and consequence. Eliot agrees with 
Charles Bray on the difficulty of discovering the causal law in the human world, 
because, as she explains, ‘the phenomena are more complex’. One might not be able to 
see it clearly until the damage is done. 
 
An even more significant element of Eliot’s deterministic morality is the 
conviction that negative consequences which one has initiated cannot be undone. 
Compensation is therefore of no use. This is characteristic of Calvinism: despite the 
individual’s ‘repentance or punishment’, the consequences of the wrongs of the past 
‘remain’.48 Writing to Cohn Chapman on 5 July 1856, Eliot remarks that she does not 
believe in the theory of ‘compensation’: ‘I have long wanted to fire away at the doctrine 
of Compensation, which I detest, considered as a theory of life’.49 A similar attitude is 
again found in a letter to Sara Sophia Hennell on 24 November 1856:   
 
                                                 
47 George Eliot, The George Eliot Letters, ed. by Gordon Haight, 9 vols (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1954, repr. 1975), II, 403. All subsequent quotations of these books, abbreviated Letters, are from 
this edition. 
48 Philip Davis, 1830-1880: The Victorians, The Oxford English Literary History, VIII (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), p. 108. 
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But now we are separated, and I shall never be able to make up for my 
past failures. There is so little we can make up for! We repent of our 
errors towards one friend, and that helps us to behave better to another, 
but rarely to the one on whom we have learnt our lesson’.50 
 
Eliot’s unconventional relationship with Lewes deeply offended her Coventry friends 
like Sara Hennell. Their friendship, as a result, suffered a heavy blow. Though later on 
Eliot resumed correspondence with them, ‘the old rapport could never be quite 
restored’.51 In this letter, Eliot expresses her guilt for having hurt her friend’s feelings. 
She does not believe that what she has done is wrong but accepts that once the damage 
is done, there is little possibility of mending it.   
 
The Reformation of Moral Habits 
According to Eliot, the only positive thing someone can do after committing a 
wrongdoing is to reform and change the way he behaves towards others. In the 
deterministic world Eliot outlines, man’s inherent evil will cause others irrevocable 
suffering. A recognition of the potential consequences of actions, however, ‘helps us to 
behave better to another’, Eliot suggests in her letter to Sara Hennell. Here, Eliot’s 
opinion in many ways resembles Mill’s idea of the formation of character. Mill holds 
that though an individual’s character is the product of external and internal 
circumstances, he is not a prey to these circumstances. Rather, he has the ‘power to alter 
his character’ to a certain extent. Though his character is formed by ‘his circumstances’, 
his own desire to ‘mould it in a particular way, is one of those circumstances, and by no 
means one of the least influential’.52 If Eliot suggests that there is an inherent flaw in 
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the construction of a ship which renders it liable to accidents at sea, Mill provides the 
solution: the flaw is fixable through our own efforts. By identifying our own desire to 
‘mould it in a particular way’ as an important circumstance, Mill is counterbalancing 
any notion of man as helplessly passive in a deterministic world, bringing man’s own 
initiative into full play.    
  
Mill further explores where this initiative comes from:   
 
Our character is formed by us as well as for us; but the wish which 
induces us to attempt to form it is formed for us; and how? Not, in 
general, by our organization, not wholly by our education, but by our 
experience; experience of the painful consequences of the character we 
previously had: or by some strong feeling of admiration or aspiration, 
accidentally aroused. (Mill, pp. 840-1) 
 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated the way in which character is shown by Eliot to 
be formed through repeated, habitual behaviour. This chapter will discuss how her 
novels illustrate how to change wrong habits. The motive for change comes from two 
sources. According to Mill, one of them is the experience of being with people whom 
one greatly admires. Romola and Gwendolen’s moral reformations under the inspiration 
of Savonarola and Deronda are of this kind. The other motive which prompts a reform 
in character is ‘the painful consequences of the character we previously had’. In other 
words, it is through the mistakes we have made that we come to realize the urgent need 
for a reform of character. ‘The painful consequences’ can be actual consequences of 
wrongdoing, or, in the case of circumstantial memory, imaginary consequences which 
we assume that our actions have initiated.  
                                                                                                                                               
from this edition with page numbers given in parentheses. For a detailed discussion of Mill and Eliot’s 
views on necessity and freedom, see Levine’s article. 
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If Mill stresses that ‘the painful consequences of the character we previously 
had’ is a strong motive that instigates people to reform their characters (Mill, p. 480), 
Eliot identifies this motive as empathetic remorse: ‘the agonised sense, the contrite 
contemplation, of the wound inflicted on another’.53 As I mentioned at the beginning of 
this chapter, her notion of remorse differs slightly from that of Lewes in its emphasis on 
internal rather than external punishment.  
 
The ‘contrite contemplation’ of ‘the wound inflicted on another’, Eliot suggests, 
is invaluable:  
 
It is this invariability of sequence which can alone give value to 
experience and render education in the true sense possible. The divine 
yea and nay, the seal of prohibition and of sanction, are effectually 
impressed on human deeds and aspirations, […] by that inexorable law of 
consequences, […] and human duty is comprised in the earnest study of 
this law and patient obedience to its teaching.54 
 
Though this passage refers to cause and effect in general, it is certainly consonant with 
Mill’s idea about the ‘painful consequences of the character we previously had’. One 
should bear in mind the consequences of actions, especially negative ones. ‘Education’ 
implies that the ill consequences initiated by an action will educate an individual about 
what he should do to prevent similar things from happening in future. Eliot’s promotion 
of the ‘earnest study of this law’ and ‘patient obedience to its teaching’ also implies the 
enhancement of moral habit through the recollection of the wrongdoings one has 
initiated or one imagines to have initiated: ‘Every mistake, every absurdity into which 
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54 Eliot, ‘R. W. Mackay’s The Progress of the Intellect’, in Selected Critical Writings, p. 21. 
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poor human nature has fallen, may be looked on as an experiment of which we may 
reap the benefit’.55 Later in this section, I will show that both Adam Bede’s and Mr. 
Tryan’s stories illustrate how they study this law and correct their behaviour, learning 
from the past wrongs they have initiated.   
 
Eliot’s religious humanism also contributes to her idea of the reformation of 
character. In John Bunyan’s Grace Abounding and The Pilgrim’s Progress, Bible 
reading initiates the protagonists’ realization of their sins, which include self-
degradation and evils done to others. The recognition of God’s love redeems them while 
Jesus’s blood washes away the sins. In Eliot’s novel, the protagonists begin in a 
Christian way by ‘carrying some “mysterious burden”’ on their back. 56  Yet Eliot 
reworks this Christian tradition by suggesting that the recognition of one’s sin comes 
not through the reading of the Bible, but through the realization of the painful 
consequence one has initiated. Furthermore, the protagonists undergo a similar spiritual 
struggle between their good and bad selves as that in Grace Abounding. However, it is 
not God’s voice that gives them strength but love and sympathy from a fellow human-
being. Tim Dolin observes that this conversion pattern is ‘typical’ in Eliot’s ethical 
humanism. Although she abandoned Christianity in her early twenties, the conversion 
experience which is central to evangelical Protestantism remains ‘powerful’ in her work. 
While Christian ‘converts become conscious of their sin, are awakened to grace, and 
become committed to Christ’, in Eliot’s religious humanism Christ’s role can be played 
by any other person. The essence of her conversion experience is the ‘“change of mental 
poise” which happens when another person touches us “with a peculiar influence, 
subduing [us] into receptiveness”’.57  
                                                 
55 Eliot, ‘R. W. Mackay’s The Progress of the Intellect’, in Selected Critical Writings, p. 21. 
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1982), p. 139. 
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Adam Bede and ‘Janet’s Repentance’ 
Before discussing how Adam and Mr. Tryan come to realize the need of 
reforming their moral habits, I would like to explore the nature of their memory after the 
deaths of Thias and Lucy respectively. Like Wordsworth, Eliot’s characters tend, 
through circumstantial memory, to hold themselves responsible for the unmeant and 
unforeseen consequences of their actions. On learning about his father’s death, for 
example, Adam is haunted by the guilt for having treated him too harshly: 
 
[T]he grey-haired father, of whom he had thought with a sort of hardness 
a few hours ago, as certain to live to be a thorn in his side, was perhaps 
even then struggling with that watery death. This was the first thought 
that flashed through Adam’s conscience. (AB, p. 52) 
 
‘The first thought that flashed through Adam’s conscience’ is what Ferguson terms 
‘circumstantial memory’. ‘Flashed’ denotes the speed with which circumstantial 
memory works to connect two events that have no relation except that they happen at 
roughly the same time. What is notable about Adam’s memory is that it extends far 
beyond the capacity of recording events. On discovering his father’s drowning, Adam 
realizes he has been too harsh towards him. His memory is thus not concerned so much 
with what he was conscious of at the time but with all his later resentment of his father. 
Such a re-experience of the past is entirely different from the one at the time of its 
occurrence. Although the effects that Adam supposes his harshness to have had are 
nothing to do with the tragic drowning of his father, he remains tortured as though they 
were. In an oblique way, it is conceivable that this curse might have hastened his 
father’s death. The narrator’s placing of the two events side by side—Adam’s cursing of 
his father, who is at that very moment ‘struggling with that watery death’—is 
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suggestive. Adam is also tortured because he thinks he might have been alert to the 
possible danger if he had treated his father differently: ‘to Adam the conception of the 
future was so inseparable from the painful image of his father, that the fear of any fatal 
accident to him was excluded by the deeply-infixed fear of his continual degradation’ 
(AB, p. 50). Adam regrets not being more alert to the possibility of such a ‘fatal 
accident’, habituated as he is to imagining a totally different eventuality.     
 
In ‘Janet’s Repentance’, Mr. Tryan’s guilt over Lucy’s death is of a similar 
nature. When flirting with Lucy, Mr. Tryan did not feel guilty about the careless life he 
led, nor did he blame himself for not being serious about her. However, upon learning 
of her career and tragic death, he starts to regard his behaviour in a new light. As he tells 
Janet painfully, ‘it was then that my past life burst upon me in all its hideousness’.58 
The fact that the same past suddenly changes its value and forces Mr. Tryan to re-
examine his past behaviour is because undesirable consequences resulted in him seeing 
the same past in a different way. Thus, although the effects that Mr. Tryan supposes his 
behaviour to have had were unmeant and unforeseen, he nevertheless suffers as if the 
consequence had been fully intended. He is overwhelmed by the feeling that Lucy’s 
tragedy is of his own making and firmly believes that he has ‘injured another 
irreparably in body and soul’ (JR, p. 287).  
 
Like Wordsworth’s feeling of guilt over the bloodshed of the French Revolution, 
the problem with circumstantial memory in the two cases I analyse above is that it has 
the potential to expand the moral responsibility on the part of the agent endlessly. This 
in turn produces a massive and disproportionate amount of guilt. In other words, the 
punishment the characters receive is much more severe than they deserve. Such a heavy 
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burden of guilt can cause profound psychic wounds. In extreme cases, it can be 
traumatizing. Adam’s pain is still acute long after the event takes place; as he tells 
Arthur towards the end of the novel, ‘I feel it now, when I think of him’ (AB, p. 469). 
Mr. Tryan too is traumatized by Lucy’s death. He suffers from nightmares, flashbacks 
and hallucinations. His guilt remains an alien force in his psyche that keeps coming 
back and haunting him: ‘The image of the wrong I had done pursued me everywhere’ 
(JR, p. 287). Traumatic guilt tortures him so much that his whole life is on the brink of 
ruin, as he confesses, ‘I seemed on the brink of madness. […] With that sense of guilt 
on my soul, I felt that whatever state I entered on must be one of misery’ (JR, p. 287).   
 
Though the self-incriminating narrative constructed by circumstantial memory is 
imaginary and exaggerated, it carries considerable weight in the rigidly deterministic 
world Eliot outlines for us. As I mentioned earlier, Eliot believes that nothing happens 
by chance. Every event, no matter how trivial it is, has its causal antecedent. Within this 
framework, a man’s inherent moral flaw will inevitably cause others to suffer. As Mr. 
Irwine shows us, ‘Consequences are unpitying. Our deeds carry their terrible 
consequences, quite apart from any fluctuations that went before – consequences that 
are hardly ever confined to ourselves’ (AB, p. 172). Earlier in the novel, when Arthur 
tells Mr. Irwine that he thinks a man should not be blamed if he is ‘betrayed into’ doing 
wrong, in spite of his ‘resolutions’ to make the right choice. Mr. Irwine answers that ‘a 
man can never do anything at variance with his own nature’ (AB, p. 172). What we do 
reflects our character. Wrong deeds expose the flaws in our nature. Correcting Arthur’s 
notion that human beings are liable to whimsical moods beyond their control, Mr. 
Irwine points out that the motivation to do something wrong lies within oneself. 
Meanwhile, he also reveals a grim reality: our wrongdoings will not only be confined to 
ourselves. They make others suffer, too. This is because in a rigidly-determined world, 
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where nothing is isolated, men’s lives are ‘as thoroughly blended with each other as the 
air they breathe’. Within such a vast, invisible network, ‘evil spreads as necessarily as 
disease’ (AB, p. 423). The cause and effect is so straightforward that nobody can escape 
from this law.      
 
Although Mr. Irwine explains this scenario with merciless clarity, he also 
concedes that it is very difficult for someone to foresee the consequences of his 
misdeeds:  
 
[T]he problem how far a man is to be held responsible for the unforeseen 
consequences of his own deed, is one that might well make us tremble to 
look into it. The evil consequences that may lie folded in a single act of 
selfish indulgence, is a thought so awful that it ought surely to awaken 
some feeling less presumptuous than a rash desire to punish. (AB, pp. 
422-3)     
 
The main thrust of the passage is reminiscent of Eliot’s agreement with Bray’s 
Philosophy of Necessity that in the social sphere ‘the true antecedent and consequent are 
proportionately difficult to discover’.59 It reveals that there is another side of Eliot’s 
determinism which Levine fails to address. For Levine, Eliot’s determinism has a moral 
bias. It is not contradictory to moral agency. Though living in a deterministic world, 
man is still free to choose a certain action and therefore has to take responsibility for its 
consequences. But from the above passage, it is evident that her views are not free from 
ambivalence. It is true that Eliot holds her characters responsible because their moral 
flaws cause others to suffer. On the other hand, she also wonders how far one can go in 
terms of inflicting punishment. If evil consequences lie hidden, or in other words, if the 
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causal links are hard to detect, one can only look back constantly to re-examine one’s 
own past to see if there was anything wrong in one’s earlier actions in the light of 
present circumstances.  
 
Even though the consequences of wrongdoings are sometimes hard to foresee, 
and in Adam and Mr. Tryan’s cases are somewhat exaggerated, Eliot still wants her 
characters to feel responsible for them. As a result, they are overloaded with a massive 
amount of guilt, which can only be alleviated through the correction of their moral flaws 
and their avoidance of similar mistakes in future. The guilt from which Adam and Mr. 
Tryan suffer provides an opportunity for their moral awakening. Gnawed by guilt over 
his father’s death, Adam comes to realize that he is too intolerant toward other people’s 
faults: ‘It’s a sore fault in me as I’m so hot and out o’ patience with people when they 
do wrong, and my heart gets shut up against ’em, so as I can’t bring myself to 
forgive ’em’ (AB, p. 201). This impatience and harshness, as he further realizes, comes 
from his pride and lack of sympathy for his fellow creatures: ‘I see clear enough there’s 
more pride nor love in my soul’. The recognition of this flaw spurs him to change: ‘The 
real tough job for me ’ud be to master my own will and temper, and go right against my 
own pride’ (AB, p. 201).  
 
Adam’s experience is also an example of Mill’s idea that the ‘experience of the 
painful consequences of the character we previously had’ is one of the circumstances 
which can prompt reform in our character. If Adam’s habitual harshness towards others 
is a weakness in his character, his own desire to ameliorate is now exercising the 
strongest influence in him. Adam is deeply mortified by the tragic consequence of his 
harshness and lack of sympathy for his father, feelings which provide a strong 
momentum to change this habit.  
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Besides being an example of Mill’s idea of the formation of character, Adam’s 
conversion also reminds us of the interaction between recollective memory and habit-
memory mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis. A. J. Ayer suggests that although 
the two types of memory are different, at times they can overlap with each other. The 
performance of a skill, for example, can be ‘facilitated by the occurrence of a 
recollection of a particular instance of learning’.60 In this light, Adam’s determination to 
abandon his harsh and unsympathetic treatment of others is strengthened by the 
recollection of the painful consequence of his harshness to his father. This particular 
recollection, like a memory aid, prompts him to form a new mode of behaviour towards 
others.             
 
These two aspects of memory can also be found in the reformation of Mr. 
Tryan’s character. Lucy’s death makes Mr. Tryan feel that his evil habits are the cause 
of ruin of Lucy’s life: ‘I only felt utterly wretched, under the power of habits and 
dispositions which had wrought hideous evil’ (JR, p. 290). The evil consequences spur 
him to get rid of them. He is determined to stop ‘swerving in search of pleasure either to 
the right hand or to the left’ (JR, p. 291). This process also demonstrates the interaction 
between recollective memory and habit-memory. Mr. Tryan’s recollection of the 
traumatic event of Lucy’s death, along with his assumption that he is the sole cause of it, 
serves as a memory aid, prompting him to form new habits.      
 
Bunyan’s treatment of guilt is also illuminating in relation to Mr. Tryan’s 
conversion process. While Bunyan’s protagonists realize their guilt through reading the 
Bible, and thereby obtain the courage to reform their moral habits, Mr. Tryan shows a 
somewhat different trajectory, as his confession suggests: ‘I went to hear celebrated 
preachers, and I read religious books. But I found nothing that fitted my own need. The 
                                                 
60  William Brewer, ‘What Is Recollective Memory?’, in Remembering Our Past: Studies in 
Autobiographical Memory, ed. by David Robin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 31. 
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faith which puts the sinner in possession of salvation seemed […] to be quite out of my 
reach’ (JR, p. 290). He does eventually, of course, find comfort in religion. But Eliot 
herself suggests that the only certain path to redemption is through human relations, the 
‘blessed influence of one true loving human soul on another’ (JR, p. 293).  
 
Trauma and Cure 
As I mentioned earlier, circumstantial memory, because of its emphasis on an 
exaggerated responsibility and its potential of producing illimitable guilt, tends to 
wound or even traumatize the individual. The reformation of moral habits, however, 
often brings with it the healing of the psychic wound incurred by the self-incriminating 
narrative. Thus, Eliot reveals a different recovery pattern from that of Wordsworth, in 
whose case circumstantial memory automatically heals the wound it has produced by 
setting a limit to the potentially illimitable guilt.  
 
Jill Matus points out that in representing psychic shock, Eliot is arguably ‘a 
precursor of later theories of trauma’. In Daniel Deronda, for example, after the 
drowning of her husband, Gwendolen becomes ‘a traumatized subject’. The symptoms 
from which she suffers—nightmares, dysfunctions of memory and a sense of the 
dislocation of time—are ‘textbook symptoms of trauma’. 61  Indeed, Gwendolen’s 
symptoms are typical of what Cathy Caruth describes as traumatic memory. Caruth 
maintains that trauma’s difference from ordinary experience lies in the fact that ‘in its 
unexpectedness or horror’, it ‘escapes full consciousness as it occurs’ and ‘cannot be 
placed within the schemes of prior knowledge’. Thus, it cannot become a ‘narrative 
                                                 
61 Jill Matus, ‘Historicizing Trauma: The Genealogy of Psychic Shock in Daniel Deronda’, Victorian 
Literature and Culture, 36 (2008), 59-78 (p. 59).  
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memory’, which has been ‘integrated into a completed story of the past’, and 
‘continually returns, in its exactness, at a later time’.62 
 
Ferguson’s notion of ‘circumstantial memory’ sheds new light onto the 
formation of traumatic memory. After Lucy’s death, Mr. Tryan suffers from very 
similar traumatic symptoms to those of Gwendolen, such as nightmares, flashbacks and 
hallucinations. However, they occur not because Mr. Tryan’s trauma escapes full 
consciousness and fails to be placed within his narrative memory, but because, though it 
has been digested by his consciousness, it is wrongly placed within his narrative 
memory. The way in which it is integrated—through the interpretation of unforeseen 
and unmeant consequences as if they were subliminally intended—is damaging and 
traumatizing.   
 
While Jill Matus sees Eliot description of traumatic symptoms as an anticipation 
of later trauma theory, I would suggest that the healing process she describes, 
particularly her emphasis on verbalization and action, also foreshadows the recovery 
process of later trauma theory. In Cathy Caruth’s opinion, since trauma is something 
lying outside narrative memory, for the sake of cure, it ‘requires integration’ into ‘a 
narrative memory that allows the story to be verbalized and communicated, to be 
integrated into one’s own, and others’, knowledge of the past’. 63  The meaning of 
‘integration’ is explained by Pierre Janet, an early-twentieth-century French 
psychologist:  
 
The person must know […] how to associate the happening with the 
other events of his life, how to put it in its place in that life-history which 
                                                 
62 Cathy Caruth, ‘Introduction’ in Trauma: Explorations in Memory, ed. by Cathy Caruth (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 151-7 (p. 153). 
63 Caruth, p. 153. 
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each one of us is perpetually building up and which for each of us is an 
essential element of his personality. A situation has not been 
satisfactorily liquidated, has not been fully assimilated, until we have 
achieved, not merely through our movements, but also an inward reaction 
through the words we address to ourselves, through the organization of 
the recital of the event to others and to ourselves, and through the putting 
of this recital in its place as one of the chapters in our personal history.64 
 
Pierre Janet here points out two important means of recovery from trauma: verbalization 
and action. However, his analysis is mainly in line with Caruth’s definition of trauma, 
which lies outside narrative memory and relies on its integration into a ‘life-history’ for 
its recovery. As for the healing of trauma triggered by circumstantial memory, the 
wrongly integrated memory needs to be rearranged into a different and positive 
narrative. That is to say, the event needs to become a constructive, rather than a 
disruptive element in our personal history.       
 
Mr. Tryan’s recovery relies heavily on verbalization. This enables his self-
incriminating narrative to be rearranged into his narrative memory and become a 
positive element in his personal history. What is interesting is that Eliot often borrows 
Christian vocabulary for this process of verbalization. Mr. Tryan is encouraged by a 
friend to see guilt as a positive thing in his life as it prepares him for coming to Christ: 
‘he made it clear to me that the only preparation for coming to Christ and partaking of 
His salvation, was that very sense of guilt and helplessness which was weighing me 
down’. Moreover, he is told that if he is united with God, he will be given new strength 
to wrestle with his sin: ‘When once we feel our helplessness in that way, and go to 
                                                 
64 Bessel A. van der Kolk and Onno van der Hart, ‘The Intrusive Past: The Flexibility of Memory and the 
Engraving of Trauma’, in Trauma: Explorations in Memory, ed. by Cathy Caruth (Baltimore: Johns 
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Christ’, we will no longer be ‘left to our own strength’ (JR, p. 290). In this way, rather 
than triggering endless self-blame and causing damage to the psyche, guilt gradually 
comes to play a positive part in Mr. Tryan’s personal history. Though Christian 
language is employed here, Eliot encourages the reader to recognize the human element 
in this process, the ‘blessed influence’ of a ‘human soul’ (JR, p. 293).  
 
Action is also important in rearranging Mr. Tryan’s traumatic guilt into a 
positive narrative memory. For Eliot, action mainly refers to the active reaching out to 
help other people. Mr. Tryan’s ardent involvement in helping others relieves him from 
the torment of guilt. The death of Lucy pursues him like the Furies. There is only one 
thing he can do to find relief and make his life tolerable: ‘to spend all the rest of it in 
trying to save others from the ruin I had brought on one’ (JR, p. 289). 
 
Helping Janet out of her misery is a particular example of Mr. Tryan’s own cure 
through action. One might wonder how this is possible. The answer is related to Eliot’s 
notion of sympathy. In many of Eliot’s novels, sympathy is involved mainly with the 
faculty of imagination. Deronda’s sympathy is achieved through an imagined 
participation in other people’s suffering. Dorothea’s sympathy with Will’s grandmother 
for the injustice done by the Casaubon family occurs as she imagines herself as ‘being 
part of Casaubon family’ and thus ‘feeling as though she herself had played a part in the 
injustice’.65 Quite distinctly, Mr. Tryan’s sympathy is more involved with the faculty of 
memory. For him, sympathy involves ‘but a living again through our own past in a new 
form, […] confession often prompts a response of confession’ (JR, p. 288). Through 
confessing to Janet, Mr. Tryan revisits his own painful past. By talking through it and 
recalling how he recovered, he once again rearranges his self-incriminating memory 
                                                 
65 Hao Li, Memory and History in George Eliot: Transfiguring the Past (London: Macmillan Press, 2000), 
p. 137. 
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into a positive narrative memory. In this case, action and verbalization work 
interactively to bring about Mr. Tryan’s cure.     
 
The emphasis on verbalization and action in the healing process of trauma 
applies not only to the trauma caused by circumstantial memory, but also to psychic 
wounds triggered by actual wrong-doings. Janet is depressed by her realization that she 
is degenerating into a drunkard. However, she is trapped in a vicious circle and is 
entirely unable to escape it: ‘I shall always be doing wrong, and hating myself after – 
sinking lower and lower, and knowing that I am sinking’ (JR, p. 287). Talking to Mr. 
Tryan is immensely curative: ‘his words would fall on her like precious balm’ (JR, p. 
299). The similar Christian narrative which heals Mr. Tryan also enables Janet to 
integrate her traumatic past into her narrative memory, and she comes to see her sin as 
the starting point of reformation. 
 
Action is also essential for Janet’s recovery. Janet feels stronger in wrestling 
with her past sin after performing benevolent acts:  
 
Whenever the too well-known depression and craving threatened her, she 
would seek a refuge in what had always been her purest enjoyment – in 
visiting one of her poor neighbours, in carrying some food or comfort to 
a sick-bed, in cheering with her smile some of the familiar dwellings up 
the dingy back-lanes. (JR, p. 318) 
 
Neighbourhood charity work does not simply help other people. It is also therapeutic for 
the worker. It provides a ‘refuge’ for Janet. Again, we see what is peculiar about Eliot’s 
notion of sympathy as a humanist form of Christian charity. It is not only for the sake of 
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other people. It cures psychological wounds by giving pleasure and a sense of 
achievement. In fact, not only Janet, but many other characters such as Romola and 
Gwendolen also benefit from the therapeutic power of performing benevolent acts.  
 
Although Eliot’s description of trauma syndrome and its recovery process in 
many ways anticipates modern trauma theory, there is a fundamental difference between 
them. The difference lies ‘perhaps most markedly in her emphasis on the responsibility 
and agency of the wounded subject’. Trauma theory today emphasizes a ‘“wound 
culture”’, ascribing the cause of trauma to external factors. In contrast, Eliot’s is ‘less a 
“wound culture” than a conscience culture’—it explores more the reason inside the 
individual that has caused the trauma. Take Gwendolen’s shock, for example: ‘the 
shock and horror is more about discovering what transgressions we may commit; less 
about what is inflicted upon us from without’.66 I have discussed Eliot’s preoccupation 
with exploring the internal, rather than external factors that lead her characters to 
become traumatized subjects. Eliot’s determinism tends to ascribe the ill consequences 
to the inherent flaws in her characters, even if they are initially unmeant and unforeseen.  
 
Partial Recovery 
Although Eliot’s characters have largely recovered from their traumatic guilt by 
the end of the story, the recovery is not complete. Guilt still haunts their psyche and is 
hard to ward off. Mr. Tryan still suffers from the torment of guilt when he makes his 
confession to Janet. His wound is fresh and acute, as it has always been. As he tells 
Janet, his sin against Lucy ‘has remained to this hour the sin which causes me the 
bitterest pang’ (JR, p. 291). Adam Bede’s recovery is not full, either. Instead of looking 
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forward to a state of total relief from pain, he comes to realize that it will forever remain 
a habitual part of him:   
 
[W]e get accustomed to mental as well as bodily pain, without, for all 
that, losing our sensibility to it: it becomes a habit of our lives, and we 
cease to imagine a condition of perfect ease as possible for us. […] We 
are contented with our day when we have been able to bear our grief in 
silence, and act as if we were not suffering. For it is at such periods that 
the sense of our lives having visible and invisible relations beyond any of 
which either our present or prospective self is the centre, grows like a 
muscle that we are obliged to lean on and exert. (AB, pp. 487-8) 
 
Though this passage refers mainly to Adam’s suffering upon recollection of Hetty’s 
tragedy, it is by no means confined to this. His guilt about the way he treats his father is 
an important part of his pain. The passage indicates that we gradually get used to our 
mental pain, but this does not mean such habitualisation will lessen the pain. It is still 
there and can be acutely felt. There is no such thing as ‘perfect ease’ in life. Suffering 
has become a habit. What we see here is the dynamic process of character building. 
Because of suffering and pain, the self can never be a stable entity but is full of tension 
and conflict. It is this tension which prompts people to move on and to grow. It prompts 
Mr. Tryan to ‘rescue other weak and falling souls’ (JR, p. 291), and Adam to do his 
work ‘well’ so that the world becomes ‘a bit better place for them [the Poysers as well 
as others] as can enjoy it’ (AB, p. 471).     
 
In this section, I have argued that through circumstantial memory, Adam and Mr. 
Tryan hold themselves responsible for the death of the people they love and are thus 
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burdened by an unbearable amount of guilt. I further explored how they ascribe these 
wrongdoings to their moral flaws and manage to fix them by reforming the way they 
treat others. This process is also shown to bring about recovery from traumatic guilt.      
 
Coda 
Both Wordsworth and Eliot are more concerned with the internal, psychological 
consequences of actions rather than the external, physical punishment that occurs when 
a transgression is made. The transgression, in the cases I have discussed, is not real. It is 
self-incrimination through circumstantial memory on seeing the unforeseen 
consequences that an action seems to have initiated. The guilt over such a transgression, 
likewise, is artificial and imaginary. However, its effect upon the psyche is no less 
overwhelming than remorse over a real offence. Wordsworth holds himself responsible 
for having somehow become implicated in the bloodshed that followed the French 
Revolution, and it torments him. Adam’s guilt over his involvement in his father’s death 
through the harsh way he treats him is similarly acute, while Mr. Tryan’s assumption 
that he has irrevocably ruined Lucy’s life crushes him and turns him into a traumatized 
person.   
 
Though similar in their exploration of the guilt triggered by circumstantial 
memory, the two writers differ in their opinions about the origin of wrongdoings. 
Wordsworth believes that sin and evil tend to start from their opposite: the pursuit of 
truth and virtue, the golden side of human nature. Therefore circumstantial memory in 
his case is particularly poignant, because the consequences are not only unintended, but 
meant to be the opposite. For Eliot, wrongdoings are connected with inherent flaws in 
character. If these can be mended and similar mistakes avoided in future, there will be 
less chance of inflicting pain on others.  Thus Eliot outlines a more positive picture of 
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human life than Wordsworth, who holds that even if we behave well, we are not 
insulated from doing wrong. 
 
While the two writers share their belief in the potential of circumstantial 
memory to wound, their characters follow different recovery patterns. For Wordsworth, 
circumstantial memory itself can heal the wound it has inflicted. It has a self-healing 
mechanism, which, by producing evidence that does not cohere into a causal pattern, 
disrupts the self-incriminating narrative. In Book X of The Prelude, while busy weaving 
a self-incriminating narrative, Wordsworth’s memory is at the same time working 
rapidly to provide an alternative narrative amid his guilt-implication story. It 
destabilizes the latter and in this way reassures the poet that he has been making the 
right choice throughout. For Eliot, however, circumstantial memory does not provide 
such a self-healing mechanism. The psychic wound can only be cured through the 
reformation of moral habits. Mr. Tryan thus recovers once he has decided to get rid of 
his evil habits and devote himself to helping others to lead a better life.   
 
This brings me back to the idea I raised in the introduction to this chapter. In the 
recovery pattern Eliot outlines, the interaction between recollective memory and habit-
memory is apparent. Guilty recollections of the wrongdoings in the past prompt Adam 
and Mr. Tryan to develop new habits. Wordsworth’s recovery pattern, however, does 
not quite fit in with this mode of recovery.     
 
Another major difference is that Wordsworth himself is the fountain of strength 
in his recovery. Eliot’s characters, on the other hand, rely heavily on the help of other 
people for the healing of their wounds. For Mr. Tryan, the two means of integrating 
psychic wounds into a positive narrative memory, verbalization and action, both require 
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other people’s participation: verbalization involves talking through his painful past to 
others and being encouraged to see guilt as the starting point of a new life; action is 
mainly about devoting himself to rescuing others from misery. Arguably, such a 
recovery pattern anticipates later trauma theory.      
  
Though the two writers follow different recovery patterns, for neither of them is 
the recovery complete. In Wordsworth’s case, though circumstantial memory itself has 
the self-healing mechanism, it only results in a partial recovery. The images the poet 
conjures up and the circumstances he lists are not powerful enough to counter-balance 
the narrative of self-recrimination. He ends up suffering from a tug-of-war in his psyche, 
torn between self-recrimination and self-exculpation. Neither can Eliot’s characters 
fully recover from their painful experience. Wound becomes a habitual part of Adam, 
while the traumatic past forever haunts Mr. Tryan prompting him to give help to others 
in order to alleviate his own pain.  
 
Chapter Four 
Collective Memory in ‘Michael’ and The Mill on the Floss  
 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters, drawing on a variety of theories from both the writers’ 
own times and from the twentieth century, I have examined individual habit-memory 
and its relationship with universal humanity, duty and guilt. This chapter will shift to a 
discussion of collective habit-memory, which in my thesis refers to the attachment to 
habitual objects, habitual modes of thinking and behaving, loyalty to the group into 
which one was born, and adherence to traditional duties and to the faithful performance 
of local customs. These are, according to James Booth, ‘the non-explicit, nearly 
invisible values, behaviors, and beliefs’, which show clearly ‘the persistence of the past’ 
in the present.1 
 
Both Wordsworth and Eliot place particular emphasis on the attachment nurtured 
through human beings’ habitual contact and interaction with the spatial objects with 
which they are surrounded. In Book I of The Prelude, the poet points out the inseparable 
relation between repetition and affection: ‘By pleasure and repeated happiness— / So 
frequently repeated’, the ‘same scenes’ become ‘habitually dear’.2 The repetition of the 
word ‘repeated’ highlights the fact that regular contact is essential in the development of 
attachment. In ‘To the Spade of a Friend’, the poet speaks highly of the intimate 
relationship between the spade and its master, with which he ‘hath tilled his Lands’ for 
                                                 
1 W. James Booth, Communities of Memory: On Witness, Identity, and Justice (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2006), pp. xi-xii.  
2 William Wordsworth, The Prelude: 1799, 1805, 1850, Authoritative Texts, Context and Reception, 
Recent Critical Essays, ed. by Jonathan Wordsworth, M. H. Abrams and Stephen Gill (New York: Norton, 
1979), 1805, I, line 1; lines 632-40. 
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so long: ‘His powerful Servant, his inspiring Mate!’.3 Again we find the cultivation of 
affection through habituation. 
 
Numerous examples can also be found in Eliot’s novels, in which the 
attachments formed with objects of daily use are eulogized. More importantly, Eliot 
stresses the acute sense of unease that emerges when these habitual objects are gone. In 
Felix Holt, Mrs. Transome tries to persuade her son not to use his father’s long-
accustomed bedroom, otherwise he will feel confused and disoriented: ‘Your father has 
slept there for years. He will be like a distracted insect, and never know where to go, if 
you alter the track he has to walk in’.4 In ‘Janet’s Repentance’, the narrator compares 
habitual life to ‘a wall hung with pictures’: ‘Take one of the pictures away, and it leaves 
a definite blank space, to which our eyes can never turn without a sensation of 
discomfort’. This ‘discomfort’, the narrator suggests, is remarkably destructive: ‘The 
involuntary loss of any familiar object almost always brings a chill as from an evil omen; 
it seems to be the first finger-shadow of advancing death’.5 
 
 In the texts discussed in this chapter, ‘Michael’ and The Mill on the Floss, I 
argue, the attachment to habitual objects is not a purely individual sentiment. It has a 
collective root, deriving from the community or social group to which the characters 
belong. Moreover, both Wordsworth and Eliot are keenly aware that their characters’ 
collective memory is closely connected with the agrarian culture which coheres through 
habit, but which is being threatened by the encroachment of capitalism. This, then, leads 
to my discussion of how the two writers think social changes should be carried out. For 
Wordsworth as well as for Eliot, social change should be a gradual process, not an 
                                                 
3 William Wordsworth, ‘To the Spade of a Friend’, in Poems in Two Volumes, and Other Poems: 1800-
1807, edited by Jared Curtis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), line 1; line 26.   
4 George Eliot, Felix Holt, The Radical, ed. by Fred Thomson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 20.  
5 George Eliot, ‘Janet’s Repentance’, in Scenes of Clerical Life, ed. by Thomas Noble (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, p. 1985), p. 254. 
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abrupt break from the past.  
         
 *          *           * 
In this section, I will explore Michael’s collective memory, which is manifested 
in his embodied understanding of and attachment to his patriarchal land and his 
resistance to its loss. The poem suggests that, in Wordsworth’s view, social changes 
should be carried out without damaging society’s collective roots.  
 
 My discussion will be divided into two parts. In the first part, through a 
phenomenological reading, I will contend that the habitual life Michael leads on his 
land is not a mechanical and clockwork experience but an embodied experience both of 
himself and of his family group. In the second part, through the discussion of how this 
collective memory is disrupted by the intrusion of capitalism, I will discuss how 
Wordsworth thinks social changes should be brought about. 
 
A Phenomenological Approach to Habit 
 Several critics have noted the integrated relationship between Michael and the 
spatial objects which are his daily company. Michael Friedman points out that Michael 
is ‘virtually interpenetrated with the land he works’.6 David Bromwich remarks that 
Michael’s consolation after his son is gone involves the freedom associated with his 
return to ‘a loved and familiar place, which he knows as an extension of himself’.7 
However, most critics do not explore the reasons for this intimate relationship between 
Michael and his land.  
 
                                                 
6 Michael Friedman, The Making of a Tory Humanist: William Wordsworth and the Idea of Community 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 188. 
7 David Bromwich, Disowned by Memory: Wordsworth’s Poetry of the 1790s (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998), p. 5. 
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Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the relationship between habit and space 
may provide the best answer to this question. Before discussing Merleau-Ponty’s theory, 
however, I would like to shift to the behaviourist idea of habit, which Merleau-Ponty 
sets out to critique.  
 
In Chapter Two, I discussed the associationists’ theory of habit, as exemplified 
by Hartley and Lewes, both of whom explain the mechanism of habit in terms of reflex 
action. These ideas anticipate modern behaviourists’ idea of the formation of human 
behaviour. In the opinion of behaviourists, the body is modelled after Newton’s 
clockwork universe, which abides by the law of physical causation. Following this 
mechanical view of the body, habit is understood in terms of a conditioned reflex, and 
habit acquisition is explained as the process of forming new reflexes on the basis of 
older ones.8  
 
Merleau-Ponty finds this explanation of human behaviour inadequate, because 
by seeing habit in terms of mechanically caused responses, one finds that human 
behaviour is no different from that of animals and is thereby ‘divorced from the world 
of meaning, purpose and agency’ characteristic of human beings (Crossley, p. 63). 
Merleau-Ponty wants to overcome the body-mind dichotomy through a revision of the 
behaviourists’ notions of the body. In his view, man is an embodied agent, or, as he 
insists, ‘I am my body’.9 Nick Crossley explains the notion of ‘embodied agent’: ‘I have 
a pre-reflective sense or grasp on my environment, relative to my body, as is evidenced 
by my capacity to move around in and utilise that space without first having to think 
                                                 
8 For a detailed discussion of behaviourists’ views on human body and habit, see Nick Crossley, The 
Social Body: Habit, Identity, Desire (London: SAGE Publications, 2001), pp. 63-5. All subsequent 
quotations of this book are from this edition with page numbers given in parentheses. 
9 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. by Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 
2002), p. 231. All subsequent quotations of this book are from this edition with page numbers given in 
parentheses. 
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how to do so’ (Crossley, p. 122). Merleau-Ponty distinguishes between the body’s ‘pre-
reflective’ grasp of the environment and the behaviourists’ notion of ‘involuntary action’. 
In an involuntary action, the body has no agency. It functions like a machine, passively 
responding to external stimuli. The channel through which a sensation is discharged is 
so entrenched through repeated practice that the action can be performed without the 
exercise of the will. By contrast, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of ‘pre-reflective’ action, or 
the body’s ability to perform an action ‘without first having to think how to do so’, 
emphasizes the body’s capacity for feeling and knowledge. If one drives or parks a car, 
one has a ‘pre-reflective’ knowledge of its speed and size as though it were one’s own 
body.  In other words, one does not ‘think about the car’, but ‘think as the car, from the 
point of view of the car’ (Crossley, p. 123, original emphasis).  
 
Merleau-Ponty also revises the traditional concept of ‘understanding’ as 
‘subsuming a sense-datum under an idea’, suggesting that there is no understanding 
exclusively within the realm of the mind and detached from the body. He goes on to 
explain how the body understands significance by forming a habit. ‘To understand’, he 
tells us, ‘is to experience the harmony between what we aim at and what is given, 
between the intention and the performance’ (Merleau-Ponty, p. 167). A movement is 
learnt when the body has understood it. The better the body understands significance, 
the easier the movement becomes. The knowledge thus acquired is practical knowledge, 
a form of bodily know-how. 
 
Merleau-Ponty further explores how such knowledge is understood by the body 
– that is to say, how a habit is formed. The body understands by incorporating the 
spatial objects it inhabits into itself, so that they become the body’s extension. Within 
Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical framework, therefore, space is not something objective, and 
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‘we must therefore avoid saying that our body is in space, or in time. Rather, it inhabits 
space and time’.  It ‘combines with them and includes them’ (Merleau-Ponty, p. 161; p. 
162, original emphasis). To be more specific, habit ‘expresses our power of dilating our 
being-in-the-world, or changing our existence by appropriating fresh instruments’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, p. 166). Merleau-Ponty’s use of the words ‘dilating’ and ‘appropriating’ 
enables him to deconstruct the subject-object dichotomy, and emphasizes that human 
beings are what they are in touch with on a daily basis; to live is to be one with the 
spatial framework with which one is surrounded.  
 
A corollary of this new conception of habit formation is a new way of 
remembering. Refuting the associationists’ and behaviourists’ conception of 
remembering as the establishment of a reflex action, through which a sensation can be 
discharged more easily, Merleau-Ponty argues that we remember through incorporating 
spatial objects into the body itself. 
 
The etymology of ‘habit’ and ‘inhabit’ also suggests that there can be no 
absolute division between the subject and space. Both ‘habit’ and ‘inhabit’ are derived 
from the Latin word habitare, which means ‘to have possession of, dwell, abide’ (OED). 
To have and to live permanently in a place are virtually one and the same thing. To be a 
human being means more than ‘to dwell’, as Heidegger proposes. It also means 
incorporating a place into one’s own being.10  
 
While Merleau-Ponty studies human behaviour more from an individual’s point 
of view, Pierre Bourdieu situates the individual within the social group to which he   
belongs. In other words, his starting point is the collective aspect of an individual’s 
                                                 
10 Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. by David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 349. 
 197 
 
habit. Nick Crossley remarks that ‘though the intellectual genealogy is unclear, it is 
commonly held that Bourdieu builds upon the work of Merleau-Ponty’ and extends his 
insights into ‘the sociological domain’ (Crossley, p. 91). His concept of ‘habitus’, 
‘systems of durable, transposable dispositions’,11 is an appropriation of the Latin word 
habitus. In stressing ‘habitus’ as ‘systems’ and considering the individual habitus as but 
a ‘variant’ of its ‘collective root’, he goes a step further than Merleau-Ponty in 
emphasizing that such a body memory is a re-enactment of a collective past (Crossley, p. 
94). In saying that ‘habitus’ is ‘durable’ and ‘transposable’, he also highlights its 
function in giving an individual and a community a sense of continuity.  
 
Another theorist relevant to the discussion of collective memory is Maurice 
Halbwachs. Though not phenomenological in approach, his theory, like that of Bourdieu, 
is collectively oriented. He emphasizes the integrated relationship between man and the 
spatial framework in which he is surrounded, maintaining that ‘when a group has lived a 
long time in a place adapted to its habits, its thoughts as well as its movements are in 
turn ordered by the succession of images from these external objects’.12 Halbwachs 
describes vividly the integration between a group and its habitual surroundings, 
suggesting that after a long period of residence, the relationship between a group and its 
environment is that of ‘life merged with things’: ‘The place a group occupies is not like 
a blackboard, where one may write and erase figures at will. […] Place and group have 
each received the imprint of the other’ (Halbwachs, p. 130). As a result of such 
integration, the spatial framework has become a part of the group’s collective identity, 
by which it makes sense of itself. Halbwachs maintains that ‘our habitual images of the 
                                                 
11 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. by Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977), p. 72. All subsequent quotations of this book are from this edition with page 
numbers given in parentheses. 
12 Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, trans. by Francis Ditter, Jr. and Vida Yazdi Ditter (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1980), p. 133. All subsequent quotations of this book are from this edition with 
page numbers given in parentheses. 
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external world are inseparable from our self’ (Halbwachs, p. 128). Such a relationship 
resists the force to change, because to lose these images would be to ‘lose the support of 
the tradition that recommends them and gives them their unique reason for existence’ 
(Halbwachs, pp. 135-6). That is why if the appearance and layout of the place where a 
group dwells are ‘altered’ or ‘demolished’, the group will ‘object’. This ‘resistance’ 
arises not simply from the individual, but from the group (Halbwachs, p. 134).     
  
The phenomenological approach is adopted in this chapter as I find the 
behaviourist approach to habit inadequate in understanding the relationship between 
habit and place in ‘Michael’ and The Mill on the Floss. The theories of Bourdieu and 
Halbwachs are also important as they shed light on our understanding of the collective 
nature of the habitual behaviour of Wordsworth’s and Eliot’s characters.  
 
‘Michael’ 
Michael leads a habitual life on his land. Many words and phrases indicating 
time are used to depict the constancy of his habit, such as ‘daily’, ‘at all times’, ‘so oft’, 
‘oftentimes’, ‘as before’, ‘from day to day’, ‘day by day’, ‘month followed month’, 
‘from year to year’. The frequency with which they appear in the poem is striking. 
‘Daily’ appears four times; ‘oftentimes’ comes up three times; ‘from time to time’ 
appears twice.13 
 
The regularity of Michael’s family routine is evidenced in the punctuality with 
which they light their lamp: 
 
                                           as duly as the light 
                                                 
13 William Wordsworth, ‘Michael’, in The Major Works, ed. by Stephen Gill (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000). All subsequent quotations of this poem are from this edition with line numbers given in 
parentheses. 
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Of day grew dim, the House-wife hung a lamp; 
[…] 
And from this constant light so regular 
And so far seen, the House  
[…] was named the Evening Star. (‘Michael’, ll. 115-6; ll. 143-6)  
 
‘Duly’, ‘constant’ and ‘so regular’ point to the fact that this pattern hardly goes through 
any change. The metaphor is very suggestive, especially when the poet pairs it with the 
punctual occurrence of the natural phenomenon. It conveys the sense that the old 
couple’s fixed pattern of life is itself part of the natural world, comparable to the rising 
of the moon and the appearance of the star.  
 
More importantly, their life pattern is not only repetitive, but also cyclic. ‘When 
/ At length their time was come, they were not loth / To give their bodies to the family 
mold’ (‘Michael’, ll. 378-80). James Chandler has noticed the ‘rich Wordsworthian 
paronomasia’ of the word ‘mold’.14 It indicates the earth of the grave, but it may also 
mean a pattern by which something is shaped. In this poem, Michael’s lifestyle is 
shaped by his forefathers, and he hopes that his son Luke’s life will be similar to his. 
The family mould is a force that shapes the lives of later generations. There may also be 
a third layer of meaning, as ‘mould’ also means ‘Rotting earth considered as the 
material of the human body’ (OED, mould/mold n1 2.a.). As such, the mould is more 
than a synecdoche symbolizing death or a life-shaping force. It is the very substance of 
which life is made. When Michael dies, he becomes dust again and makes new life 
possible. From the dust he comes, to the dust he returns. The family mould is thus 
where the life of each generation both begins and ends. Life and death in the community 
                                                 
14 James Chandler, Wordsworth’s Second Nature: A Study of the Poetry and Politics (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 165. 
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of Michael’s family are not mutually exclusive, but part of a cycle of repetition.   
 
The rhythmic and cyclic pattern of pastoral life depicted here is reminiscent of 
‘The Brothers’, in which the priest describes the village life in a similar way: ‘A wood is 
felled’, ‘A child is born or christened’, ‘a field ploughed’, ‘A daughter sent to service’, 
‘a web spun’, ‘The old house clock is decked with a new face’.15 Both poems draw a 
picture of the timeless practice that has been transmitted from previous generations and 
will carry on into the future.  
 
Michael’s habitual life is not a mechanical and clockwork experience. It shows 
Michael’s embodied relationship with the spatial framework in which the shepherd is 
surrounded:    
 
An old man, stout of heart, and strong of limb.  
His bodily frame had been from youth to age 
Of an unusual strength: his mind was keen  
Intense and frugal, apt for all affairs,  
And in his Shepherd’s calling he was prompt 
And watchful more than ordinary men.  
Hence he had learned the meaning of all winds,  
Of blasts of every tone, and often-times  
When others heeded not, He heard the South  
Make subterraneous music, like the noise  
Of Bagpipers on distant Highland hills. 
[…] 
                                                 
15 Wordsworth, ‘The Brothers’, in The Major Works, lines 155-8. 
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And truly at all times the storm, that drives  
The traveller to a shelter, summoned him  
Up to the mountains. (‘Michael’, ll. 42-58) 
 
One may argue that there is still a body-mind dichotomy in the lines quoted above. 
However, when the poet describes Michael’s mind, he uses such phrases as ‘apt for all 
affairs’, ‘prompt / And watchful’ in ‘Shepherd’s calling’. These phrases show that even 
though the word ‘mind’ is used, the emphasis is on its practical aspect: the dexterity and 
readiness in performing skills and solving problems. This echoes the core of Merleau-
Ponty’s idea that there is no metaphysical or contemplative mind as such. The mind is 
practically engaged and oriented. Michael’s knowledge of ‘the meaning of all winds’ is 
a perfect example of this. It is not metaphysical knowledge, but practical know-how, 
quite similar to the typist’s knowledge of the keyboard, which Merleau-Ponty terms 
‘knowledge in the hands’. ‘Music’ expresses the harmony achieved between Michael 
and the spatial objects that surrounds him, between Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ‘what we 
aim at and what is given’ (Merleau-Ponty, p. 166; p. 167). 
 
The poet also emphasizes Michael’s extraordinary bodily strength: ‘stout of 
heart’, ‘strong of limb’, ‘unusual strength’. Indeed phrases like these appear altogether 
three times in the poem. In the light of Merleau-Ponty’s theory that ‘a movement is 
learned when the body has understood it’, the poet’s emphasis of Michael’s physical 
aptitude and fitness in performing these highly proficient shepherding skills show that 
his body has well understood its tasks.  
 
Just as the habitual life Michael leads shows his embodied understanding of his 
environment, so the spatial framework within which he operates is not something 
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external to him. To borrow Merleau-Ponty’s vocabulary, Michael is not ‘in space’. 
Through the habits he develops there, he ‘dilates’ his ‘being-in-the-world’ by combining 
with and including the spatial framework around him. As a result, the hills and the fields 
and everything with which he has daily contact have become part of himself. As the 
poet tells us, ‘These fields, these hills’ are ‘his living Being’, a phrase reminiscent of 
Merleau-Ponty’s argument, ‘the world is wholly inside and I am wholly outside myself’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, p. 474).  
 
As a result of such incorporation, Michael is deeply attached to his land. The 
narrator emphasizes that it would be wrong to suppose that the valleys, the streams and 
rocks are ‘things indifferent to the Shepherd’s thoughts’ (‘Michael’, l. 64):  
 
[…] these fields, these hills 
[…] had laid 
Strong hold on his affections, were to him 
A pleasurable feeling of blind love, 
The pleasure which there is in life itself. (‘Michael’, ll. 74-9) 
 
To call this love ‘blind’ highlights the fact that the nature of the attachment is without 
the involvement of consciousness. It reminds us of the pre-reflective, bodily knowledge 
Michael has acquired through the long-term familiarity with his land. Such a love is 
further reaffirmed by the poet’s insistence that Michael’s love of his land is similar to 
his love for his son. When describing Michael’s love for his son, the poet uses similar 
vocabulary to that in the passage above: 'This Son of his old age was yet more dear— / 
Effect which might perhaps have been produced / By that instinctive tenderness, the 
same / Blind Spirit, which is in the blood of all’ (‘Michael’, ll. 150-3). The word ‘blind’ 
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appears again after being used to describe Michael’s love of his land. The poet makes a 
direct connection between the two kinds of love by insisting that they are actually one 
and the same thing. That is to say, Michael’s relationship with the fields and the hills is 
that of a blood-tie relation. The use of the words ‘blind’ and ‘instinctive tenderness’ 
suggests that the nature of such a relationship is not conscious but deeply habituated. In 
the lines ‘even more / Than his own Blood’ (‘Michael’, ll. 74-5), what the poet actually 
suggests is that Michael’s love of his patrimonial field has surpassed the blood-tie 
relation. In an oblique way, this foreshadows his decision to keep his land and let go of 
his blood relation when it is in danger of being lost.   
 
Michael’s attachment to his land is not an individual sentiment, but a collective 
attachment shared by his family group. This is what Bourdieu means by saying that 
each individual’s habitus is ‘a structural variant’ of that of his group or class (Bourdieu, 
p. 86). Such a collective attachment between farmers and their patriarchal land is 
emphasized by Wordsworth in his letter to Charles James Fox on 14 January 1801: 
 
But if they are proprietors of small estates, which have descended to 
them from their ancestors, the power which these affections will acquire 
amongst such men is inconceivable by those who have only had an 
opportunity of observing hired labourers, farmers, and the manufacturing 
Poor.16 
 
‘Hired’ is set in sharp contrast with the phrase ‘descended […] from their ancestors’, 
indicating that in the former the relationship with the land is simply a product of 
economics. This kind of relationship can never nurture the powerful affections that 
                                                 
16 William Wordsworth, Letters of William Wordsworth: A New Selection, ed. by Alan Hill (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 42. 
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characterize the owners of landed properties.  The fact that only owners of landed 
property have powerful domestic affections points to the fact that these affections are 
initiated by the family group, rather than simply originating from the individual. 
Michael’s attachment to his land could hardly be so powerful if his relationship with the 
land was of short duration and without the feelings accumulated over generations. 
 
Wordsworth’s concern for the yeomen’s attachment to their small inheritance 
was quite consistent. Forty-three years later, he mentioned this theme again when 
vigorously attacking the construction of a railway in Kendal and Windermere, saying 
that ‘the degree and kind of attachment which many of the yeomanry feel to their small 
inheritances can scarcely be over-rated’.17 If an individual’s property is destroyed as a 
result of the building of the railway, Wordsworth argues, ‘must he too the ruthless 
change bemoan / [...] Mid his paternal fields at random thrown?’.18 The emphasis that 
the attachment to the land belongs to ‘many of the yeomanry’ reminds us again of 
Bourdieu’s point that an individual’s habit is deeply rooted in the collective. 
 
Just as Michael’s affection for the land grows out of the collective root, so too 
does his resistance to its loss. Michael laments that the land ‘looks as if it never could 
endure / Another Master’, as though these fields, as human beings, also had feelings 
(‘Michael’, ll. 389-90). Actually the resistance comes not from the land, but from the 
family group. Michael knows clearly that if the land is lost through him, he will be the 
betrayer of his family. As he explains, he has ‘lived to be a fool […] / To my own 
family’, and ‘could not lie quiet in my grave’ (‘Michael’, ll. 245-6; l. 242). The 
emphasis on the whole family highlights Halbwachs’s idea of the collective nature of 
                                                 
17 William Wordsworth, ‘Kendal and Windermere Railway’, in The Prose Works of William Wordsworth, 
ed. by W. J. B. Owen and Jane Smyser, 3 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), III, 339. 
18 Wordsworth, ‘Sonnet on the Projected Kendal and Windermere Railway’, in Prose Works, III, 339, lines 
9, 11. 
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such a resistance.  
 
In fact, what is collectively rooted is not only Michael’s attachment to the land 
and his resistance to its loss, but the whole of his habitual mode of life, a memory which 
James Booth claims pervades ‘our lives-in-common’.19 To borrow Pierre Bourdieu’s 
vocabulary, it is ‘an active residue’ of the past experiences of Michael’s forefathers 
which functions within the present, as is seen in their re-enactment in Michael’s own 
life. Michael tells Luke that the land is a place his parents ‘lived / As all their 
Forefathers had done’ (‘Michael’, ll. 377-8). ‘As’ and ‘all’ point to the fact that the mode 
of life from one generation down to the next is characterized by sameness. From the 
way Michael teaches Luke shepherding skills, we can discern that Michael was taught 
in such a way by his father, who received similar instructions from his forefathers. This 
is what Bourdieu terms the transposability of habitus. If it were not for the loss of the 
land, the same habit would have woven a thread of continuity, which could extend itself 
into future generations.  
 
The collective memory Michael has inherited from his forefathers is not 
confined to the similar lifestyle they lead, but extends to the value that belongs to the 
whole family group. When telling Luke how he has loved him, Michael says that ‘I but 
repay a gift which I myself / Received at others hands’ (‘Michael’, ll. 373-4). The love 
he gives to Luke is not something peculiar to him but a repetition of the way his parents 
behaved towards him, which is in turn the same way his grandparents loved his parents.  
What Michael hands down from his forefathers to Luke is not only love, but also a 
diligent, frugal and virtuous way of life. Michael’s determination for Luke to join him in 
building the sheepfold demonstrates this point. He wants Luke to lead a life ‘thy Fathers 
                                                 
19 Booth, p. x. 
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lived’, ‘Who, being innocent, did for that cause / Bestir them in good deeds’ (‘Michael’, 
ll. 420-2). Here the emphasis is on the collective values handed down from generation 
to generation.  
 
The influence of collective past is strong in Michael. Though his parents never 
make an actual appearance, their influence is everywhere to be found. They are part of 
Michael’s collective identity. Michael’s profound distress when he is in danger of losing 
his land, his decision to keep the land by letting go of his son, and his idea of making a 
covenant with Luke and building the sheepfold with him – in all these we can feel their 
influence. This can also be recognized in Michael’s vocabulary. When his direct speech 
is quoted, he frequently uses nouns and pronouns indicating the family as a group, such 
as ‘we all’, ‘ours’, ‘our’, ‘them’, ‘both of them’, ‘they’, ‘their’, ‘my own family’, ‘all 
their Forefathers’, ‘thy Fathers’, rather than referring to  himself as an individual.  
 
While the habitual life Michael leads is a collective mode of life shared by his 
family group, the land is also incorporated into the family’s collective identity. When 
emphasizing ‘these fields of ours’, Michael means far more than that the family owns 
the land legally (‘Michael’, l. 240). Rather, he is saying that these fields are an integral 
part of them, through which they make sense of themselves. Halbwachs has emphasized 
the overwhelming significance of a residential place for a community, because ‘the 
group’s image of its external milieu and its stable relationships with this environment 
becomes paramount in the idea it forms of itself’ (Halbwachs, p. 130). To lose them 
would be to lose ‘the support of the tradition that recommends them and gives them 
their unique reason for existence’ (Halbwachs, 135-6).  
 
This is why Michael does everything he can to preserve his patrimonial land, 
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and therefore his collective memory, from being lost. The first thing he does is to send 
his son away to the city so that he can earn enough money to pay for the debt, and thus 
keep the land from being sold. He hopes that in this way he will be able to keep the land 
and the collective memory which it embodies.  
 
Secondly, Michael tries to make his son remember the collective memory of his 
family group. He wants him to remember his own virtue and that of his forefathers, a 
sort of collective virtue, developed along with the habitual life they have all shared. The 
sheepfold can, as Michael hopes, serve as a shield against the potential threat from the 
dissolute city. ‘Should evil men / Be thy companions, let this Sheep-fold be / Thy 
anchor and thy shield’ (‘Michael’, ll. 416-8). The sheep-fold thus protects Luke from 
‘all fear / And all temptation’ (‘Michael’, ll. 418-9). Michael clearly recognizes that the 
disruption of the blood-tie relationship with the land could result in relaxation of virtue. 
By preventing Luke’s collective memory from being impinged upon by commercial 
values, he hopes to keep both his family and his land intact.  
 
After his son’s corruption, Michael takes refuge by staying in his land and 
sticking to his habitual life: 
 
There is a comfort in the strength of love;  
’Twill make a thing endurable, which else  
Would break the heart:— Old Michael found it so.  
[…] 
Among the rocks 
He went, and still looked up upon the sun, 
And listened to the wind; and as before 
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Performed all kinds of labour for his Sheep, 
And for the land his small inheritance.  
And to that hollow Dell from time to time 
Did he repair, to build the Fold of which  
His flock had need. (‘Michael’, ll. 457-71)  
 
The reader is not told how heart-broken Michael is after hearing the ‘heavy news’. In 
fact, we are not given any description of how the news is received and how the family 
struggles to bear it. Instead, habit emerges with full force, counter-balancing the tragic 
episode that went before and giving the reader some sense of comfort. ‘Still’, ‘as before’ 
and ‘from time to time’ all speak of the old way of life to which Michael tightly clings. 
It seems that these are the only phrases in which he can take refuge. As David 
Bromwich points out, ‘Michael will find “a comfort in the strength of love”; but he does 
it by recurring to the worn tracks of his customary existence, the same life as before 
amid “those fields, those hills”’. 20 It is through returning to his habitual existence that 
Michael once more finds love, comfort and his identity. This ‘therapy of self-recovery’ 
shows how powerful tradition and custom can be.21  
 
Critics have debated the cause of Michael’s tragedy. Some hold that it is the 
intrusion of capitalism which disrupts the harmony of agrarian life. Michael Friedman 
maintains that ‘the infiltration of the newer, more rationalized, more blatantly egotistical 
and calculating forms of capitalism […] into the natural economy’ can be ‘destructive 
of’ the rural community’s ‘affective ties’, which are ‘contingent upon the maintenance 
and prosperity of the natural economy’. The breaking of the bonds of affection between 
                                                 
20 David Bromwich, A Choice of Inheritance: Self and Community from Edmund Burke to Robert Frost 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 68. 
21 Bromwich, A Choice of Inheritance, p. 70. 
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Michael and his son serves as an example of this.22 In a similar way, Roger Sales holds 
that it is an ‘ill-defined and significantly distanced commercial ethos which destroys 
Michael’s estate’.23 Thomas Pfau suggests that what Michael experiences is a revolution 
which not only accounts for the ‘transmutation of landed wealth into mobile capital’, 
but also results in the disappearance of ‘the older, feudal notions of inalienable property 
relations’. Pfau quotes from a contemporary historian who considers ‘the declining 
price of basic food costs that had resulted from increased agricultural productivity’ a 
‘major factor’ in the ‘growing rates of bankruptcy experienced by families that had 
farmed their lands for generations’.24 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, David Collings sees Michael’s tragedy as 
arising out of the inherent problem in agrarian society. ‘Insofar as Michael’s life is 
disrupted by obligations to his kinsman’, he argues, ‘the system constructed for the 
preservation of the local tradition proves to be the source of its undoing’.25 But David 
Simpson sees that Wordsworth deliberately avoids the suggestion that the family’s 
decline is the result of either the external force or the inherent problem of agrarian life. 
For him, Michael’s tragedy is of his own making: the poet attributes Michael’s affliction 
to ‘self-incurred […] fraternal loyalty’ and thus shifts his focus to human rather than 
social factors.26  
 
My own view is that Wordsworth wants to invite his readers to recognize that 
the intrusion of capitalism has disturbed the family’s harmonious life. As Roger Sales 
                                                 
22 Friedman, p. 186. 
23 Roger Sales, English Literature in History: 1780-1830, Pastoral and Politics (London: Hutchinson, 
1983), p. 57. 
24 Thomas Pfau, Romantic Moods: Paranoia, Trauma, and Melancholy, 1790-1840 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2005), pp. 197-8.  
25  David Collings, ‘Covenant in Hyperbole: The Disruption of Tradition in “Michael”’, Studies in 
Romanticism, 32 (1993), 551-76 (p. 555).  
26  David Simpson, Wordsworth's Historical Imagination: The Poetry of Displacement (New York: 
Methuen, 1987), p. 142. 
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points out, the way in which Wordsworth constructs the past in the poem is problematic. 
He is ‘unwilling to commit himself even to general propositions about economic agency 
in relation to the internal structure of rural society’ because he wants to suggest that 
early eighteenth-century rural society was ‘a pre-capitalist utopia’.27  This utopia, as my 
earlier argument shows, is characterized by a regular and rhythmic pattern, which 
provides its residents with a sense of ease and security. The newly emerged capitalist 
world, by contrast, is full of change and unpredictability, as the words ‘unforeseen’, 
‘suddenly’, and the phrase ‘un-looked for claim’ suggest (‘Michael’, l. 223; l. 227). The 
sharp contrast the poet makes between the two kinds of society and his obvious 
preference of the former over the latter is plain to see. Reading the poem, one feels the 
intrusion of this new external force at whose hand the old world is powerless. 
 
 Another piece of evidence which supports this argument is Wordsworth’s 1836 
assertion that the poem drew its source from a local story about a son becoming 
dissolute and running away from his parents. 28  In the poem, however, the poet 
deliberately twists the story by stating that the son’s corruption happens after he leaves 
his parents. The purpose of this reconstruction, as Simpson suggests, reflects the poet’s 
wish to present the image of ‘perfect familial harmony in an ideal rural economy’, even 
though such a depiction is ‘out of tune’ with the facts.29        
 
Wordsworth’s own account in A Guide through the District of the Lakes also 
shows negativity towards the impact of the industrial revolution upon the old agrarian 
world of self-sufficiency. Before the industrial revolution, ‘the family of each man’, 
says the poet, whether estatesman or farmer, had a ‘twofold support’. The first was ‘the 
                                                 
27 Sales, p. 55. 
28 William Wordsworth, The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth, ed. by E. de Selincourt, 5 vols 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944), II, 478. 
29 Simpson, p. 143. 
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produce of his lands and flocks’, and the second the profit made by women and children 
through spinning wool. However, ‘by the invention and universal application of 
machinery’, the second support had been ‘cut off’. As a result, proprietors and farmers 
were 
 
no longer able to maintain themselves upon small farms, several are 
united in one, and the buildings go to decay, or are destroyed; and that 
the lands of the estatesmen being mortgaged, and the owners constrained 
to part with them, they fall into the hands of wealthy purchasers, who […] 
erect new mansions out of the ruins of the ancient cottages, whose little 
enclosures, with all the wild graces that grew out of them, disappear.30 
 
In these passages, the poet depicts a livelihood very similar to that of Michael and 
Isabel. The Guide shows Wordsworth’s deep concern about the impact of the industrial 
revolution on the social system of rural England, and the life of estatesmen in particular.  
 
In depicting Michael and his family group’s collective habits, their integrated 
relationship with the land, and the intrusion of capitalism which causes the disruption of 
this collective past from being transmitted to the following generations, Wordsworth 
follows Burke in his opinion about the damage caused to society by revolution, and, like 
Burke, suggests that social change should not be effected too radically.  
 
In Burke’s opinion, we are the bearers of our collective memory. This 
inheritance comes in the forms of habit, custom, morality, prescription, and even 
prejudice. This whole body of collective memory is the treasure that the previous 
                                                 
30 Wordsworth, A Guide through the District of the Lakes, in Prose Works, II, 224 (original emphasis). 
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generation has passed down to us, which makes us what we are. ‘All those habits, 
customs, and local superstitions’ are ‘human nature’. They are the physical embodiment 
of ‘the gradual accretion of practices’ of the past generations.31 They give meaning to 
man’s existence and purpose to his action, like a ‘compass’ which guides man to his 
destination. If they are abolished all at once, man will become disoriented, not knowing 
‘distinctly to what port we steer’.32 Life will become meaningless and void of purpose 
and motivation. 
 
Just as an individual is an embodiment of his collective past, the same holds true 
of society. It is, according to Burke, ‘a partnership’ between ‘those who are living, those 
who are dead, and those who are to be born’ (Burke, pp. 194-5). Burke compares the 
organic image of society to an edifice, with the collective memory that weaves the 
society together serving as its ‘models’ and ‘patterns’: 
 
It is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling 
down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the 
common purposes of society, or on building it up again, without having 
models and patterns of approved utility before his eyes. (Burke, p. 152)  
 
If society is an edifice, the collective past which is made up of shared beliefs and 
practices is the foundation upon which it is built. An individual will feel disoriented if 
he abandons the collective past while society will go through similar chaos if its 
collective memories are abolished. Mankind will end up with ‘no compass to govern us’ 
(Burke, p. 172). As a result, it is necessary to be extremely cautious when bringing 
                                                 
31 Bromwich, A Choice of Inheritance, p. 45; p. 47. 
32 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. by Conor Cruise O’Brien (London: 
Penguin, 1986), pp. 172-3. All subsequent quotations of this book are from this edition with page 
numbers given in parentheses. 
 213 
 
about social change: ‘Amelioration by degrees is all our condition may allow’.33  
 
As Burke’s ‘interpreter to the nineteenth century’, Wordsworth has a notion of 
habit strikingly similar to that of Burke.34 I mentioned in Chapter One that Wordsworth 
explains all actions in terms of habit, which is inherited from the past, and over which 
reason has no power of control.35 His play, The Borderers, is perhaps the best example 
of what an individual can become once he chooses to shake off this yoke of the past and 
allow reason to become his ruler. 
 
Society follows a similar trajectory. Echoing the vocabulary in Burke’s 
suggestion that society is a partnership between the living, the dead and those who are 
to be born, Wordsworth sees society as a ‘spiritual community binding together the 
living and the dead’, emphasizing the impact of the past over the present. Moreover, in a 
structure similar to Burke’s metaphor of society as an edifice or a tree, Wordsworth 
visualizes society as a web, a ‘concentric circle’, with self as the centre, and 
benevolence as the ‘outermost and all-embracing circle’.36  
 
In Two Addresses to the Freeholders of Westmorland, Wordsworth expresses a 
Burkean view that social changes should allow the collective root to remain undisturbed. 
The letter was written in 1818 in support of the election of the Lowthers, who were 
representative of the landed interest, and against an outsider, Henry Brougham. Though 
the letter was written about two decades after the composition of ‘Michael’, by which 
time Wordsworth’s general political stance had become more conservative, the poet’s 
attitude to property and land remained quite consistent throughout his life. Roger Sales 
                                                 
33 Bromwich, A Choice of Inheritance, p. 46.  
34 Bromwich, A Choice of Inheritance, p. 48. 
35 Wordsworth, ‘Essay on Morals’, in Prose Works, I, 103. 
36 Wordsworth, The Convention of Cintra, in Prose Works, I, 339-40. 
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remarks that the two texts address virtually the same issue, with the only difference 
lying in their ‘emphasis’. The Lowthers and yeomen like Michael, he remarks, ‘handed 
down their estates from father to son’. The two texts illustrate that ‘the great and small 
were inextricably connected’. If these small estates ‘were allowed to be broken up’, then 
it was only ‘a matter of time before the aristocratic estates and the realm of the state 
itself crumbled away’.37 
 
In the letter, Wordsworth warns that the reformers should respect habit and the 
values handed down from the past:  
 
Independence, according to the meaning of their interpretation, is the 
explosive energy of conceit – making blind havoc with expediency. It is a 
presumptuous spirit at war with all the passive worth of mankind. The 
independence which they boast of despises habit, and time-honoured 
forms of subordination; it consists in breaking old ties upon new 
temptations, in casting off the modest garb of private obligation to strut 
about in the glittering armour of public virtue; in sacrificing, with 
jacobinical infatuation, the near to the remote, and preferring to what has 
been known and tried, that which has no distinct existence, even in 
imagination.38 
 
The phrase ‘passive worth’ is reminiscent of Michael’s ‘blind’ attachment to his land 
and his faithful performance of the local customs throughout his life, especially after his 
son’s corruption. ‘All the passive worth of mankind’, ‘habit’ and ‘time-honoured forms 
of subordination’, ‘old ties’ and ‘the modest garb of private obligation’ are the collective 
                                                 
37 Sales, pp. 53-4.  
38 Wordsworth, Two Addresses to the Freeholders of Westmorland, in Prose Works, III, 170. 
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heritage, sustaining the spiritual community which binds the living and the dead. Social 
reform should not be conducted with the aim of ‘casting off’ the collective heritage. 
Otherwise the reformers are merely ‘making blind havoc with expediency’.  
 
Though Wordsworth advocates a sense of universal humanity in the image of the 
concentric circle, it is not achieved at the expense of the attachment to the near and dear. 
There is a hierarchy within the concentric circle, which proceeds from the centre of self 
to the outmost circle of humanity, the near to the remote. Similarly, in the passage 
quoted above, the poet’s hierarchical order is apparent.  Pairing up a group of antonyms, 
‘old ties’ versus ‘new temptations’, ‘private obligation’ versus ‘public virtue’, ‘the near’ 
versus ‘the remote’, ‘what has been known and tried’ versus ‘that which has no distinct 
existence’, he advises reformers not to achieve the latter at the expense of the former. 
Otherwise the result can be nothing but destructive. 
 
If this letter is a warning to political reformers, ‘Michael’ is an example of what 
happens when collective memory is cast off.  When the land stops providing a sense of 
deep-rootedness for Luke, his blood-tie relationship with his family is broken and the 
virtues which characterize the communal life also disappear.  
 
It can be argued that Michael’s blind attachment to his land is negative, as it is 
pitched against his familial love and ends in the loss of his son, a situation summarized 
by Bromwich as, ‘the love of family and the love of property’ pulled in ‘irreconcilably 
opposite directions’.39 In my view, Bromwich touches the essence of Michael’s tragedy. 
In the old agrarian world, with the smooth transmission of collective memory from one 
generation to another, the two forms of love are in harmony with each other. With the 
                                                 
39 Bromwich, Disowned by Memory, p. 158.  
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invasion of capitalism, however, they stop going hand-in-hand and begin to pull in 
opposite directions. This is where Wordsworth’s anxiety lies and what he sets out to 
critique. 
 
The Mill on the Floss 
Tim Dolin remarks that the ‘question of inheritance was a crucial one for the 
Victorians, for whom industrial modernity was both a liberation and an estrangement 
from the pre-modern past’.40 In this section, I will address the conflict between social 
progress and the question of inheritance as manifested in The Mill on the Floss. I will 
argue that Mr. Tulliver’s blind clinging to his habitual life on the mill, which leads to his 
own destruction, and Maggie’s faithful and yet painful commitment to her collective 
past, reflect Eliot’s conflicting views on the inheritance of the collective memory of 
agrarian culture against a background of capitalist development. 
  
As is the case with ‘Michael’, Merleau-Ponty’s and Bourdieu’s theories on habit, 
I suggest, shed light on the way in which the Tullivers are all deeply attached to the 
customary life and the old, familiar objects and places they inhabit. Maggie loves the 
mill in which her habitual life is located. The ‘din’ and the ‘stones’ make it ‘a little 
world apart from her outside everyday life’.41 She even ‘loves’ the ‘corn-hutch’ which 
she is ‘in the habit of’ […] sit[ting] on and slid[ing] down continually’ (MF, p. 29). For 
Tom, too, the mill is his ‘old favourite spot’ and always ‘heightened’ his ‘good-humour’ 
(MF, p. 40). After the loss of the mill, he is determined to buy it back again because ‘he 
should prefer it to any smarter, newer place’ (MF, p. 226).   
 
                                                 
40 Tim Dolin, Authors in Context: George Eliot (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 115. 
41 George Eliot, The Mill on the Floss, ed. by Gordon Haight (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 
29. All subsequent quotations of this novel, abbreviated MF, are from this edition with page numbers 
given in parentheses. 
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The narrator repeatedly eulogizes human beings’ attachment to the things and 
places to which they are used: 
 
We could never have loved the earth so well […] if it were  not the earth 
where the same flowers come up again every spring […]— the same hips 
and haws on the autumn hedgerows — the same redbreasts that we used 
to call “God’s birds,” […]  What novelty is worth that sweet monotony 
where everything is known, and loved because it is known? (MF, p. 41, 
original emphasis) 
 
The parallelism and the repetition of the words ‘same’ and ‘known’ in this passage 
highlight the sense that love is inseparable from the feeling that these are old, familiar 
objects to which the narrator is accustomed. The narrator’s insistence that they are ‘the 
same flowers’, ‘the same hips’, the same birds, reinforces the sense of emotional 
security provided by these habitual objects. The oxymoron ‘sweet monotony’ suggests 
the sense of pleasure and reassurance derived from things of our daily company.  
 
The preference for what is known over ‘novelty’ is suggestive of the narrator’s 
anxiety in a rapidly changing world. People may find this world puzzling and 
disorienting, so they cling instead to what is old and familiar, which may turn out to be 
costly. Though a preference for the familiar is not new, it is important to note what is 
peculiarly striking about the way in which it is described. The narrator explains why 
these objects engender a pleasure of ‘sweet monotony’: 
 
There is no sense of ease like the ease we felt in those scenes where we 
were born, where objects became dear to us before we had known the 
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labour of choice, and where the outer world seemed only an extension of 
our personality: we accepted and loved it as we accepted our own sense 
of existence and our limbs. (MF, p. 151)  
 
The whole passage is surprisingly Merleau-Pontean, especially the idea of the external 
world as an extension of the body. The narrator suggests that memory of the familiar 
objects in the immediate environment is acquired ‘before we had known the labour of 
choice’. In other words, it is ‘pre-reflective knowledge’, obtained not through the mind, 
but through the body. Through habituation, we develop a physical familiarity with these 
objects and incorporate them into our own bodies. The outer world becomes ‘an 
extension of our personality’, and we remember it as we remember ‘our own sense of 
existence and our limbs’. The ease we feel as adults is simply a re-enactment of this 
embodied understanding of the home scene deeply rooted in past experience. One is 
reminded of the narrator’s comment in the opening of chapter three of Daniel Deronda, 
‘a spot where the definiteness of early memories […] may spread not by sentimental 
effort and reflection, but as a sweet habit of the blood’.42 By emphasizing the nature of 
early memories as ‘a sweet habit of the blood’ — an echo of Michael’s blind attachment 
to his land — the narrator stresses yet again that it is pre-reflective, within the realm not 
of the mind but of the body. 
 
The opposite of this ease, of course, is the dis-ease that afflicts Mr Tulliver when 
he has to abandon the mill and the land: 
 
The Tullivers had lived on this spot for generations. […] It was when he 
[Mr. Tulliver] got able to walk about and look at all the old objects, that 
                                                 
42 George Eliot, Daniel Deronda, ed. by Graham Handley (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 18. 
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he felt the strain of this clinging affection for the old home as part of his 
life, part of himself. He couldn’t bear to think of himself living on any 
other spot than this, where he knew the sound of every gate and door, and 
felt that the shape and colour of every roof and weather-stain and broken 
hillock was good, because his growing senses had been fed on them. Our 
instructed vagrancy […] can hardly get a dim notion of what an old-
fashioned man like Tulliver felt for this spot, where all his memories 
centred, and where life seemed like a familiar smooth-handled tool that 
the fingers clutch with loving ease. (MF, p. 263) 
 
Here again is the Merleau-Pontean image of the familiar place as a bodily extension. 
Tulliver’s old home is ‘part of his life, part of himself’. Strikingly, his whole life is 
depicted as a ‘smooth-handled tool’, an object that has worn smooth with the passage of 
time and is therefore both reassuring and handy, effectively becoming an extension of 
his own body. The physical comfort he now feels is rooted in the ‘making present’ of his 
past, in his body’s appropriation of the ‘old home’ and ‘the old objects’ through years of 
residence on the patrimonial land. Eliot’s analysis of Tulliver’s habitual ease in his 
surroundings is similar to Merleau-Ponty’s example: a man ‘in the habit of driving a 
car’ is able to ‘enter a narrow opening’ and see that he ‘can “get through” without 
comparing the width of the opening with that of the wings’, because he feels its width 
and height as if they were his own limbs (Merleau-Ponty, p. 165, original emphasis). 
Tulliver’s surroundings are part of his life in another sense: they are the source of the 
content of his mental life, as ‘his growing senses had been fed on them’. The word ‘fed’ 
suggests that there is no dichotomy here between subject and object. Rather, the external 
world is appropriated, or more accurately, digested and absorbed into his life. To use the 
favourite image of Wordsworth and Eliot, it turns into his lifeblood. 
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 As the result of such intense identification, Mr. Tulliver is deeply attached to his 
home, and cannot bear the thought of leaving it. Like Michael, who regards the hills and 
the fields as his ‘living Being’, ‘more / Than his own Blood’ (‘Michael’, ll. 75-6), Mr. 
Tulliver feels ‘the strain of this clinging affection for the old home’. He cannot ‘bear to 
think of himself living on any other spot than this’. If displaced, he will feel disoriented: 
‘I should go off my head in a new place’; ‘I should be like as if I’d lost my way’ (MF, p. 
264). 
 
Mr. Tulliver’s habit-memory of the mill is a re-enactment not only of his 
individual past but also of his collective past. As Bourdieu explains, ‘each individual 
system of dispositions may be seen as a structural variant of all the other group of class 
habitus’ (Bourdieu, p. 86). It is a collective memory of his family, which can be seen 
from the family’s resistance to the mill’s changing hands. Like Michael, who feels that 
the land he and his forefathers possess ‘looks as if it never could endure / Another 
Master’ (‘Michael’, ll. 389-90), Mr. Tulliver feels a similar bitterness when he laments 
the loss of the mill. As Tulliver’s father repeatedly tells him, ‘when the mill changes 
hands, the river’s angry’ (MF, p. 263). Actually it is the Tullivers themselves who 
cannot bear to part from the mill, which has become an integral part of them. Such a 
strong resistance, as Halbwachs argues, ‘can emanate only from a group’ (Halbwachs, 
134). The attachment is so strong that Mr. Tulliver would rather choose to ‘stop in the 
old place’ and swallow his pride serving under Wakem, the man who has ruined him, 
than leave it and go to a completely new place. As he puts it, ‘I wanted to die in th’ old 
place, where I was born and my father was born’ (MF, p. 266; p. 267). 
 
Hao Li points out that in Eliot’s early novels,  ‘affinity with one’s “land” and 
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“place” […] in which one moves about’, is ‘an experimental connection that contains an 
ineradicable claim from the past’.43 I would suggest that for Mr. Tulliver this ‘past’ is 
not simply an individual past but one characteristic of the class to which he belongs. 
The German sociologist Wilhelm Heinrich von Riehl, greatly admired by Eliot, gives an 
example similar to the description of Mr. Tulliver’s attachment to his old house, saying 
that a man ‘has the warmest piety towards the old tumbledown house which his 
grandfather built’, where he feels so physically comfortable. Riehl suggests that such an 
attachment to the customary life is a collective habit of the rural proletariat in his 
country, who act ‘more as one of a group’, and that ‘many thousands of men are as like 
each other in thoughts and habits as so many sheep or oysters, which constitutes the 
weight of the peasantry in the social and political scale’. 44 Mr. Tulliver is just one of 
such people; in Bourdieu’s words, his is but a variant of the habitus of the rural people.  
 
Such a collective memory, Bourdieu tells us, is ‘transposable’ (Bourdieu, p. 72). 
It has been transmitted from Mr. Tulliver’s grandfather to himself, and to Tom, whose 
faithfulness to his family prompts him to buy the mill back, and to Maggie, whose 
reverence for home and the ties knit in her childhood make her renounce her love for 
Stephen. Thus, because it is deeply planted in the collective past and acts as ‘a hinge 
between past and present’ (Crossley, p. 95), collective memory gives Mr. Tulliver a 
sense of deep-rootedness and continuity, so that he would rather remain in his own 
community and serve the man who has ruined him than start a new life elsewhere. 
 
Maggie’s embodiment of her collective past is best expressed in her ‘faithfulness 
to kindred’, to be more specific, to the ties knit by ‘trust and love’ in the earlier part of 
                                                 
43 Hao Li, Memory and History in George Eliot: Transfiguring the Past (London: Macmillan Press, 2000), 
p. 28 (original emphasis). 
44 George Eliot, ‘The Natural History of German Life’, in Selected Critical Writings, ed. by Rosemary 
Ashton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 271; p. 268. 
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her life. When Stephen claims that ‘natural law surmounts every other’ (MF, p. 274; p. 
471; p. 475), that these ties are ‘unnatural bonds’ that prevent her from the legitimate 
pursuit of love (MF, p. 465), Maggie argues that ‘love is natural, but surely pity and 
faithfulness and memory are natural too’ (MF, p. 450). These qualities are ‘natural’ in 
the Burkean sense that they are our ‘second nature’, a habitual and inherited part of us 
(Burke, p. 299). In the words of Montaigne, we ‘suck them in with our mothers’ milk’, 
and are ‘born with the property of continuing to act that way’.45 For Maggie, these ties 
are ‘the best organs of her soul’. To be cut off from them would be like ‘enjoy[ing] 
walking by maiming her feet’ (MF, p. 458), an apt Merleau-Pontean image implying 
that the ties have become a bodily extension. Consequently, the severance of such ties 
amounts to a physical wound and is traumatizing. 
 
More importantly, as these ties have their roots in the past, they are hallowed. 
For Maggie, home, where her old ties lie, is a ‘sanctuary’ where ‘sacred relics lay’ (MF, 
p. 479): 
   
Where, then, would be all the memories of early striving – all the deep 
pity for another’s pain, which had been nurtured in her through years of 
affection and hardship – all the divine presentiment of something higher 
than mere personal enjoyment, which had made the sacredness of life? 
(MF, p. 458) 
  
We can only choose whether we will indulge ourselves in the present 
moment, or whether we will renounce that, for the sake of obeying the 
divine voice within us – for the sake of being true to all the motives that 
                                                 
45 Michael de Montaigne, ‘On Habit: And on Never Easily Changing a Traditional Law’, in Michael de 
Montaigne: The Complete Essays, ed. by M. A. Screech (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 130. 
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sanctify our lives. (MF, p. 477)   
 
What is particularly striking about these passages is the religious language adopted by 
Maggie. Memory, pity, duty, faithfulness and feelings nurtured in the past are the 
‘divine voice’ which guides her through ‘the darkness of this life’ towards the ‘light’, a 
higher form of existence. Without such a guide, there will be no law in her life but ‘the 
inclination of the moment’ and a warrant for ‘all treachery and cruelty’ (MF, p. 475). If 
she turns her back on it, it will be a ‘sin’, a ‘fall’ (MF, p. 471), which will not only cause 
misery to her loved ones, but also leave her haunted by guilt. Thus, Maggie would 
rather give up her own happiness than betray her past. 
 
Though the narrator eulogizes such a reverence for the past, she does not feel 
that it necessarily leads to happiness. In some cases a ‘strong tenacity’ to ‘conventional 
worldly notions and habits’ has ‘no standard beyond hereditary custom’. It contributes 
nothing to either individual happiness or the general good of mankind (MF, p. 272). On 
the contrary, it can be destructive. Mr. Tulliver’s blind clinging to his family’s past 
nurtures a ‘vindictiveness’ towards Wakem, which leads to their fatal confrontation and 
Mr. Tulliver’s subsequent death (MF, p. 275). It can become an excuse for persecuting 
others. St. Ogg’s judgement on Maggie, made through its ‘emmet-like’ perspective of 
‘hereditary custom’, prevents its people from gaining an insight into her lot and 
showing her their ‘fellow-feeling’ (MF, p. 498). It even outweighs brotherly affection so 
that Tom disowns Maggie for having disgraced the family.  
 
Such a ‘strong tenacity’, as the narrator says, also prevents the local people from 
pursuing ‘something beautiful, great, or noble’ and thus becomes an ‘oppressive’ force 
(MF, p. 272). This is exactly what Maggie comes to experience. The sacred ties, without 
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which she feels handicapped, hold her in a ‘tightening clutch’ (MF, p. 471). They 
prevent her from pursuing the ‘fulness of existence’, the fulfilment of her own 
happiness (MF, p. 458). Though she is momentarily fascinated by Stephen’s idea of a 
drastic break away from her past, by what the narrator calls ‘those wild, uncontrollable 
passions’, and feels that her indulgence of them is legitimate, wondering ‘when […] all 
that her nature craved – was brought within her reach, why was she to forego it?’, her 
inherited nature always gets the upper hand (MF, p. 272; p. 458). But when she tries to 
obey the ‘old voices’, she foresees ‘a lonely future’, burdened by ‘regret’, ‘upheld only 
by clinging faith’. It is as if she has given up ‘the life-nourishing day’ for ‘the damp 
darkness’ (MF, p. 514). Thus she is forever torn between the ‘cruel charm’ of the love 
she longs for and the irresistible power of the past (MF, p. 480).      
 
Mr. Tulliver and Maggie’s tragic endings, I want to suggest, reflect Eliot’s 
conflicting views on the inheritance of collective memory in agrarian society. They 
reveal the dichotomy Eliot feels between her commitment to the agrarian past and her 
desire for liberation, for social change. On the one hand, she is keenly conscious that 
change and liberation from the past are necessary. As Nietzsche claims, an individual’s 
ignorant clinging to his roots is harmful because it prevents him from searching for 
something he thinks ‘more worth having’. Nietzsche’s alternative, like Stephen’s, is a 
radical break away from the past: ‘the best we can do is to confront our inherited and 
hereditary nature with our knowledge’, and to ‘combat our inborn heritage and implant 
in ourselves a new habit’.46 
 
However, Eliot is keenly conscious that such a break with the past should not be 
too radical because in her view, society is an organic growth out of the past, out of 
                                                 
46 Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’, in Untimely Meditations, 
trans. by R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 73; p. 76. 
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‘customs and traditions rooted in the past and still vitally meaningful in the present, in 
the enduring affective ties of family and community’.47 This image of society reminds 
one of St. Ogg’s, which the narrator depicts as ‘one of those old, old towns which 
impress one as a continuation and outgrowth of nature’, carrying the traces of its history 
like ‘a millennial tree’ (MF, p. 115). The emphasis on the town as an ‘outgrowth of 
nature’, like ‘a millennial tree’, highlights the point that it is an organic growth out of 
the past. This resonates with Burke’s image of society as an edifice and his idea that 
society is ‘the offspring of convention’ (Burke, p. 150). 
 
Eliot’s organic notion of society also echoes the view of Riehl, who expresses a 
similar view to Burke about the inheritance of the collective past by an individual as 
well as a society, and who regards European society as an ‘incarnate history’.48 Eliot’s 
review of his book, The Natural History of German Life, represents the best way of 
understanding Riehl’s political stance and conservative view on social development. 
The book, Eliot tells us, is a study of the habitual life of the small shopkeepers, artisans, 
and peasantry of German rural society. Whereas Burke focuses his study on the 
community of the ancien régime to see an individual and a society’s complicated 
relationship with their past, Riehl’s focus is on the lower classes, so his work has a 
direct impact on George Eliot. His notion of ‘incarnate history’ suggests that both an 
individual and society physically embody the collective past: 
  
We all of us physically embody, and carry forward through the 
generations, the nature of our collective being — our racial memory — in 
our customary acts, emotional responses, and social relationships.49                 
 
                                                 
47 Dolin, pp. 111-2. 
48 Eliot, ‘The Natural History of German Life’, in Selected Critical Writings, p. 281. 
49 Dolin, p. 112. 
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This clearly resonates with Bourdieu’s insistence on the collective aspect of habitual 
behaviour and the customary way of thinking, which are ‘transposable’, capable of 
being transmitted from one generation to the next.  
     
For Riehl, the peasant is a good example of the extent to which an individual is 
part of ‘incarnate history’. The embodiment of the past is manifested in his blind 
acceptance of habit and strong affections for custom, prejudice and local tradition. 
‘Custom with him holds the place of sentiment, of theory, and in many cases of 
affection’. The peasant’s attachment to local customs such as its dialect, its phraseology, 
its proverbs and its songs, is ‘a remnant of history to which he clings with the utmost 
tenacity’. He has historical traditions ‘fresh in his memory’, and ‘anything is easier to 
him than to move out of his habitual course’. He has an ‘inveterate habit of litigation’, 
which is ‘his point of honour’. He ‘never questions the obligation of family-ties — he 
questions no custom’. Like Burke, Riehl believes that an individual suffers mental chaos 
when he is deprived of his customary way of life. He describes a lad who ‘having never 
in his life slept in a bed, when he had to get into one for the first time began to cry like a 
child’.50   
 
Society also inherits a great deal from the past. Again like Burke, Riehl believes 
that a social structure is a complicated inheritance from the past, which proves the best 
choice of the previous generations. He praises the old institution, the feudal system, 
which ‘made the peasant the bondman of his lord’. This is ‘an immense benefit in a 
country’, as it ‘rescued the peasant from vagabondage, and laid the foundation of 
persistency and endurance in future generations’. For him, the current society has its 
roots ‘intertwined with the past’. Any social changes should therefore proceed carefully, 
                                                 
50 Eliot, ‘The Natural History of German Life’, in Selected Critical Writings, p. 272-3 (original emphasis). 
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‘allowing those roots to remain undisturbed’. Otherwise it will be destructive: ‘Any 
attempt to disengage it [European society] from its historical elements’ must be ‘simply 
destructive of social vitality’.51  
 
Riehl also establishes a connection between individual and society in their deep-
rootedness in the past:  
 
The external conditions which society has inherited from the past are but 
the manifestation of inherited internal conditions in the human beings 
who compose it; the internal conditions and the external are related to 
each other as the organism and its medium. […] There is an analogous 
relation between the moral tendencies of men and the social conditions 
they have inherited.52 
 
Development, as he sees it, can only take place by ‘the gradual consentaneous 
development of both’.53  That is, both individuals and society should develop while 
allowing their collective memory to remain undisturbed, so that they both carry with 
them the ‘incarnate history’ of the past. 
 
George Eliot also emphasizes the embodiment of past in an individual as well as 
a social group’s habitual behaviour, customary life and social relationship. Eliot shares 
Riehl’s view that we inherit an invaluable treasure from the past, which is physically 
embodied in our habitual behaviour and customary belief. Mr. Tulliver’s profound 
attachment to the mill where his family have lived for generations, his habitual ease in it 
and his obstinate refusal to leave it, because he wishes to die in the place where his 
                                                 
51 Eliot, ‘The Natural History of German Life’, in Selected Critical Writings, p. 272; p. 281; p. 283. 
52 Eliot, ‘The Natural History of German Life’, in Selected Critical Writings, pp. 281-3. 
53 Eliot, ‘The Natural History of German Life’, in Selected Critical Writings, p. 282. 
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forefathers have lived, reveal the extent to which an individual can ‘physically embody, 
and carry forward through the generations, the nature of our collective being’. 54  
Likewise, Maggie has inherited a loyalty to the collective memory of her community 
from her father. She would rather stick to the affectionate ties formed in the past and 
abide by the moral code of her community than shake them off and pursue her own 
personal happiness. 
 
Like individuals, society is also a past incarnate. This idea pervades Eliot’s essay 
‘Address to Working Men, by Felix Holt’, which lays considerable emphasis on the 
responsibility of the ‘newly enfranchised working classes’ to preserve ‘the English 
cultural tradition’,55 celebrating 
 
knowledge, science, poetry, refinement of thought, feeling, and manners, 
great memories and the interpretation of great records, which is carried 
on from the minds of one generation to the minds of another.56 
 
These are termed by Eliot ‘the common estate of society’, which one generation hands 
down to another. Of course, the scope of English cultural tradition is broader than that 
of the collective memory discussed in this chapter. However, Eliot’s emphasis on the 
‘thought’, ‘feeling’ and ‘manners’ one generation passes down to another can be seen as 
an acknowledgement of some key elements of collective memory.  
 
Society, according to Felix Holt, who serves as a mouthpiece for Eliot’s own 
views, is just like an organic human body woven by these ‘precious benefits’:  
                                                 
54 Dolin, p. 112. 
55 Fred Thomson, Introduction to ‘Address to Working Men, By Felix Holt’, in Felix Holt, The Radical, 
ed. by Fred Thomson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 412. 
56 Eliot, ‘Address to Working Men, by Felix Holt’, in Selected Critical Writings, p. 348. 
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 Society stands before us like that wonderful piece of life, the human body, 
with all its various parts depending on one another, and with a terrible 
liability to get wrong because of that delicate dependence. […] That is 
because the body is made up of so many various parts, all related to each 
other.57  
 
The body image here is apt. It reminds us not only of Burke’s metaphor of society as an 
edifice, but also of Wordsworth’s image of the concentric circle. Because of such 
delicacy and interdependence, social changes should not be carried out too radically. 
Since we all physically embody our collective past, society too, which also grows out of 
it, is similarly rooted in the past. It is like a human body, organic, vulnerable, and liable 
to go wrong because of such a ‘delicate dependence’. Social changes should not allow 
these collective roots to be too deeply disturbed. As a gradual reformist, Holt / Eliot 
insists that social progress should not come ‘in a hurry’, so that ‘no fatal shock may be 
given to this society of ours, this living body in which our lives are bound up’.58 Also, 
as the narrator of The Mill on the Floss claims, if ‘the striving after something better and 
better’ does not use its ‘trick of twining round those old inferior things’ and ‘deep 
immovable roots in memory’, ‘heaven knows where that striving might lead us’ (MF, p. 
152). 
 
In The Mill on the Floss too, the intrusion of capitalism is seen to have caused a 
‘fatal shock’ to the rural community of which the Tullivers are a part, which is ‘an 
organic outgrowth of customs and traditions rooted in the past’. Critics have analyzed 
Mr. Tulliver’s bankruptcy in a similar way to that of Michael. Some see it as the result 
                                                 
57 Eliot, ‘Address to Working Men, by Felix Holt’, in Selected Critical Writings, p.342. 
58 Eliot, ‘Address to Working Men, by Felix Holt’, in Selected Critical Writings, p.347; p.345. 
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of the intrusion of capitalism, while others ascribe it to the inherent problem of the rural 
economy. There are also critics who hold that Mr. Tulliver’s tragedy is of his own 
making. Joshua Esty points out that the novel’s setting, Dorlcote Mill, constitutes ‘a 
locus classicus of English yeomanry’. Mr. Tulliver’s loss of Dorlcote Mill to lawyer 
Wakem is ‘a paradigmatic instance of the yeoman fallen prey to modernization’.59 In his 
early work, Terry Eagleton also maintains that an external force brings about Mr. 
Tulliver’s ruin. The rural society of the Mill, he argues, is one of ‘struggling tenant 
farmers becoming enmortgaged and forced to ruin by the pressures of urban banking 
and agricultural industry’.60 However, Eagleton’s view has changed in his recent work. 
Though external factors play a part, he now sees the internal aspects of the rural 
community as more important in bringing about Mr. Tulliver’s bankruptcy. The novel, 
he points out, ‘is not a fable of the death of the old organic society at the hands of sharp 
commercial practitioners like Guest and Wakem’. The rural community’s own defects 
play ‘a vital role’ in the collapse of Mr. Tulliver’s small-scale rural capital.61 Kathleen 
Blake, however, holds that Mr. Tulliver’s ruin is caused by neither external nor internal 
factors, but is of his own making. It is brought about by the poor account he keeps. ‘He 
doesn’t know how much capital he has at his disposal, how much is saved compared to 
owned’. He suffers from ‘misrecognition’ and ‘category confusion’, as he confuses gifts 
with loans.62  
 
Diverse as these views are, my opinion is that like Wordsworth’s construction of 
the story of Michael and his nostalgia for a more natural and coherent agrarian world, 
Eliot is suggesting that it is the intrusion of capitalism which has destroyed Mr. 
                                                 
59 Joshua Esty, ‘Nationhood, Adulthood, and the Ruptures of Bildung: Arresting Development in The Mill 
on the Floss’, in The Mill on the Floss and Silas Marner, ed. by Nahem Yousaf and Andrew Maunder 
(Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 101-21 (p. 102; p. 103 original emphasis). 
60 Terry Eagleton, Criticism and Ideology: A Study in Marxist Literary Theory (London: Verso, 1988), p. 
115. 
61 Terry Eagleton, The English Novel: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), p. 177. 
62 Kathleen Blake, ‘Between Economies in The Mill on the Floss: Loans Versus Gifts, or, Auditing Mr. 
Tulliver’s Accounts’, Victorian Literature and Culture, 33 (2005), 219-37 (p. 222). 
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Tulliver’s habitual life in his old home, which is set in St. Ogg’s, a traditional and 
organic agrarian community cohering through custom and collective values. 
 
When rural people are displaced from their patrimonial land, the intimacy 
between body and land is destroyed, leading to further disruption of their habitual life 
and the loss of their embodied memory deeply rooted in the past. Collective memory, 
the hinge between past, present and future, is substituted by a traumatic feeling of 
displacement, a casting adrift from traditional roots, for which the tragic deaths of Mr. 
Tulliver and Maggie serve as a powerful symbol. 
 
Coda 
‘Michael’ and The Mill on the Floss have a lot in common. Stephen Gill remarks 
that the latter has been considered as Eliot’s ‘“most Wordsworthian novel”’, and that 
‘critics have noted […] the similarity between Mr. Tulliver’s attachment to the mill and 
Michael’s to his fields’.63 Both texts also emphasize the agency of the body, which does 
not respond to the external stimuli mechanically, but is capable of feeling and 
knowledge. Michael’s understanding of ‘the meaning of all winds’ (‘Michael’, l. 48) and 
Mr. Tulliver’s knowledge of ‘the sound of every gate and door’ (MF, p. 263) both 
highlight the body’s capability of knowing and understanding. Michael’s aptness for all 
sorts of affairs on his land and Mr. Tulliver’s feeling that life is like ‘a smooth-handled 
tool’ that ‘the fingers clutch with loving ease’ reaffirm that the knowledge they develop 
about their spatial objects is a bodily know-how, practically engaged and oriented (MF, 
p. 263).    
 
Based on the characters’ embodied understanding of the environment, habit 
                                                 
63 Stephen Gill, Wordsworth and the Victorians (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 157. 
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formation is represented not as the creation of new pathways through repeated exercises, 
which is the view generally held by the behaviourists, but as the body’s incorporation of 
the spatial framework into its own framework. The land Michael tills is his ‘living 
Being’ (‘Michael’, l. 74). Likewise, the mill Mr. Tulliver has had for many years 
becomes ‘part of his life’ and ‘part of himself’ (MF, p. 263). Angus Easson remarks that 
for both Michael and Silas Marner, things are ‘extensions of their personalities’.64 I 
suggest that this applies to Mr. Tulliver as well.  
 
The incorporation of habitual objects into the body explains the profound 
attachment developed by Wordsworth’s and Eliot’s characters for objects of their daily 
experience. Michael loves his land ‘even more than his own blood’ and feels that it can 
never ‘endure / Another Master’ when going into a stranger’s hand (‘Michael’, ll. 389-
90). Mr. Tulliver too has a ‘clinging affection’ for his home, and cannot bear the thought 
of ‘living on any other spot than this’ (MF, p. 263).  
 
Wordsworth and Eliot also share the view that the habitual life led by their 
characters and the attachment they have developed for it are not simply their own, but 
collectively rooted. Michael’s customary life on the land, his deep love for it and his 
resistance to its loss are a collective memory of his family group, and in a broader sense, 
one shared by the whole class of yeomanry. Similarly, the ease and affection Mr. 
Tulliver feels towards his mill and his mortification when it changes hands represent a 
re-enactment of the habit of his forefathers. This re-enactment is a collective memory of 
the class to which Mr. Tulliver belongs. 
 
The two texts can also be seen to adopt a similar nostalgic tone. Both are set in 
                                                 
64 Angus Easson, ‘Statesman, Dwarf and Weaver: Wordsworth and Nineteenth-Century Narrative’, in The 
Nineteenth-Century British Novel, ed. by Jeremy Hawthorn (London: Edward Arnold, 1986), pp. 17-30 (p. 
26). 
 233 
 
 234 
 
the past. The story of ‘Michael’ goes back to the eighteenth century; The Mill on the 
Floss is set in Eliot’s childhood, the early nineteenth century. In a way, both writers 
have in mind an old agrarian world which coheres through habit and custom and which 
is for them more natural, giving its people a sense of anchorage and continuity. This 
world, however, is disappearing fast. The intrusion of capitalism, by depriving the 
people of their patrimonial land which is the embodiment of their collective memory, is 
shown to have caused a rupture in the smooth transmission of this collective memory 
from one generation to another. Such a radical change inflicts not only psychological 
disorder upon the individual, but also family misfortune. This can be seen clearly in the 
tragedies of Michael, Luke and Mr. Tulliver.          
 
Social changes, as Wordsworth and Eliot see it, should not be made too swiftly. 
For them, society is an organic growth out of the past. If social changes are brought 
about too drastically, the collective root will be damaged, and people will suffer a 
traumatic displacement. 
    
Similar though the two writers’ opinions are, there are points on which they 
differ. On the whole, Eliot presents a more nuanced view on the inheritance of collective 
memory compared to her predecessor. Wordsworth is uniformly positive towards it, and 
the ending of ‘Michael’ suggests that it not only serves as the hinge between past, 
present and future, but is also therapeutic. Eliot’s view on collective memory, however, 
is not altogether positive. Though it provides one with a sense of deep-rootedness and 
continuity, collective memory is also shown to be oppressive, as Mr. Tulliver’s obstinate 
refusal to change and Maggie’s painful commitment to the past demonstrate. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Memory, Aristotle tells us, is ‘of the past’.1 This thesis has attempted to show 
that this past need not be confined to the recollection of a particular event, but can also 
refer to the accumulative force of past actions re-enacted in the present, in habitual 
behaviour and customary ways of thinking. I have shown both Wordsworth and Eliot to 
be preoccupied with this aspect of the past, especially its moral implications. As 
morality is an important aspect of habit-memory, they are both eager to cultivate in their 
characters as well as in their readers the right mode of conduct through the work of 
habit. 
 
In spite of such a shared interest, the two writers have been shown to address 
different issues at different times. In the works examined in this thesis, Wordsworth’s 
concept of habit is mainly in dialogue with Godwinian reason; or broadly speaking, 
with the belief of radicals such as Godwin, Paine and Wollstonecraft, who maintain that 
the way society is constructed needs to be rationally based. Moreover, habit is 
represented as a means of coming to terms with the poet’s disillusionment with the 
French Revolution. In spite of putting his faith in revolution, which he once believed 
could sweep away social corruption and lead to equality, Wordsworth later turned to 
habit, an imperceptible but reliable guide, to cultivate moral virtue, ameliorate human 
relations, mend class divisions, and bind men into a commonwealth of Christian 
brotherhood.   
 
 
1 Aristotle, ‘De Memoria et Reminiscentia’, in Aristotle on Memory, ed. by Richard Sorabji (Providence: 
Brown University Press, 1972), 449a9. 
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Eliot, on the other hand, has been shown to have dealt mainly with the loss of 
religious faith characteristic of her time. What Arnold thought could be achieved by 
culture, she believed could be obtained by habit. In other words, habit, for Eliot, was a 
worthwhile alternative to religion in helping man to overcome his inborn selfishness, 
develop a sense of duty, transform wrong-doings into positive experiences, achieve 
moral redemption and bind his fellow men into a brotherhood without recourse to a 
religious authority. Despite dealing with different issues at different historical moments, 
both writers put their faith in habit, accepting it as a trustworthy alternative in 
combating the major disillusionments in their lives. 
 
This thesis has drawn on the philosophical and scientific discourse of the two 
writers’ own times to explore their shared belief that our memory of the needs of others 
could be enhanced through repeated, habitual practice. With the move from Hume, 
through Hartley, to Lewes, one sees not only an increasing emphasis on education, but 
also a shift in focus towards the physiological process of habit formation and the role 
played by inheritance. This development from Romantic to Victorian science also 
marks the shift in focus from Wordsworth to Eliot. Though the educational function of 
habit was a concern for both writers, Eliot was certainly more anxious than Wordsworth 
about probing the physiological process behind the work of habit. Moreover, she was 
engaged with a much wider range of scientific dialogue than her predecessor, exploring 
the role of inheritance and social medium in habit acquisition in addition to 
Wordsworth’s areas of focus. Her treatment of habit is therefore more comprehensive 
and her vocabulary more scientific. For example, she goes a step further than 
Wordsworth in discussing the role of habit when moral choice has to be made in an 
emergency. When an individual has no time to reflect and can only act upon instinct, the 
accumulative force of the past is best displayed. This force acts by us and for us, but has 
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already been determined through the performance of the same actions on similar 
occasions in the past.    
 
Habit has not only been explored in the light of eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century associationism, but also twentieth-century continental philosophy, specifically 
phenomenology. For Wordsworth as well as Eliot, habit has been shown to be an 
embodied activity. The incorporation of the spatial framework into one’s own body and 
the development of an embodied knowledge of one’s surroundings are used to explain 
the profound attachment of Wordsworth and Eliot’s characters to objects of their daily 
company.   
 
Furthermore, both writers see habit not as a purely individual phenomenon, but 
as a re-enactment of the collective past. In an individual’s deep attachment to his 
habitual objects, customary life, and faithful performance of traditional duties, the 
imprint of his forefathers and the ‘ingrained’, ‘spontaneously actualizing’ memory of 
the community is apparent.2 The persistence of this collective past plays a significant 
role in the moral choice of Wordsworth and Eliot’s characters, whether its impact is 
positive or negative.   
 
This leads to the discussion of the political significance of habit-memory, which, 
in the views of the two writers, works both diachronically and synchronically. 
Diachronically, it cements a community and gives its individuals a sense of anchorage 
and a collective identity. Society, for both Wordsworth and Eliot, is an organic growth 
out of collective memory, shared beliefs, values, and habitual feelings. Political reform 
should therefore be conducted in a gradual way, without damaging the collective roots 
 
2 Pierre Nora, ‘Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire’, trans. by Marc Roudebush, 
Representations, 26 (1989), 7-25 (p. 13; p. 8). 
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of society. Otherwise, chaos will befall individuals. Synchronically, through the 
amelioration of human relations and the removal of the boundary between thick and thin 
relations, habit can help man to achieve universal humanity, a political ideal shared by 
the two writers. It must be noted, however, that Wordsworth’s humanitarianism is that 
of a Christian brotherhood while Eliot’s is secular and deprived of religious 
connotations. In spite of such a difference, both Wordsworth’s concentric circle and 
Eliot’s web of human relations rely heavily on memory for their sustenance. For them, 
either diachronically or synchronically, habit brings an individual beyond the narrow 
scope of the self and into an ever-widening circle.  
 
On the whole, Eliot’s treatment of habit is more nuanced than that of her 
predecessor. Wordsworth acknowledges that habit can be negative as well as positive, 
particularly when he wants to reform his readers’ habits in the Preface to Lyrical 
Ballads and expresses his anxiety that the villagers might yield to the habit of apathy 
without the presence of the beggar in ‘The Old Cumberland Beggar’. However, 
generally speaking, he is more positive about the value of habit in terms of both the 
individual and the community. Eliot, on the other hand, is always alert to the double-
sidedness of habit-memory. She shows that, in terms of the individual, it can mould one 
into either a virtuous person or a villain, while collectively speaking, it can be both a 
source of the feeling of deep-rootedness and an oppressive force, preventing groups of 
people from leading more worthwhile lives. Moreover, in Eliot’s novels generally, the 
interaction between habit-memory and recollective memory in the enhancement of 
moral virtue is more obvious. Guilty recollections, for example, are seen to be the 
starting point of moral reformation.  
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Like any research project, this study cannot cover every aspect of memory in its 
chosen writers. More work, I think, needs to be done to address the issue of nationalism, 
which began to emerge in the eighteenth century, and with which both writers are 
engaged. Particular attention should be given to its relationship with collective memory, 
and how it fits within the framework of universal humanity which both writers advocate. 
Moreover, the role of habit in The Excursion in relation to the maintenance of social 
order and the welfare of the nation is also worthy of further exploration. 
 
In the works of Wordsworth and Eliot, through habit-memory, a memory which 
is hardly perceptible but which is the best means of removing the distance between past 
and present, we see not only the connection between past, present and future, but also 
the binding force between self, community and humanity. 
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